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Rice is one of the most essential staple foods for a large part of the world’s human population and 
has a large influence on human nutrition, the livelihood and food security of several billion people 
living across the globe. Similar to other Asian countries, the rice crop plays an important role in 
Malaysian society as it fosters agricultural activity and is a major source of employment for many 
Malaysian farmers. However, the advent of free trade agreements, including the Asean Free Trade 
Agreement (AFTA) and the WTO accession, pose challenges for the Malaysian rice production as 
the sector must compete with low-cost exporting countries. This outcome implies the need for not 
only structural changes in trade, but also adjustments at the farm level to improve efficiency and 
competitiveness. Further developments in the rice sector will therefore depend on the availability 
of sufficient, relatively low-cost and high-quality rice, or in other words, on the competitiveness 
of rice production.  
 
In line with that, the primary objective of this dissertation is to look into a competitiveness 
assessment of rice production in Malaysia. Furthermore, the work aims to analyze the changes in 
farm level efficiency over time for rice farms in Malaysia and to gain insight into the factors that 
determine the distribution of efficiency and competitiveness. Finally, by establishing the linkage 
between both comparative advantage/competitiveness and technical efficiency, the results of this 
research would then provide us with a foundation for understanding the information, the 
measurements and the characteristics associated with each method and how this link may 
contribute to explaining competitiveness. Overall, this newly accumulated knowledge has the 
potential  to guide the direction of the policy’s effects. 
 
In order to achieve the established goals, the dissertation adopts a new extension to the Policy 
Analysis Matrix approach proposed by Monke and Pearson (1989) using farm level survey data. 
The measurement of competitiveness in agriculture is often based on the average farms or 
aggregate data. If the farms that are summarized in this manner are heterogeneous, inferences 
based on aggregated measure can be misleading. As means of addressing misrepresentative 
information and the pitfalls of using aggregated data, this extension will allow us to take farm 
level heterogeneity into account and study the distributions of the competitiveness scores for each 
rice farm. Subsequently, we conduct an empirical technical efficiency analysis with unobserved 
heterogeneity and employ a recent fixed effect model. The static decomposition of 
competitiveness, which is presented by linking comparative advantage/competitiveness and 
technical efficiency, concludes this PhD dissertation. 
 
The main findings of this dissertation can be summarized in the following points: three out of four 
granary areas have comparative advantages in rice production using the average data; however, 
regional averages can hide considerable variation among farms. Between 2011 and 2014, the 
average SCB ratios were greater than 1, which  indicates that rice production was not competitive 
in MADA granary areas. Despite this observation, many farmers appear to be competitive; more 
than 60% of farms produce rice competitively and these competitive farms account for a 
disproportionately large share of rice production when using disaggregate data. Additionally, in 
the period from 2010 to 2014, many farms showed improvements in the technical efficiency with 
more efficient farms produced disproportionately more rice outputs. Specifically, the mean values 
were around 50-60%, implying many farms were far from the frontier. However, the rice output 
per farm can be increased through the efficient use of the resources. Finally, the results presented 
in this dissertation demonstrate that competitiveness has a positive relationship with the level of 
technical efficiency, thus confirming our perception of the static decomposition. 
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Chapter 1  
Background of study  
1.1 Background and objectives 
Rice is the most economically important staple food crop for a large part of the human 
population, providing more than 3 billion people in Asia with two thirds of their caloric 
intake, and supplying nearly 1.5 billion people in Africa and Latin America with one third of 
their caloric needs (FAO, 1995a). The total rice harvested globally in 2010 equated to 
approximately 154 million hectare (ha). The majority of this amount was harvested in Asia 
(137 million ha or 88% of the rice harvested globally), 31% of which, or about 48 million ha, 
was harvested in Southeast Asia alone (Redfern et al, 2012).  
 
Given the economic predominance of rice and its direct link to global food security, the state 
of the economy in the region in which rice is produced plays a significant role. The World 
Food Summit (1996) succinctly describes food security as “when all people, at all times, have 
physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary 
needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”. In Asia, food security has been 
defined as maintaining stable prices for rice in the major urban markets of each country (The 
Asia Foundation, 2010) in which rice is a major staple food for more than half of the 
population. In South Asia, rice makes up a dominant portion of approximately 70% of the 
population’s diet. This degree of rice consumption is the highest in the world; hence food 
security is essentially a reflection of rice security in this region. Therefore, an effective way to 
promote national level food security is by achieving self-sufficiency in rice production 
(Bishwajit et al, 2013).  
 
When food security is equated with food self-sufficiency, this strategy makes sense since it is 
easier to stabilize domestic food prices using domestic production by stimulating high prices 
than to depend on the world rice market, which has great price volatility. However, this 
approach may significantly increase the spread of poverty as it forces poor consumers to pay 
high prices for rice. As Timmer (2010) argued, if the countries were more open to the rice 
trade, they would be richer not poorer. 
 




At the same time, most governments in Southeast Asia have pursued price stabilization 
mechanisms or provided supports to protect their domestic producers. These mechanisms 
incorporate a vast array of instruments from storage, input subsidies, income supports, floor 
prices and rice distribution programs to trade policies, such as tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions. However, these mechanisms and supports have been subject to intense debate in 
the policy analysis arena since five decades ago (Timmer, 1989). On the one hand, rice prices 
need to be affordable so that poor consumers benefit most from the stable rice prices. In 
contrast, farm prices need to be high enough for the farmers, who often lead precarious lives 
and are net rice sellers, to sustain their incomes. Additionally, rice prices must be high enough 
to provide farmers with adequate incentives to continue investing in rice production. 
However, simultaneously protecting both producers and consumers is very costly (Warr and 
Yusuf, 2014) and has become a politically contentious issue. 
 
Recently, the implementation of the Asian Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Economic Community (AEC) has signified 
a major milestone in the region’s economic integration and free trade status. The region has 
remained ambitious with aims of becoming integrated, competitive, innovative and dynamic 
enough to integrate domestic markets fully into the global economy. In the context of the 
products and crops sectors of Malaysia’s farms particularly rice, this objective leads to 
increased competition with other countries exporting rice at a low-cost. Furthermore, the 
introduction of domestic markets into the global economy creates opportunities for trade 
between ASEAN countries and imposes new conditions on local farms that include 
opportunities to enhance profits, while potentially enhances competitiveness of each farm’s 
production. This implies that not only structural changes to trading practices, but also 
adjustments at the farm level are required to improve each farm’s efficiency and profitability. 
Further developments in the rice sector will, therefore, depend on the availability of sufficient, 
relatively low-cost and high-quality rice, or in other words, on the competitiveness of rice 
production. Consequently, understanding the key factors, the driving forces and the 
limitations of rice production under the dynamics of the global rice market is crucial to 








1.2 Agriculture overview in Malaysia 
Malaysia is located in Southeast Asia and has a total area of 329,758 square kilometers 
(127,320 square miles). It is divided into two similarly sized regions, Peninsular Malaysia and 
East Malaysia (Malaysian Borneo). Peninsular Malaysia is bordered by Thailand in the north, 
Indonesia and Singapore in the south, and the Philippines in the east, while East Malaysia 
borders with Brunei and Indonesia (Kalimantan). The country consists of 13 states, and is 
divided into 2 parts: 11 states are located in Peninsular Malaysia and 2 states are situated on 
the island of Borneo (see map). The Malaysian population is nearly 28 million, while the 
population density was 86 people per square kilometer in 2010 (Department of Statistics 
Malaysia, 2011) 
 
Sixty eight percent of the total population makes up the labor force of the country and 11 
percent of the total labor forces are engaged in agricultural activities. The average 
unemployment rate is 3 percent (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2015). The work force in 
the agricultural sector, however showed a declining trend from 1.28 million employed persons 
in 2000 to 0.93 million in 2010. The annual productivity per worker, on the other hand, 
increased from RM14,450 in 2000 to RM24,730 in 2010 (see Table 1.1), thus accounting for 
the positive growth of the GDP in this sector. The agricultural sector is successful and 
competitive because of the technological advancements to reduce labour requirements and 
increase agricultural worker productivity, on which it still relies today.  
 
The three main key drivers to the Malaysian economy are the service sector, manufacturing 
and agriculture. In 2016, the service sector contributed nearly 54% to the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), followed by manufacturing (23%) and the agricultural sector (9%) 
(Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2016). The GDP growth rate is approximately 4.3 percent 
per annum. In addition, exports grew by 1.9% to reach a value of almost 780 billion Ringgit 
Malaysia (RM) and agricultural commodities and products represented nearly 9 percent of the 
total export value in 2015 (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2016). Palm oil and natural 
rubber are the main agricultural exported items. On the other hand, imports increased by 
RM2.71 billion and the total import share were approximately 686 billion RM in 2015. The 
significant imported agricultural inputs include agriculture chemicals such as pesticides and 
herbicides, animal feed and agricultural tractors and machinery. As a result, the world prices, 
trade and market situation have strongly influenced the Malaysian economy, especially its 
agriculture sector. 





Figure 1.1 Percentage share to GDP at Constant 2010 Price 
Note: Exclude import duties. Source: Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2016 
 
Table 1.1: Employment and Agricultural Productivity, 1985- 2010 
 
Source: Economic Planning Unit, Department of Statistics, Malaysia 
 
The Malaysian agricultural sector can be divided into 3 sub-sectors: industrial crops, food 
crops, and other miscelllaneous crops. The important crops in terms of land use are industrial 
crops such as oil palm, rubber, cocoa and tobacco, which mainly serve the export market 
followed by the food crops such as paddy, coconut, fruits, vegetables and livestocks. The third 
sub-sector includes, sugarcane, cassava, maize and sweet potato which cater both export and 
domestic markets. The agricultural land use has shown significant changes over the period 



















('000) Employment (RM in 1978 prices) ('000) (RM in 1978 prices)
1985 1,796 31.3 6,600 5,737 9,950
1990 1,738 26 8,530 6,685 11,870
1995 1,429 18 11,360 7,937 15,160
2000 1,280 14.1 14,450 9,066 17,460
2005 1,100 10.9 18,450 10,053 22,640
2010 930 8.4 24,730 11,099 29,060
Average Annual Growth Rate (%)
1985-1995 -2.3 5.6 3.3 4.3
199-2010 -2.8 5.3 2.3 4.4
Year




2540 thousand hectares in 1995 to 3637 thousand hectares in 2010. Conversely, the planted 
area for paddy continued to decline to 450 thousand hectares in 2010 compared to 673 
thousand hectares in 1995 as a result of conversion of paddy land for other land uses, 
including urbanisation (Table 1.2). 
 
Interestingly, agricultural value-added grew at 3.0 per cent per annum over 2001-2005 and 5 
per cent per annum over the period 2006-2010. In 2005, agricultural value added was RM21.6 
billion (in 1987 constant prices) or 8.2 % of the GDP and it increased to RM49.7 billion or 
14.2% of the GDP in 2010 (Olaniyi et al. 2013). 
 
Table 1.2: Agricultural land use in Malaysia and average annual growth rate, 1995- 
2010 (in 1000 ha) 
Crops 
Year Average Annual Growth Rate (%) 
1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Industrial crops          
Rubber 1679 1560 1395 1185 -1.5 -2.2 -3.2 -2.3 
Oil palm 2540 3131 3461 3637 4.3 2 1 2.4 
Cocoa 191 164 160 160 -3 -0.5 0 -1.2 
Tobacco 11 9 8 6 -2.4 -3.5 -4.5 -3.5 
Food crops 
    Paddy 673 521 475 450 -5 -1.8 -1.1 -2.6 
Coconut 249 214 193 176 -3 -2 -1.9 -2.3 
Pepper 10 9 9 8 -2 -1.6 -1 -1.5 
Vegetables 42 48 64 86 2.7 5.7 6.2 4.9 
Fruits 258 292 330 373 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Others 99 106 111 130 1.4 0.9 3.1 1.8 
Total 5,751 6,055 6,205 6,211 1 0.5 0 0.5 
Source: Economic Planning Unit, Ministry of Agriculture, Malaysia 
1.2.1  Significant roles of rice in Malaysian economy 
The agricultural sector has played a significant role in the Malaysian economy and has been 
considered as the third engine of growth, after services and manufacturing. In fact, the rice 
sector employs many Malaysians as well as creates food supply, food-sufficiency and income 
for the farmers.  
 
Rice is grown in all states of Malaysia. In terms of land use, rice farming occupies 8 percent 
(465 thousand hectares) of the agricultural land of the country, while other food crops, such as 
coconut, fruits and vegetables share about 10 percent of agricultural land. In 1993, the total 




paddy area which covers both irrigated and non-irrigated was about 600,000 hectares of 
which rice farming occupied about 322,000 hectares or 48 percent of the total irrigated area 
while the remaining areas are rainfed. Of the irrigated areas, 290,000 are found in Peninsular 
Malaysia while the rest are in Borneo (Toriman and Mokhtar, 2012).  
 
In terms of labor force, it is inevitable that rice farming provides a major source of labor 
supply of the agricultural sector. Presently, there are approximately 1 million farmers in 
Malaysia; nearly 26 percent of agricultural households or 320,022 households were 
exclusively paddy farming in 2004 (Ministry of Agriculture, 2009). In addition, more than 20 
percent of the agricultural labor force are working in the rural areas. Rice farming provides 
the main livelihood to these farmers, and the majority of rice farmers are Bumiputera or 
native Malays, who are mostly poor farmers and manual labourers.  
 
Given the economic predominance of rice and its direct link to global food security, rice 
production has a significant role in the region’s economy. In Malaysia, food security 
constitutes three main pillars namely to ensure food availability and consistency of food 
supply, to safeguard accessibility of adequate and nutritious food and to ensure nutrient food 
provides sufficient nutrition (MOA, 2008). At the household level, the concept of food 
security is to ensure enough nutritious food and supply without any obstacles; which means 
households are able and afford to pay for this food. While at the national level, emphasis is on 
the ability of the country to provide adequate and sufficient food in term of domestic 
production. Simultaneously, government involvement in food security is to ensure access to 
sufficient and nutritious food by the households is unrestricted.  
 
Rice is the most economically important staple food crop for a large part of the population, 
providing two thirds of the caloric intake of more than 3 million people in Malaysia. The total 
paddy production was 2465 MT in 2010 while the average yield per hectare was 3.48 tonnes 
in 2010. Rice planted area has shown a stable trend over the period 2000-2010. 
Approximately, 63 percent were cultivated in the main granary areas in 2010. The main rain-
fed areas are located in Borneo while the main irrigated areas are located in the Peninsular 
Malaysia or the central plain. According to the definition of DOA, the major rice planting 
season varies between regions where the main season normally begins from September to 
February,while in the off season, the major rice planting season starts from January to July of 
the following year (Department of Agriculture, 2011). 




Like Japan, Thailand and many other Asian countries, rice farmers and rural communities are 
perceived as preservers of Malaysian cultural values. Instead of commercial reasons like food 
exports and tourism, the cultural values associates with the rice farming help to create strong 
communal bonds, which have been involved in the local beliefs, traditions, ceremonies and 
religious activities. In Japan, agriculture is commonly considered as a way of life and the 
autumn festivals as thanksgiving of good harvest and reunion time where family members 
return to their hometowns to worship their ancestors are still being practiced. Whereas in 
Thailand, an annual important occasion of the Royal Ploughing Ceremony is held in May at 
the Royal Field in front of the Grand Palace in Bangkok (TRFRP, 2006). This ceremony gives 
people, especially rice farmers, the opportunity to collect the rice seeds sowed by ‘Phaya 
Raek Na’ which is believed to bring good luck. In Malaysia, The Gawai Day is celebrated 
every June by the Dayaks (natives of Sarawak state). It is a celebration for giving thanks to 
God for a good harvest.  This is a celebration for tourists as well, where they can partake in 
the unique agricultural atmosphere. (Chuen-Khee, 2009). 
 
 1.2.2 Rice policy in Malaysia  
Rice is a major staple food and it is one of the major calorie providers for many Malaysians. 
Given its economic importance in the society and the country, the government has been 
intervening more in the rice sector than in most others. There are three main obejctives of the 
different rice policies adopted by the government through the decades; i) to ensure food 
security; ii) to raise productivity and income of the farmers and iii) to ensure adequate food 
supply at reasonable costs. The intervention levels through direct or indirect support are 
















Table 1.3 Self-sufficiency level (SSL) of rice in Malaysia 
Master  Plan Period SSL target (%) 
SSL achieved 
(%) 
First Malaysia Plan 1966 - 1970 - 80 
Second Malaysia Plan 1971 - 1975 - 87 
Third Malaysia Plan 1976 - 1980 90 92 
National Agriculture Policy I 1984- 1991 70 75.9 
Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981 - 1985 70 76.5 
Fifth Malaysia Plan 1986 - 1990 70 75 
Sixth Malaysia Plan 1991 - 1995 70 76.3 
National Agriculture Policy II 1992-2010 70 65 
Seventh Malaysia Plan 1995 - 2000 65 71 
National Agriculture Policy III 1998- 2010 65 65 
Eight Malaysia Plan 2001 - 2005 72 71 
Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006 - 2010 90 72 
National Agro-food Policy 2011 - 2020 
70 by 2012 
- 
85 by 2020 
Minister of  Agriculture & 
Agro-based Industry 
  
100 by 2020 - 
Source: MOA, 2012; Fatimah et al, 2010; New Straits Times, 2014 
 
The First Malaysia Plan (1966-1970) was introduced to stimulate the adoption of modern 
farming practices and crop diversification. Considering the uncertainty of imports which were 
highly susceptible to natural disasters as well as uncertainty of imports from major exporting 
countries such as Thailand and China, the objectives of the rice sector during the period were 
to ensure food security and maintain stable supplies to consumers (Arshad et al, 2000). To 
achieve this objective, the government made heavy investments in infrastructure and 
development of new land for agriculture. To assist in the development of the agricultural 
sector, the government had established various agencies including Malaysian Agricultural 
Reserach and Development Institute (MARDI) with full responsibility for paddy production 
research that included, among others, rice breeding, varietal evaluation, agronomic practices 
and soil management, while The Federal Agricultural Marketing Authority (FAMA) was 
established to perform marketing functions especially to regulate the marketing scheme in the 
major granary areas of the Peninsular. 
 
 




However, in the early 70s, rice policy in Malaysia had shifted from focusing exclusively on 
food security, as in the 1960s, to the objectives of self-sufficiency and income distribution 
between producers and consumers. In the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-1980), the goverment 
aimed to achieve the self-sufficiency level of 90 percent. These goals were pursued through 
double cropping on increasing acreage, drainage and irrigation infrastructure expansion, price 
support, and extension services. 
 
Through the years, the self-sufficiency targets were deliberately lowered because of the 
government's decision to diversify and intensify agriculture, particularly the production of 
industrial crops which provide higher earnings than rice. However, in the Third National 
Agriculture Policy (1998-2010), eight granary areas were designated as permanent rice 
growing areas responsible for achieving at least 65 percent self-sufficiency. The Eight 
Malaysia Plan (2001-2005) increased this target to 72 percent, and the Ninth Malaysia Plan 
(2006-2010) increased it further to 90 percent. However, these targets were not met. In 2014, 
the Minister of Agriculture and Agro-based Industry announced that Malaysia is determined 
to achieve its target to end rice imports and be fully self-sufficient by 2020. 
 
In order to ensure that rice supply is sufficient for the nation various measures have been 
taken: subsidies, ranging from a fertilizer subsidy and cash assistance to rice farmers; direct 
intervention of the government in price stabilization; development of irrigation and 
infrastructure; as well as mechanization projects have been introduced. In terms of production 
incentives, the government has implemented a Guaranteed Minimum Price (GMP), paddy 
price subsidy and an input subsidy. This price guarantee is to ensure that the paddy price 
remains above GMP or at least at GMP level. GMP was first introduced in 1949 at the rate of 
248 RM per ton to ensure paddy farmers receive a reasonable minimum farm income. The 
rate was later revised in 2014 to increase to 1,200 RM per ton, partly due to the increase in 
input prices and labor costs.  
Another form of production incentive is the price subsidy. This scheme was introduced in 
1980 at the rate of 165 RM per ton and was then revised and increased to 248.10 RM per ton 
in 1990. The high poverty prevalance among the rural farmers has directed the intervention by 
the government to address the situation and raise farmers’ income to at least above the 
poverty line of 300 RM per month.  
 




Considering the increasing cost of paddy production in the granary areas, the government 
provided input subsidies to the farmers in the form of fertilizer, and chemical inputs. Since 
1974, farmers who owned less than 10 hectares of lands received free fertilizers (240 kg per 
hectare of mixed fertilizer, 80 kg per hectare of organic fertilizer and 150 kg (3 bags) of 
NPK;nitrogen, phosphate and potassium). Along with trying to shield farmers’ income from 
high input costs, the objective of input subsidy is to encourage farmers to use fertilizers 
efficiently according to the recommendation rate proposed by Department of Agriculture or 
Malaysian Agriculture Research and Development Institute (MARDI). In addition, farmers 
also receive a coupon of chemical inputs for purchasing weed and pest controls worth of 200 
RM/ha.  
 
In the mid-1970s, the government had created a specific agency, Padiberas Nasional Berhad 
(BERNAS) as a rice monopoly to regulate the development of the rice industry and rice 
marketing. After being privatized in 1996, BERNAS now controls almost all aspects of rice 
trade, including the normal commercial activities of paddy procurement, rice milling and 
trading as well as non-commercial activities on behalf of the government, namely 
management of the national rice stockpile, reimbursement of paddy subsidy payments and 
procurement of paddy from farmers as the buyer of last resort. To ensure sufficient supply and 
price stabilization especially during emergency of rice shortages, the government introduced a 
rice stockpile scheme in 1949. As a policy, BERNAS was obliged to maintain the national 
stockpile of 292,000 MT, which was intended as a buffer stock during a food crisis and 
sufficient to sustain the population for at least three months.  
 
Figure 1.2: Role of BERNAS  
Source: Vengedasalam et al. (2011) 




Overall, the Malaysian government allocates about 12.5 percent of its annual national budget 
to economic services such as infrastructure, industrial agriculture and rural development, 
where a significant portion goes towards supporting the rice sector (Daño and Samonte, n.d.). 
In 2009, the incentive scheme cost almost half thousand million US dollars (493.3 millions 
USD) of the government revenue. The largest component of government subsidies went to the 
price subsidy (448 millions RM) followed by subsidies of inputs use such as fertilizer (275 
millions RM) and pesticides subsidies (173 million RM).  
Figure 1.3: Subsidies and incentives in the rice sector, 2009  
Source: Department of Agriculture (2010)  
 
Despite of the voluminous incentives provided by the government, the Malaysian rice farms 
have faced unstable farmer income, high costs of production, natural resources and 
environment degradation, which have lead to unsustainable development of this sector. In 
addition, more international and global issues such as international trade agreements and 
regulations lead the farmers and policy makers to adjust and to change strategies for 










  1.2.3 Case study site: MADA granary area 
 
After Independence in 1957, the government made massive public investments, including 
irrigation infrastructure to supplement rainfall of a single crop. By early 1970, the first phase 
of rice double cropping was successfully launched through the implementation of a 
development project for both water resources and irrigation as well as drainage infrastructures 
(which received irrigation water from the dam for the first time). This project which is known 
as Muda Irrigation Project has allowed irrigating the rice fields during the dry season and 
supplementing the supply of water for crop requirements during the end of the wet season 
(less rainfall). The project has resulted in a massive increase in the cropping intensity of 
approximately 190% (Chan and Cho, 2012). Increased investment in irrigation and drainage 
facilities, together with improved farm road networks and other infrastructures had been 
instrumental in changing the scenario of rice production in Malaysia.  
 
The success of rice double cropping has been furthered through the development of irrigation 
infrastructures to eight permanent designated granary areas. Granary Areas are the irrigated 
areas that refer to major irrigation schemes (areas greater than 4,000 hectares) and recognized 
by the Government in the National Agricultural Policy as the main paddy producing areas 
(Department of Agriculture, 2014). There are eight granary areas in Malaysia, namely Muda 
Agricultural Development Authority (MADA), Kemubu Agricultural Development Authority 
(KADA), Kemasin Semerak Integrated Agricultural Development Area (IADA Kemasin- 
Semerak), Kerian-Sg. Manik Integrated Agricultural Development Area (IADA KSM), Barat 
Laut Selangor Integrated Agricultural Development Area (IADA BLS), Pulau Pinang 
Integrated Agricultural Development Area (IADA P. Pinang), Seberang Perak Integrated 
Agricultural Development Area (IADA Seberang Perak), and Northern Terengganu 
Integrated Agricultural Development Area (IADA KETARA)  (refer to Figure 1.4). These 
eight granaries have been responsible for scaling up and increasing productivity in the rice 
farming as well as contributing to at least 65% of total rice production in the country. 
 
This study was performed in the MADA granary area in Kedah, located in northern Malaysia 
(Figure 2). MADA is located in the Muda Irrigation Scheme that covers about 130,282 ha of 
which about 108,581 ha or 84% of the total irrigated areas are in the north-west of Kedah 
state and 21,701 ha (19%) are located in the southern part of Perlis State. MADA is the 
largest granary area in Malaysia and contributed 51% of total granary production in 2013. It 




consistently generates 37% of Malaysia’s total annual rice production on 33% of the 
country’s rice area.  
The average temperature in MADA was 27.4°C in 2008 with an average maximum 
temperature of 33°C, and average minimum of 22° (Afroz and Ba, n.d.). The optimum 
temperature of 34°C allows for the high-yielding rice cultivars of MR219, MR220 and 
MR232 to be grown in this granary area. Annual rainfall averages over 2,500mm; this far 
exceeds the global annual average of 1,050mm (Chan and Cho 2012). Rainfall is inextricably 
linked to the seasonal monsoons; the southwest monsoon and the northeast monsoon 
seasons.The northeast monsoons,which are usually established in early May and end in 
September, provide a wet season  in Kedah, particularly for the MADA granary area in which 
rice grows. The northeast monsoon of early November until late March provides a dry season 
that allows the rice fields to dry out and rice to ripen and be harvested. During this dry season, 
the Muda Irrigation Scheme allows rice fields to be flooded so as to enable double cropping 
of rice in a more intensive fashion.  
 
Since its establishment in 1970, MADA has been given the responsibility to undertake any 
agricultural development in the Muda area in Kedah and Perlis. The main function of MADA 
is to improve the social economics and well-being of the farmers, especially the rural 
population, and to implement efficient and effective use of irrigation and water resources for 

















Figure 1.4: Location of MADA granary area in Northern Malaysia (Source: Department 








1.3 Objectives and research questions 
In correspondence to the previously mentioned problems, the overall objective of this study is 
to empirically analyze the current effects of policies, and to investigate the level and 
composition of policy supports and the actual market structure inherent to economic 
incentives in Malaysia’s rice sector.  In particular, this study will serve four main purposes: 
  
First, it will present an analysis of the comparative advantages or competitiveness of rice 
production under different scenarios of existing policies and economic reforms. 
  
Second, it will contribute to the understanding of the forces that drive the competitiveness of 
rice production in Malaysia.  
 
Third, it will investigate the technical efficiency among the rice farms in Malaysia and 
determine the factors that influence it. 
 
Fourth, by establishing the linkage between both competitiveness and efficiency, the results 
of this research will enable the comprehension of this information, the measurements and the 
characteristics associated with each method and how these details may contribute to 
explaining competitiveness. 
 
The central research questions addressed in this dissertation are as follows:  
i) Is rice sufficiently profitable privately to provide farmers with the incentive to 
maintain or expand output? 
ii)  Is rice production in Malaysia socially profitable, and hence, should Malaysia 
endeavor for self-sufficiency?  
iii) Is rice production in Malaysia competitive?  
iv) What are the factors that influence competitiveness at the individual farm level?  
v) Will a farm that becomes more efficient become competitive as a result?  
vi) Are rice farms in Malaysia technically efficient?  
vii) Does efficiency enhance competitiveness?  
viii) Is there a positive correlation between a farm’s comparative/competitive advantage 
and efficiency? 
ix) How are these two types of analysis (competitiveness and efficiency) related? 
 




1.4 Overview and outline of the chapters 
To comprehend the remainder of this work, it is essential to have a clear understanding of 
‘competitiveness’. This section aims to introduce further insights on the term’s conceptual 
foundation as means of achieving clarity for the following chapters. 
 
Most of the questions posed by the relevant economic literature revolve around how to 
allocate resources in order to ensure social welfare, including the establishment of high living 
standards and high employment rates. Researchers often rely on the concept of 
competitiveness as the basis of analysis when they are interested in determining which sector 
contributes the most to the nation’s economic growth. ‘Competitiveness’ has a broad meaning 
that has yet to gain universal definition acceptance in economics (Sharples, 1990). The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) succinctly describes 
competitiveness as “the ability of companies, industries, regions, nations and supranational 
regions to generate, while being and remaining exposed to international competition, a 
relatively high factor of income and factor employment levels on a sustainable basis” 
(Hatzichronologou, 1996). The European Commission (2001) defines competitiveness as "the 
ability of an economy to provide its population with high and rising standards of living and 
high rates of employment on a sustainable basis”. Others relate this meaning to profitability. 
Agriculture Canada (1991) defines competitiveness as “the ability to gain profits and 
maintain market share”. 
 
Given the broad concept and ambiguity present in the literature, competitiveness is a relative 
measure. Thus, depending on the purpose of the study, the level of analysis, and the 
commodity in question, several methodologies for estimating competitiveness have been 
developed (see more in Hatzichronoglou, 1996; Latruffe, 2010; von Cramon-Taubadel and 
Nivyevskyi, 2008 etc.). Latruffe (2010) classifies measurement into two disciplines: 1) the 
neoclassical economies that place emphasis on trade and measure competitiveness with 
comparative advantages, exchange rates and export or import indices and; 2) the strategic 
management that focuses on the firm’s structure and strategy, as well as measures the firm’s 
competitiveness based on various cost indicators, including productivity and efficiency. These 
two measurements of competitiveness are presented in the remaining chapters, which can be 
categorized into the first stream of the literature on the comparative advantage/ 
competitiveness described by Monke and Pearson (1989), while the second stream of 
literature mainly focuses on efficiency.  




Within the context of this work, ‘comparative/competitive advantage’ is defined as a 
country’s ability to produce a good or service at a lower cost than other countries can. 
Specifically, this dissertation, whether qualitative or quantitative in nature, serves two 
fundamental tasks: First, it explores the ability of Malaysian rice farms to gain private and 
social profits under the current policy scenario and takes into consideration potential external 
factors that contribute to or hinder this competitiveness; Second, it measures the consequences 
of public intervention, as well as assesses the consequences of these interventions with respect 
to the national policy objectives or development of rice production. This information on 
competitiveness and the factors that influence it is crucial for local policymakers to be 
conscious of in order to design targeted and efficient policies for agricultural practices.  
 
Among the measures surveyed, the Domestic Resource Cost or DRC is regarded as the true 
measure of comparative advantage (Singgel, 2006). The DRC compares the domestic 
resources cost at social prices to the value added measured at social prices
1
. The use of the 
social price ensures that the DRC measures the true comparative advantage that can be 
derived from the Ricardian framework.  
 
However, Masters and Winter-Nelson (1995) and Singgel (2006) have demonstrated that the 
DRC understates the competitiveness of activities relying on a high level of non-tradable 
inputs. The bias is more pronounced if the activities include very divergent combinations of 
traded and non-traded inputs. Consequently, Masters and Winter-Nelson (1995) proposed the 
Social Cost Benefit (SCB), which is analogous to the unit cost ration (UCs) proposed by 
Singgel (2006). SCB compares total domestic costs at social prices to the total outputs 
measured at social prices. This concept is regularly cited in economic literature and is also an 
indicator of comparative advantage, which can be calculated using the Policy Analysis Matrix 
(PAM) framework (Monke and Pearson, 1989). Since SCB does not include the calculation of 
the value added in the critical dimension, it is not affected by the classifications of tradable or 
non-tradable costs. 
 
The second stream of literature is related to efficiency, which is often cited as an indicator of 
competitiveness. Efficiency can be defined as a farm’s ability to use existing technology in 
                                                 
1
 The development of the DRC ratio draws back to Bruno (1965)  as a project appraisal indicator to evaluate the 
benefits of new activities. 
 




the best way (Latruffe, 2010). The concept consists of three components: scale efficiency 
(whether the firm operates at an optimal or sub-optimal rate), technical efficiency (relative to 
the best possible output in the industry) and allocative efficiency (a farm’s ability to use 
inputs in optimal proportions given their respective prices). Further information on this can be 
found in Farrell (1957). 
 
Technical efficiency offers the opportunity to measure the degree to which a farmer produces 
maximum potential output, information that is obtainable from a given set of inputs and a 
specific technology (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). More importantly, it allows for 
measuring the shortfall of the observed output to the maximum feasible output, as well as the 
possible causes of this shortfall. This shortfall is known as technical inefficiency and is 
attributed to a farm’s managerial inefficiency, which refers to aspects that are not under the 
control of the producers, such as the farmer’s age or managerial experience.  
 
Technical efficiency can be estimated using either a parametric approach, such as the 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), or a non-parametric approach, for example, the Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Through linear programming, DEA provides a simple way to 
estimate technical efficiency by conducting a benchmarking assessment of the most efficient 
farms in the frontier. However, the major drawback of DEA is that all deviations from the 
production frontier are attributed to technical inefficiencies, and any consideration of random 
events is ignored (Coelli et al., 2005). On the other hand, SFA distinguishes statistical noise 
from inefficiency, which is a pragmatic assumption for a real world application. 
 
This dissertation presents four papers on the topic of the competitiveness and efficiency of the 
rice farms in Malaysia. A brief description of the four core papers is detailed as below: 
 
Paper 1 (Chapter 2): 'Assessing Competitiveness of Rice Production in Malaysia using the 
Policy Analysis Matrix'. In this paper, we perform an analysis of comparative advantage, or 
an aggregate competitiveness of the rice production, using the Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) 
as the core analytical approach. PAM, as developed by Monke and Pearson (1989), is a 
straight-forward policy induced transfer analysis that allows policymakers to analyze the 
impact of current policies and market structures on commodities in question by comparing the 
private and social structures of incentives to producers. The first perspectives on private 
incentives are the incentives that motivate the behavior of the individuals actively involved in 




the rice chain business, including the farmers, the processors, the millers and the wholesalers 
whose questions or aims are primarily profit and income oriented. The second perspectives on 
the social incentives refer to the nation as a whole and thus the questions focus on economic 
growth, social wellbeing, or the international comparative advantage of the commodity. In the 
context of rice production in Malaysia, these incentives aim to enhance rice production levels, 
secure self-sufficiency by 2020 and maintain food security. Utilizing a PAM model, this study 
investigated whether the government’s interventions make economic sense to be fully self-
efficient. In order to arrive at this conclusion, the competitiveness of Malaysia’s rice 
production, particularly in the four granary areas, was analyzed. 
 
In the PAM framework, there are several indicators that can be calculated to measure the 
protection rate, including the Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPC), the Effective Protection 
Coefficient (EPC), the Domestic Resources Cost (DRC), and the Social Cost Benefit (SCB). 
These protection rates were used throughout this study to measure comparative advantages. 
Among these indicators, the DRC indicator is widely employed as a measure of 
competitiveness. The DRC compares the cost of domestic resources measured at social prices 
to value added measured in social prices. 0 < DRC < 1 indicates comparative advantage (the 
social opportunity cost of domestic resources used is smaller than the corresponding social 
value added). The opposite is true for the DRC > 1.  
 
The empirical results show that three out of four granary areas have comparative advantages 
in the production of rice with Domestic Resource Cost values or DRCs of less than 1. The 
farms located in these areas produce a net surplus for the country. In the other region, rice 
farming appears to be marginally competitive and imparts relatively low social profits. As one 
might expect, such average or representative data might suffer from several significant 
problems. As described by von Cramon Taubadel and Nivyevskyi (2008; 2009), the results 
based on aggregated data most certainly conceal relevant variations and the underlying 
distribution of competitiveness across a set of heterogeneous producers. In other words, the 
results presented in this paper aggregate very efficient farms that are more competitive than 
average with less efficient farms that are less competitive than average. This can have great, 
far-reaching implications for policy conclusions based on the PAM results. Therefore, only 
cautious conclusions based on average DRCs have been made in this paper and further 




analyses of DRC distributions are required to determine which factors influence a farm’s 
competitiveness. 
Paper 2 (Chapter 3): ‘Determinants of Rice Farming Competitiveness in Malaysia: An 
Extension of the Policy Analysis Matrix’. In consideration of the disadvantage of using 
aggregated data, as outlined in the first paper, and in light of the aforementioned aspects of 
measuring a farm’s competitiveness, this paper provides a disaggregated analysis that allowed 
us to construct the distributions of SCB scores for rice production and individual rice farms. 
By considering the distribution of competitiveness, we therefore avoid the shortcomings of 
working with average or aggregated data. These shortcomings arise since results based on 
average data ignore the facts that farms are heterogeneous with very few farms might actually 
resemble the average.  
 
Since DRC understates the competitiveness of activities relying on a high level of non-
tradable inputs, therefore the Social Cost Benefit Ratio (SCB) indicator is employed in this 
paper as a measure of competitiveness. SCB compares total costs at social prices to the social 
value of producing that unit of output in question. The SCB ratio is always greater than 0, and 
a SCB greater than 1 indicates that production is uncompetitive, while a SCB ratio of less 
than 1 indicates that total input costs are less than revenue and that production is competitive. 
SCB distributions are generated using farm-level data provided by the Muda Agricultural 
Development Authority (MADA). This dataset is a balanced panel of 6750 rice farms over the 
period 2010- 2014. For each rice farm, it was possible to generate information on 
disaggregated input use and output of the rice production. The conversion from private to 
social prices and costs was based on the available sources of data, as well as interviews with 
the traders and government-related agencies. 
 
The results demonstrate that many Malaysian rice farms were able to produce rice 
competitively from 2010 until 2013, but not in 2014. For example, in 2010, 70% of all farms 
that produced rice did so competitively. Corresponding shares for rice in 2011 until 2014 
were 73%, 61%, 62% and 48% respectively, which point to a sizeable competitive core. 
These competitive farms account for a disproportionately large share of total rice output; the 
73% of the rice producing farms that were competitive in 2011, for example, accounted for 
almost 90% of total rice production in that year. This suggests that competitive rice 
production takes place mainly on a large scale in Malaysia. 
 




However, as one might expect, several issues impede the aggregated data on representative 
farms; the consideration of average SCBs alone conceal important variations among the 
farms. For example, in 2013, the average ton of paddy was produced at a SCB of 1.02, i.e. not 
competitive. This result obscures the fact that more than half of the farms (62%) in this region 
were competitive, and that these competitive farms together accounted for about 83% of the 
total rice production. Therefore, the analysis conveys there is substantial variation in the 
competitiveness of farms producing rice in the MADA granary area. This highlights the major 
pitfall of grounding policy based on the average data and the main advantage of using the 
distribution analysis as presented in this paper. 
 
In the second stage of analysis, we identified factors that explain this variation and that could 
be used to improve the competitiveness of individual farms by essentially focusing on the 
determinants of rice competitiveness in Malaysia. In particular we looked at the impact of the 
farm’s size, its distance from the milling factories, the farmer’s access to credit, off-farm 
income, landownership, cost of hired labor, farmers’ organization and subsidies on 
competitiveness. The analysis draws specific attention to the impact of input and output 
subsidies on farm-level performance. Subsidies are of considerable interest to policy makers 
in Malaysia considering the WTO commitments to the reduction of domestic support.  
 
The empirical analysis in the paper employs farm-level survey data on input use, output, farm 
characteristics and subsidies from 2010 to 2014. We used the System Generalized Methods of 
Moments (SGMM) estimator. The SGMM includes dynamics in the estimation of farm 
competitiveness. That is, we could use previous farm competitiveness or the SCB ratio as a 
regressor and control for potential endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity and persistency of 
the series. In this case, the SCB was advantageous because it allowed us to calculate the social 
profits without government intervention or subsidies.  
 
Our results indicate that participation in the farmers’ organization, the farmer’s gender and the 
total farm size are the major determinants of rice competitiveness, while the farm’s distance 
from the rice mills, off-farm income and the cost of hired labor are the main constraints that 
reduce competitiveness. Finally, our estimates revealed that there are no significant 
differences between types of policies (input subsidies and bonuses) and competitiveness. 
 




Paper 3 (Chapter 4): ‘Estimating Technical Efficiency and Unobserved Heterogeneity on 
Rice Farms in Malaysia’. In this paper, we performed an analysis of the farm’s performance 
and its determinants in Malaysian rice farming. In contrast to the second paper introduced 
above, here we measured performance using efficiency analysis methods. Increasing resource 
use efficiency has become a critical issue on the policy agenda for enhancing food 
productivity and food security in Malaysia. Heterogeneous environmental and biophysical 
characteristics, such as soil condition, rainfall or droughts, as well as managerial 
characteristics, may influence the input and output of production processes. When such 
differences are observed and captured by proxies, they can be incorporated into the model so 
that measured technical efficiency can be determined by these factors.  However, when such 
heterogeneity is neglected or omitted, it leads to biased estimations of the parameters 
concerning the production frontier and it could induce overstatement of the farm’s technical 
inefficiency. The framework provided in this paper will, therefore, focus on the cases in 
which managerial characteristics and environmental conditions are not observed, but are 
assumed to be constant or different for each rice farm. This is crucial considering the panel 
data collections provided by developing countries are significantly costlier, and, 
consequently, a long tradition of statistical collection may not exist. This issue is particularly 
relevant when the data exhibits a missing variable problem where firm heterogeneity is not 
accounted for in the model due to aggregation or a lack of information.  
 
In view of this lack of information, we applied a Stochastic Frontier model of Chen et al. 
(2014) that allowed us to distinguish technical inefficiency from individual fixed effects. The 
advantage of this model specification is that it allows for unmeasured characteristics and the 
estimation is free of incidental parameters. 
 
The results imply that roughly 60% of the rice farms experienced improvements in technical 
efficiency with more efficient farms produce disproportionately more outputs over the period 
2010-2014. However, the efficiency fluctuated over this period; mean efficiency was 61% in 
2010, decreased in 2011, and increased steadily for the next two years before it declined again 
in 2014. A high standard deviation throughout the years is indicative of the large degree of 
heterogeneity within the rice production system, which means that some farms improved, 
while some farms did not. The low mean values of TEC further revealing that the frontier is 
shifting inward and some farms are essentially moving farther from the frontier. However, the 
potential for increasing individual farm output varies considerably since many farms became 




much better while others became much worse. Government support, such as input and output 
subsidies, availability of credit facilities and off-farm activities, are identified as important 
factors causing variations in the level of technical efficiency among rice farmers. This 
suggests that a serious policy recommendation that facilitates farmers’ accessibility to credit, 
capital, land and other inputs, and improved access to and distribution of input subsidies 
especially for small farms, must be carefully designed and well-targeted.  
 
Paper 4 (Chapter 5): ‘A Note on Farm Competitiveness and Efficiency'. This paper 
concludes this PhD dissertation by linking the two strands of analysis on competitiveness 
measurements. The first strand focuses on the analysis of comparative advantages or 
competitiveness while the second strand of literature focuses on efficiency where technical 
efficiency analysis is the main interest. For the purpose of this paper, we developed a simple 
model that relates competitiveness and technical efficiency and proposed a PCB criterion 
decomposition that formally relates improvements in efficiency to improvements in PCB 
ratio. 
 
In particular, we demonstrated that efficiency enhances a farm’s competitiveness, thus 
supporting the common perception of a connection between efficiency and competitiveness. 
While comparative advantage and efficiency have been long-standing measurements of 
competitiveness, both analyses used for this research required different data, expertise, 
computation, framework and calculation. Therefore, to help us clearly define competitiveness 
and guide the direction of the policy’s effects, we briefly contrast these two largely 
independent methods. Establishing the linkage will help policy makers and others make better 
use of one or the other measure if they knew how it relates to the other. 
 
PAM has many disadvantages including the common perception on the static nature due to its 
limitation of the Leontief fixed input-output coefficients which do not take into account the 
farmer’s behavior or reaction to the changes in domestic prices as well as the difficulty in 
estimating social prices. However, the advantages of PAM go beyond its pure analytic nature 
in terms of policy analysis. Due to its intuitively comprehensive concept, communicability 
and easiness, PAM results can serve as an appropriate tool for delivering the information 
needs of politicians and officials interested in evaluating the impact of policies. It is very 
intuitive and non-technical; even anybody who can do as simple gross margin calculation can 
understand the PAM. In contrast, a competent empirical application of efficiency approach 




(i.e SFA) requires a clear understanding of both the production economics and the 
econometric theory behind the specified model along with adequate programming skills, 
which can often prove to be a difficult task and challenging. Furthermore, the results of 
efficiency analysis is quite complex and hardly being applied especially a more sophisticated 
analysis such as profit function or distance function approach, which makes it relatively 
difficult to explain particularly for the policy-makers dialog or ministry discussions. In some 
cases, there might be almost better to use PAM rather than a more sophisticated SFA model 
as it is easier to communicate, carry out and more intuitive. However, if both methods 
produce a fairly similar result, it is therefore easier to use PAM method. If so, then it leads to 
the question; what additional information that we get in return for complexity of SFA 
estimation? To this end, by linking these two methods, the results will provide us with 
additional information on understanding competitiveness and how these two approaches are 
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Chapter 2  
Assessing Competitiveness of Malaysian Rice Production 
Using the Policy Analysis Matrix 
 
In recent years, the Malaysian rice sector has experienced structural changes to increase its 
competitiveness within a dynamic environment that is influenced by political, technical, 
economic and international trade challenges. Malaysia’s high dependency on food imports 
makes the country vulnerable to international market shocks as well as policy disruptions in 
major rice exporting countries. Using a Policy Analysis Matrix, this paper examines whether 
Malaysia would have a comparative advantage in rice production under different scenarios of 
existing policies and economic reforms. The empirical results show that three out of four 
granary areas have comparative advantages in the production of rice with Domestic Resource 
Cost values or DRCs of less than one. The farms located in these areas produce a net surplus 
for the country. In the other region, rice farming appears to be marginally competitive and 
imparts relatively low social profits. To fully understand the impact of these farms, they must 
be identified and studied by further research using disaggregated data. This finding suggests 
that policy should focus on encouraging structural changes capable of enabling the local 
farms to grow enough to generate a sufficient income from social profits and thus improving 















Rice is one of the most important staple foods for a large part of the world’s human 
population and has a large influence on human nutrition, the livelihood and food security of 
several billion people across the globe. In Asia alone, rice provides about 60 to 70% of the 
average inhabitant’s daily calorie intake and contributes to 50 to 55% of the average protein 
consumption (Bishwajit et al. 2013). The total rice harvested globally in 2010 equated to 
approximately 154 million hectare. The majority of this amount was harvested in Asia (137 
million ha or 88% of the rice harvested global) of which about 48 million ha or 31% of the 
global rice total was harvested in Southeast Asia (Redfern et al, 2012). Given the economic 
predominance of rice and its direct link to global food security, rice production places a 
significant role on the region’s economy. 
 
Similar to other Asian countries, the rice crop plays an important role in Malaysian society as 
it fosters agricultural activity and contributes to the nourishment of a rising population. This 
sector is an important source of employment and constitutes as a significant pillar of the 
Malaysian agricultural production. However, its contribution to the agricultural economy is 
relatively small compared to industrial export crops, such as palm oil and rubber. The rice 
sector’s contribution to the agricultural GDP was only 4 percent of the sector’s total value in 
2010. In 1995, rice farms occupied a mere 6.9 percent of the total agricultural land. In 2005 
this share increased slightly to an estimated 9.7 percent. This outcome was partly due to the 
expansion of rice production in new regions. Industrial export crops, such as rubber and palm 
oil, dominated the agricultural sector and combined accounted for 77% of the country’s total 
agricultural land use in 2010 (Perangkaan, Perancangan and Pertanian, 2013).  
 
Malaysia’s rice production has fluctuated over the last two decades. However, production has 
exceeded the long-term trend in recent years (2006- 2013, see Figure 2.1). High yielding 
varieties and generally favorable growing conditions (Rittgers and Wahab, 2014) have 
resulted; production area and yields have additionally increased above previous trends. The 
harvested area increased from 660,000 ha in 2005 to 690,000 ha in 2013. With higher 
productivity levels leading to an increase in yields, an increasing trend in rice production has 
been recorded during this period. 
 
However, the country’s rice yield is still below the world average and the levels of 
productivity vary in the country’s major producing states. In 2011, the government launched 
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the National Agro-Food Policy (2012- 2020) in tandem to increase rice production. A total of 
RM 19.6 million (US $6.5 million) was spent in 2012 in order to improve paddy yields and 
irrigation infrastructure by introducing high yielding rice varieties. Through these measures, 
the government hopes to enhance rice yields to 4 tons per hectare, compared to the current 2.5 
tons per hectare (Cottrell and Hoh, 2011). As part of the policy’s goal to boost production, a 
new planted area was identified in East Malaysia and planted with high yielding paddy. The 
aim is to plant paddies in an additional area of 5,100 hectares by the year 2020. Apart from 
improving basic infrastructure, the Malaysian government is also promoting a System of Rice 
Intensification (SRI) technology in some rice growing states. SRI requires less water and 
chemical fertilizer to enhance rice productivity under rain fed conditions.  These efforts and 
incentives could explain the recent productivity gains experienced in the country’s rice 
growing states. 
 
Figure 2.1: Rice Production, Consumption, Yield and Harvested Area in Malaysia 
(1980- 2013) (Source: FAOSTAT, 2014) 
The consumption of rice has increased consistently since the 1980s and had nearly doubled by 
2010. It was further predicted to increase slightly in 2014/2015 in accordance with population 
growth and the increasing number of tourists and immigrant workers coming to Malaysia 
(Rittgers & Wahab, 2014). Rice is considered a daily staple food and Malaysians consume 
between 2.6 million to 2.8 million tons of rice annually. However, the current production is 
not able to meet the growing demand since Malaysia only produces 70% of its total rice 




needs. The other 30% is imported from suppliers such as Thailand, Vietnam and Pakistan. 
Clearly, as the population increases and rice consumption grows, the gap between demand 
and the supply of rice will continue to widen. Malaysia’s lack of self-sufficiency in rice 
production results in heavy dependence on rice imports, which cost the country millions of 
Malaysia Ringgit annually and increasing Malaysia’s trade deficit. 
A series of dramatic changes in the rice scenario have occurred globally, which have been 
precipitated by a hike in the price of petroleum and the unfolding of world food prices, 
coupled with the rising price the tripling of Thai rice price and other major exporting 
countries in 2008 (Jamora & Von Cramon-Taubadel, 2012; Rosegrant et al, 2002). The 2008 
food crisis led to an increase in input costs and reduced profits. While the input costs place 
further financial pressure on farmers, they continue to struggle to maximize profits and make 
end meets. Like in any other developing countries, Malaysia being a net importer of rice was 
caught in the tension of the food crisis (Tey and Radam, 2011; Timmer, 2007). 
By definition, the concept of food security entails a great emphasis on providing adequate 
amounts of food in the context of food production (the primary interest at the national level), 
while simultaneously ensuring that affordable and nutritious food is easily accessible (the 
primary interest at the household and individual level) (FAO, n.d.). In response to increased 
efforts to achieve food security, new initiatives have been enacted to ensure citizens have 
access to sufficient food supplies. Malaysia has more than 100,000 farmers who depend 
solely on rice production and their employment in the rice industry to live above the poverty 
level (M.d Wahid et al,  2008). Thus, robust planning and a coherent commitment from all 
parties are crucial for establishing food security and effectively addressing poverty. 
This has prompted Malaysian authorities to readdress the agriculture industry and structurally 
adjust the local rice policy in order to increase production and become 100% self-sufficient. 
Achieving self-sufficiency in rice production is thus an effective way to promote national 
level food security (Bishwajit et al, 2013). The primary aim of the policy is to increase 
domestic paddy production by improving yields through the utilization of optimal inputs, new 
technology and improved farm management. The policy also includes incentives for paddy 
production, such as price support and a yield increase incentive (Mailena et al, 2014)). In the 
Third National Agriculture Policy (1998-2010), eight granary areas were designated as 
permanent rice growing areas responsible for achieving at least 65% self-sufficiency. The 
Eight Malaysia Plan (2001-2005) increased this target to 72 percent, and the Ninth Malaysia 




Plan (2006-2010) increased it further to a 90%. Unfortunately, these targets were not met. 
Correspondingly, the Minister of Agriculture and the Agro-based Industry announced that 
Malaysia is determined to achieve its target to end rice imports and become entirely self-
sufficient by 2020 (New Straits Times, 2014). 
Against this background, several pertinent questions can be raised: Is rice sufficiently 
profitable privately to provide farmers with the incentive to maintain or expand output? Is rice 
production in Malaysia socially profitable, and hence should Malaysia endeavor for self-
sufficiency? Answers to these questions are essential in order to evaluate the current policy 
environment. If Malaysia is not adequately competitive in rice production, then the 
government’s plan to become self-sufficient by 2020 will impose costs on the rest of the 
economy. This might be politically desirable, but if rice is not competitive, then Malaysia 
would be better off putting its agricultural resources to other uses where they generate higher 
returns, and using these proceeds to import rice instead. Therefore, a comparative advantage 
assessment of rice production is required to address the issue of rice’s self-sufficiency in the 
country and to shed light on these questions. 
 
2.2 Policy measures in the rice industry 
Malaysia is one of the most liberalized trading nations with low tariffs on the majority of 
commodities and products (Tengku Mohd Ariff and Ariffin, 1999). The concept of low tariffs 
as an agricultural protection and as a national security measure is intended to: maintain food 
security and to make it the food available to all consumers at low prices, improve terms of 
trade, provide a source of government revenue, protect domestic programs, balance trade 
deficit, enhance national health standards, improve national safety and protect the local 
environment.  
 
Since rice is considered a strategically important commodity, however, the Malaysian 
government intervenes more on the rice market than in most others. Policy measures for rice 
include: a monopoly on imports, controlled prices for milling, wholesale and retail rice, a 
fertilizer subsidy, price support, provision of drainage and irrigation facilities, spurring 
innovation, and public investments in research and development (R&D) support. 
 
 




The Malaysian government has been intervening in the rice industry since the country’s 
independence in 1957. Since then, three main goals of rice policy have changed in relative 
importance over time. The transition from colonial to post independence government resulted 
in a shift of rice policy towards achieving self-sufficiency, as a strategy to save on the rapidly 
rising food imports and reduce the country’s dependency on essential food supplies coming 
from overseas. Hence, the goal of achieving independence from food imports by 1963 was 
adopted by the government (Rudner, 1975). For rice specifically, 65 percent self-sufficiency 
was targeted in order to ensure rice’s availability, especially during a food crisis. Beyond 
these 65%, the government argued that it is cheaper to import rice from the world market so 
as to release arable land to more lucrative and profitable industrial crops that yield high-value 
products and provide more export earnings. 
 
In the 1960s, the government initiated several land development programs, notably related to 
irrigation and drainage works necessary for double cropping. The Muda Irrigation Scheme in 
Kedah, the country’s largest rice growing state is an example of these programs (Rudner, 
1975). Another prominent intervention was the provision of a fertilizer subsidy scheme, 
which began in the late 1950s.  This scheme has remained active over the decades and the 
continuous increase in global fertilizer prices prompted a more comprehensive fertilizer 
subsidy program in 2008, which aimed to expand support to paddy producers. The 2008 
scheme included the implementation of additional fertilizer, pesticides, lime and yield 
increase incentives, and cost $493.3 million US dollars (Department of Agriculture, 2010). Of 
the total costs, more than 525 million RM ($154.4) were allocated to the fertilizer subsidy 
scheme to benefit the farmers who owned less than 10 hectares of land. As a result of the 
scheme, farmers received free fertilizers: 240 kg per hectare of mixed fertilizer, 80 kg per 
hectare of organic fertilizer and 150 kg (3 bags) of NPK (nitrogen, phosphate and potassium).  
 
Middlemen have always played a dominant role in the marketing, milling and purchasing 
activities of Malaysia’s rice market. Consequently, in the mid-1970s, the government created 
a specific agency called Padiberas Nasional Berhad (BERNAS) to serve as a rice monopoly. 
The agency’s purpose was to regulate the development of the rice industry and rice 
marketing. After being privatized in 1996, BERNAS controlled nearly every aspect of the rice 
trade, including the normal commercial activities of paddy procurement, rice milling and 
trading, as well as non-commercial activities on behalf of the government. Such activities 
conducted for the government’s sake involved namely the management of the national rice 




stockpile, reimbursement of paddy subsidy payments and the procurement of paddy from 
farmers as the buyer of last resort (Tengku Mohd Ariff and Ariffin, 1999). As a consequence 
of rice being used as a buffer stock to ensure sufficient supply and price stabilization, 
BERNAS was obliged to maintain the national stockpile of 92,000 metric tons of rice in 1994. 
A summary of subsidies and major incentives with the respective allocations in the rice sector 
is presented in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1: Subsidies and incentives in the rice sector in 2008 
Types of subsidies Descriptions Allocations (RM mil.) 
Federal Government paddy 
fertilizer subsidy scheme 
-RM240 kg/ hectare mixed fertilizer (12 bags @ 
20kg/bag) 




Price Subsidy Scheme RM248.10/MT 448 
 
Paddy production incentive RM140/ha/season 
Ploughing expenses at a maximum of RM100 
 
95 
Additional fertilizer NPK 3 bag @ 50kg each bag/hectare 
 
250 
Pesticide Control Subsidy RM200/ha/season 
 
173 
Lime Application RM850/ha  46 
Rice Millers Subsidy Peninsular Malaysia; RM750/Mt 
Sabah & Sarawak: RM600/Mt 
(to encourage domestic millers to produce ST15 
(Peninsular) and SS15 (Sabah & Sarawak) 
 
250 
Rice Subsidy in Sabah and 
Sarawak 
Difference between wholesaler price and 
purchasing cost of rice import 
150 
Source: Department of Agriculture (last updated 29 December, 2010). 
 
One of the primary problems regarding sectoral constraints is that rice production has 
developed in an instable market environment, which has been characterized by price 
variability and strong fluctuations in product supply and demand (Amaya Montoya, 2011). 
Therefore, rice farmers are exposed to variable levels of profitability. Furthermore, the 
Malaysian rice sector consistently encountered difficulties in increasing its competitiveness 
within a dynamic environment influenced by political, technical, economic and trade 
challenges. Globalization and international trade have additionally played defining roles in the 
country’s national development, however these factors have equally important implications 
for Malaysia’s rice sector, which must compete with other international producers. 
 




As a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Malaysia is bound by the stipulations 
of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. These include rules and regulations 
regarding domestic support, export subsidies and market access in agriculture. Regardless of 
whether or not Malaysian rice production is profitable from a comprehensive economic 
perspective depends on its comparative advantage, under the conditions of no subsidies or 
with limited subsidies that have been permitted by the rules for all trading partners. Therefore, 
an assessment of comparative advantage can be helpful in this respect. 
 
2.3 Material and Method 
2.3.1 Policy Analysis Matrix 
The policy analysis matrix (PAM), as developed by Monke and Pearson, (1989) is a double 
entry bookkeeping analytical framework that helps policymakers to address central issues 
regarding agricultural policy developments. PAM is widely used for measuring the impact of 
policies on farm competitiveness and farm level profits. The framework additionally measures 
the influence public investments have on the agricultural system’s efficiency, and the effect 
agricultural research and development have on economic efficiency and comparative 
advantages (Masters and Winter-Nelson 1995; Siggel 2006). 
PAM takes the influence policies have on the costs and returns of agricultural production and 
investment projects into account. The principal strength of PAM is that it provides a 
straightforward policy-induced transfer analysis and allows for varying levels of 
disaggregation. In addition, PAM results show the net effects under the complex and 
contradictory policies as well as the individual effects of these policies. However, PAM also 
has its shortcomings, one of which is the assumption of fixed input-output coefficients, or 
static nature. Production is described by a string of techniques in which each has a fixed 
input-output coefficient representing some share of total production, whereas others do not 
consider the results to be realistic in a dynamic setting (Monke and Pearson 1989; Nelson and 
Panggabean 2011). 
PAM is composed of two cost columns (shown in Table 2.2); one representing tradable inputs 
and the other domestic factors. Intermediate inputs, which consist of fertilizers, pesticides, 
compound feed, transportation, electricity, fuel and purchased seeds, are divided into tradable 
inputs and domestic factor components. This disaggregation process allows for intermediate 
goods to be separated into four categories: tradable inputs, domestic factors, transfers (taxes 




or subsidies that are disregarded in the social evaluations), and non-tradable inputs (which 
must be further disaggregated so that all costs will be classified as tradable inputs, domestic 
factors and transfers). 
 
Table 2.2: Policy Analysis Matrix 
     Items Revenues Costs Profits 
    
Tradable Inputs Domestic Factors   
Private prices 𝑨 = 𝑃𝑖
𝐷 









D = A-B-C 
Social prices 𝑬 =  𝑃𝑖
𝑆 









H = E-F-G 
Effects of divergences 
and efficient policy I = A - E J= B - F K = C - G 
L = D – H 
= 
I – J - K 
Source: Monke and Pearson (1989) 
Note: 
The subscript i refers to outputs and the subscript j refers to inputs, 
aij for (j= 1 to k) are technical coefficients for traded inputs in the production of i; 
aij for(j=k+1 to n) are technical coefficients for domestic inputs in the production of i; 
Pi* is the price of output i, evaluated privately (*=D) or socially (*=S); 
Pj* is the price of traded input j, evaluated privately (*=D) or socially (*=S); 
Wj* is the price of domestic input j, evaluated privately (*=D) or socially (*=S); 
D (= A-B-C) measures Private profit; 
H (=E-F-G) measures Social profits; 
I (= A-E) measures Output transfers; 
J (=B-F) measures Input transfers; 
 K (=C-G) measures Factor transfers; 
 L (= D-H; or I-J-K) measures Net transfers. 
The first row of the matrix provides a measure of private profitability (D), defined as revenue 
(A) minus total costs (B+C), which assesses the values of all outputs and inputs at private 
prices, reflecting the actual market or financial prices received by the farmers, processors, or 
merchants involved in the agricultural system. This private or financial price includes the 
underlying economic costs and valuation combined with the effects of all policies and market 
failures. Thus, the private profitability calculations reveal the competitiveness of the 
agricultural system assuming the use of modern technology, input costs, output values and 
policy transfers.  




The table’s second row measures the social profits (H), which reflect the agricultural system’s 
efficient use of resources and overall comparative advantage. Efficient outcomes are 
attainable when economy´s resources are used to create the highest income and output levels. 
To determine social profits, social prices are used for the valuation of inputs and outputs. 
Social values, or prices, demonstrate a policy benchmark for comparisons because they are 
considered the prevailing prices in a free market in the absence of policy interventions, 
distortions or market failures (Kanaka and Chinnadurai, 2013; Monke and Pearson, 1989). 
Social prices reflect the opportunity cost or the value of using a good or service produced by a 
particular activity in order to achieve the objective of optimizing income and social welfare. 
Thus, considering that output (E) and input (F+G) are valued at social prices that reflect the 
scarcity values or opportunity costs, social profits are an efficiency measure. For output (E) 
and input (F) traded internationally, world export prices (free on board) are used. The cost of 
insurance freight prices (CIF) is used to deduce domestic factors, which are not traded in the 
international market. Social profits indicate that the foreign exchange either cut costs by 
reducing imports or earned by expanding exports of each unit of production. A positive value 
indicates that production contributes to national income, while a negative value suggests that 
the country’s national growth would be improved by not producing the commodity. Thus, it is 
a signal of measuring international comparative advantage (Kanaka and Chinnadurai, 2013). 
The second identity located in the third row of the accounting matrix measures divergences, 
which are defined as the differences between private and social valuations of revenues, costs 
and profits. Any divergence between private and social prices, which is measured vertically, 
must be explained by the effects of the policies. The effects of divergences are disaggregated 
into three categories: distorting policies, market failure and efficient policies. When 
government enforced market failure correction policies are not in place, distorting policies are 
the cause of divergences between the private and social prices of tradable outputs and inputs. 
However, if efficient policies enacted by the government are able to correct or offset market 
failures and create a greater income, the differences between private and social valuations will 
be reduced, since efficient policies correct divergences (Masters and Winter-Nelson 1995; 
Monke and Pearson 1989). The PAM framework also calculates the protection rate generated 
by different ratios such as the NPC, EPC, DRC, and SCB. These protection rates were used 
throughout this study to measure comparative advantages.  




The Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPC) is one of the most widely used methods of 
measuring price distortions (Fang and Beghin 2000; S. Mohanty, Fang, and Chaudhary 2003; 
Sadoulet and Janvry 1995; S. J. Yao 1997). The NPC is defined as: 
NPCi = 𝑃𝑖
𝐷/ 𝑃𝑖
𝑆                                                          (1) 
NPC ratio compares the private and social prices of a commodity. This ratio demonstrates the 
impact a policy has on the two prices; domestic price compared to the world price that causes 
a divergence. NPC can be calculated for both inputs (NPCI) and outputs (NPCO). Subsidies 
on outputs are indicated by NPCO (which is A/E) if its value is larger than one, while input 
subsidies are represented by NPCI (which is B/F) if its value is smaller than one (Fang and 
Beghin, 2000). From a strictly theoretical point of view in the context of trade, if NPC>1, 
producers are protected and consumers taxed; this scenario suggests that the production is 
inefficient and the price is heavily affected by government policies or by other factors of that 
commodity. 
The effective protection coefficient (EPC) is defined as the ratio of distorted tradable value, 
which has been added at market price to its undistorted value at the border price level. EPC 
captures the effect of government policies on input as well as on output markets (Hayat and 
Islam 2005; Javed et al. 2006). EPC is defined as: 
EPC= (𝑃𝑖





𝑗=1 )                                      (2) 
Based on the PAM table, EPC is the ratio of the value of added private prices (A-B) to the 
value of added social prices (E-F). This coefficient indicates the degree of policy transfer 
from output and tradable input distortions. A value greater (or less) than one indicates a net 
subsidy (or net tax) to value added (Beghin and Fang, 2002; Monke and Pearson, 1989). 
Additionally, if EPC>1, it suggests that government policies impart positive incentives to 
producers while EPC<1 indicates that producers are not protected through policy 
interventions (Mohanty et. al, 2003). 
The Domestic Resources Cost (DRC) is widely used to measure comparative advantages or 
relative efficiency between agricultural commodities (e.g.von Cramon Taubadel and 
Nivyevskyi, 2008; 2009). DRC was developed simultaneously in the 1960s by Bruno (1965) 
in Israel and by Krueger (1966) in United States. The DRC is defined as the shadow value of 




non-tradable inputs used in an activity per unit of tradable value added (G/ (E-F)). The 
formula for DRC is written as;  
DRC=  ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑊𝑗
𝑆𝑛
𝑗=𝑘+1  / (𝑃𝑖
𝑆 -∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑃𝑗
𝑆𝑘
𝑗=1 )                                    (3) 
DRC indicates whether or not the use of domestic factors is socially profitable (DRC<1) 
(DRC>1). We calculate the DRCs to enable cross-commodity comparisons in each Malaysian 
state. The commodities can be ranked according to the DRC values and thus can provide 
indications of comparative advantage or disadvantage within that state. A state is said to have 
a comparative advantage due to a given crop if the value of the DRC for that crop is lower 
than the DRC for other crops grown in that state. 
 
The Social Cost Benefit (SCB) is defined as (F+G)/E, and provides information similar to the 
DRC. Finally, the indicators private net return to land (PNRL) and social net return to land 
(SNRL) were used to measure the return to the fixed factor for this study. Hayat and Islam, 
(2005) state that the net economic benefit per unit of land is likely to be more relevant when 
ranking crops, as opposed to calculating domestic resources per unit (or ringgit/domestic 
currency). The PAM table provides the PNRL, which is defined as A-B-C without the cost of 
land use and SNRL as E-F-G without the cost of land use. Greater values of PNRL indicate 
that the crop in question is more desirable for the producer, but not necessarily for society. A 
higher value of SNRL suggests both a product’s stronger competitiveness as well as its 
desirability for the society (Fang and Beghin, 2000; Yao, 1997).  
 
2.3.2 Data collection 
In the 1980s, the government enhanced further irrigation developments in order to enable rice 
double cropping in eight designated granary areas. Of these, four were chosen as the study 
areas: Muda Agricultural Development Authority (MADA); Kemubu Agricultural 
Development Authority (KADA); Barat Laut Selangor Integrated Agricultural Development 
(BLS); and North Terengganu Integrated Agricultural Development (KETARA). The 
contributions of the four granary areas are presented in Appendix 2.1.  
The data employed in this study are collected from various national and international 
published and unpublished resources. In order to estimate the PAM, a comprehensive set of 
data including yields, input requirements of the markets, and social prices of inputs and 




outputs were required. The aggregate output and input coefficients for the four granary areas 
were taken from Terano and Mohamed, (2011), Mohd Rashid and Mohd Dainuri, (2013) and 
KADA (2014). These authors used a fairly large-scale survey that encompassed different agro 
ecological zones. The survey focused on generating information related to the production 
costs of rice for the provinces over the period 2011-2012.  These output and input coefficients 
were then complied according to the land’s hectare count.  
The output (rice) and input farm gate prices (urea, compound or TSP, NPK and organic 
fertilizers, pesticides and lime) were taken from nationally and internationally published and 
unpublished sources. Social prices of tradable commodities are based on import parity prices 
or export parity prices, depending on the trade status of the commodity in question. Since 
Malaysia frequently imports rice, an import parity price is used to measure the social price of 
rice. The CIF price of 25 percent broken rice and the official exchange rate were collected 
from FAO and the Central Bank Malaysia. CIF prices for fertilizers, including urea (Europe), 
TSP (US Gulf ports), organic and NPK, were collected from the World Bank, IRRI, and the 
FAO food outlook. The fuel price was obtained from Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs 
Ministry in Malaysia, whereas the data pertaining to lime, pesticides and wages were 
collected from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the Department of Statistics 
Malaysia and FAOSTAT.  
The social price of land is one of the more important and complicated components of 
domestic factors. With regard to land valuation, Gittinger, (1984) describe the social cost of 
land, which is considered when determining border prices, as the net value of production 
forgone when the status of the land changed from ‘without land use’ to ‘with land use’. In a 
free market, the market price of a piece of land will reflect its economic value. However, Van 
Schalkwyk and Van Zyl (1994) argue that non-farm related factors, such as policy distortions 
may get capitalized as market values and thus, land values tend to not reflect its true 
economic value. In this respect, Monke and Pearson (1989) propose using the rental value 
instead of market value, because the rental value reflects the relationship between opportunity 
cost and land use. They further argue that in the absence of both financial cost and rental 
value that reflect the opportunity cost of a land, its ‘potential productive capacity’ can be used 
to access its value in the best alternative use. For example, if oil palm production represents 
the best alternative to rice production in granary areas, the social costs of land for rice 
production equals the social profits (excluding land) from the oil palm production. 




In the studied areas, many farmers preferred sharecropping or producing oil palm as a 
substitute commodity for rice (Terano and Mohamed 2011). Hence, in estimating social prices 
for land, we used the average net income of palm oil in each granary area. Due to the 
challenges inherent to estimating the social profits of oil palm production, these figures are 
based on primary data provided by an agricultural officer and a land value officer in Selangor, 
Malaysia. Other data pertaining to the conversion of private to social prices are presented in 
Appendix 2.2 and 2.3. 
 
2.4 Result and Discussion 
2.4.1 Policy analysis matrix in the context of import parity price of rice 
In this section, the results of the policy analysis matrix and sensitivity analysis are discussed 
sequentially and with necessary interpretations. The main results of the protection and 
comparative advantage coefficients for the four observed granary areas are shown in Table 
2.3. Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) and Social Cost Benefit (SCB) were estimated in order 
to measure the competitiveness of Malaysia’s rice sector. DRC compares the domestic costs 
of resources measured at the corresponding social price with the value added measured in the 
social prices. The use of the social prices in DRC measure allows us to test whether the 
employment of scarce domestic inputs in the production of rice generates positive returns for 
Malaysia. 
The empirical analysis presented in this paper demonstrates that three of four study areas 
(BLS, MADA and KADA) had comparative advantages in the production of rice (DRC<1) 
between 2011 and 2012. However, the results indicate no comparative advantage for rice 
production in the KETARA area because the DRC was greater than one. It is more 
advantageous for the nation to produce rice in the three granary areas and to expand its 
production considering the added social value is greater than the cost of importing rice. 
However, the estimated DRCs are closer to unity, indicating that there may be some 
competing demand on resources for production of other crops. Moreover, the closer the DRC 
value is to one, the more impact a small change in prices can have. With the estimated DRC 
of rice grown in KETARA observed to be greater than one under the circumstances of import 
parity prices, no comparative advantage is detected. As a result, the emphasis on the 
attainment of self-sufficiency in rice production appears to be uneconomically justified and 
remains debatable.  




Table 2.3: Summary results of different indicators of protection and comparative 
advantage 
Source: Own estimation 
Nevertheless, the average DRC results presented in this paper should be interpreted with 
caution. These results are based on aggregated data that most certainly conceals relevant 
variation and the underlying distribution of competitiveness across a set of heterogeneous 
producers (von Cramon Taubadel and Nivyevskyi, 2008). In other words, the results 
presented here aggregate very efficient farms that are more competitive than average with less 
efficient farms that are less competitive than average. This can have great far-reaching 
implications for policy conclusions based on the PAM results. For example, support based on 
the average competitiveness will over-support some farms and under-support others. 
Therefore, only cautious conclusions based on average DRCs have been made and further 
analyses of DRC distributions is required to determine which factors influence a farm’s 
competitiveness. 
Another indicator of competitiveness is the Social Cost Benefit (SCB) ratio. The estimated 
SCB values used for this research are consistent with the DRC calculations discussed above. 
The calculated SCB ratios, which are less than 1, indicate the profitability of rice farming in 
each granary area except for in KETARA. With an estimated SCB ratio exceeding unity, the 
KETARA granary area hardly displays a comparative advantage in rice production. 
The measure of net transfer is further demonstrated by the Profitability Coefficient (PC), 
which determines the predominant effects of all policies, including output, tradable and non-
tradable input policies that may not be included in NPC and EPC estimates (Monke and 
Pearson, 1989). Each of the PC values for the three granary areas, excluding KETARA, is 
negative in both years. The results indicate that there is a net transfer from social to private 




profits, except in KETARA. The other ratio indicator measuring net transfer is the Subsidy 
Ratio to producers (SRP), which indicates the influence of incentives or disincentives on 
divergences. The average values of SRP range between 0.47 and 0.59 in 2012. This value 
conveys that the divergences, which are almost entirely due to distortive policies in the case 
of this study, have nearly doubled in gross revenue. 
Further analyses were conducted to measure the private net return to land (PNRL) and social 
net return to land (SNRL), which were used to estimate the returns to the fixed factor: land. 
Both PNRL and SNRL values are positive for three of the areas, except for KETARA. This 
implies that it is desirable for average rice producers in the granary areas KADA, MADA and 
BLS to grow rice.  
The results in Table 2.4 show the divergences between private and social profits, or in other 
words, the effect of different policy transfers, such as output, input, factor and net policy 
transfers. The values of the output transfers (private revenues less social revenues) are 
positive, while the values for input transfers (the difference between the private and social 
prices of tradable inputs) and the factor transfers (the difference between the private and 
social prices of non-tradable inputs or domestic factors) are all negative. The positive values 
of output transfers point to the system receiving protection, i.e. the government protective 
policies affect the system positively, resulting in a price subsidy scheme of RM240.1/mt. The 
negative values of the input transfers indicate that the producers buy inputs at a lower price 
than the world market price due to the subsidy policy on fertilizers, lime and pesticides. The 
same is true for the factor transfer values that demonstrate that the costs of non-tradable 
inputs are lower than their social prices. This can be attributed to the primary factors of 
production, which is mainly land, since the social and private values of land are determined 




































KADA 2011 1772.95 -284.38 -1100 3431.60 274.27 3157.33 
  2012 1252.35 -140.6 -1100 2841.60 348.65 2492.95 
MADA 2011 1571.15 -204.76 -1200 3324.64 348.73 2975.91 
  2012 996.03 -122.66 -1600 3379.73 661.04 2718.69 
KETARA 2011 1315.57 -204.66 -1100 1921.84 -698.39 2620.23 
  2012 1161.45 -46.44 -1200 2100.95 -306.94 2407.89 
BLS 2011 2284.75 -194.44 -1100 4165.28 586.09 3579.19 
  2012 2064.27 -84.08 -1200 4239.07 890.72 3348.35 
Source: Own estimation 
Overall, the net transfer policy for all regions is positive. The net transfer is the sum of output 
transfer, the tradable input transfer and factor transfer. The net transfer is the difference 
between private profits and social profits. Due to the fact that social profits are positive in 
each granary area, except in the KETARA area, the systems could operate profitably without 
any policy transfers. The results also show variations in profitability across regions, both in 
private and social terms. Based on the research conducted for this paper, the private profits 
per hectare of rice production in all granary areas are greater than zero. This is demonstrated 
by normal returns and possible expansions to each area’s production, unless, of course, a 
farming area could not be expanded or the substitute crops were more lucrative at private 
prices. Moreover, the social profits are positive in all areas that have DRCs less than one, 
indicating that the rice producers in these areas are efficiently using scarce resources. 
Conversely, a negative social profit value in KETARA reveals that the rice system is 
dependent on government assistance. The result of private profits clearly indicates that rice 
production is highly profitable in some granary areas at private prices. However, at social 
prices, profitability is decreased.  
 
                                                 
2
 . Exchange rate: US$1= RM3.05 and EUR€1= RM4.25 (Oct 31, 2011); US$1= RM3.06 and EUR€1=RM4.27 








2.4.2 Sensitivity analysis 
It may be worthwhile to examine the degree to which the comparative advantage of rice 
production in Malaysia, under a set of baseline assumptions, is affected by the changes in key 
parameter values. Morris et al. (1990) postulates that a sensitivity analysis would be 
applicable for two reasons. Firstly, the profitability analysis is conducted on the basis of 
certain simplifying assumptions of production technologies, as indicated by the output-input 
coefficients, government policies and prices. Secondly, the DRC framework gauges an area’s 
comparative advantage, which is static as it represents a snapshot taken at a fixed point in 
time. However, in practice, actual efficiency is dynamic (it adjusts according to changes in 
production technologies, prices and government policies). Therefore, it is crucial to determine 
the effect changes in the parameters have on the results.  
Figure 2.2: Change of Domestic resource cost (DRC) in the import rice prices in 
Malaysia  
 




The subsequent graphs summarize the results of the sensitivity analysis on the comparative 
advantages of rice production in Malaysia in 2011, with special emphasis on the individual 
impact of relevant determining factors. Figure 2.2 demonstrates that the estimated DRCs in 
rice production in each granary area are quite sensitive to changes in the international 
(reference) price of rice. An increase of 20 percent in the international price would make the 
domestic production of rice in all areas socially profitable, with DRC values of less than one.  
 





















Fertilizer KADA 0.92 0.949 1.000 1.076 0.889 0.849 0.824 
 
MADA 0.97 1.001 1.053 1.131 0.940 0.898 0.873 
 
KETARA 1.19 1.236 1.313 1.433 1.146 1.086 1.050 
 BLS 0.86 0.891 0.939 1.001 0.835 0.796 0.773 
Seed KADA 0.92 0.921 0.926 0.932 0.915 0.910 0.907 
 
MADA 0.97 0.974 0.980 0.988 0.966 0.960 0.956 
 
KETARA 1.19 1.196 1.206 1.220 1.182 1.172 1.166 
 BLS 0.86 0.867 0.875 0.885 0.857 0.850 0.845 
Pesticides KADA 0.92 0.923 0.931 0.942 0.913 0.905 0.900 
 
MADA 0.97 0.974 0.981 0.991 0.965 0.958 0.954 
 
KETARA 1.19 1.193 1.199 1.206 1.185 1.180 1.176 
 BLS 0.86 0.864 0.868 0.872 0.860 0.857 0.854 
Fuel KADA 0.92 0.919 0.922 0.925 0.916 0.914 0.912 
 
MADA 0.97 0.971 0.972 0.974 0.969 0.967 0.966 
 
KETARA 1.19 1.191 1.194 1.198 1.187 1.184 1.182 
 BLS 0.86 0.864 0.866 0.870 0.860 0.858 0.856 
Source: Own estimation 
The impact of changes in other single factors namely traded inputs; imported fertilizer prices, 
seed, pesticides, and fuel prices, are presented in Table 2.5. As the country progresses towards 
trade liberalization, the costs of these inputs are expected to rise, resulting in a reduction of 
comparative advantages for rice farming in all major granary areas. It is evident that if the 
costs of tradable inputs increase, the values of DRC will also grow, but fertilizer is the most 
susceptible to changes. The high share of fertilizer used in rice production in all the granary 
areas, has negatively affected the comparative advantage in Malaysia. As the price of fertilizer 
increases by 25 percent in KADA, or by 10 percent in MADA, the social profits will 
minimize. However, profitability remains quite robust for the other inputs. 
 




The sensitivity analysis of increasing or decreasing the costs of imported rice, fertilizer, seed, 
pesticides and fuel shows that the coefficients have similar patterns of competitiveness. Under 
certain unfavorable economic conditions, average Malaysian rice producers could lose their 
comparative advantages. For example, in the event of higher input costs, with particular 
emphasis on fertilizer costs or the deterioration of the international market’s price of rice, a 
rice producer’s comparative advantage could diminish. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The challenges presented by trade liberalization have created tougher competition and 
unfavorable conditions for Malaysia to strengthen its economic growth. The country’s rice 
sector, which is an important part of the economy because of its production value and the 
source of employment it provides, also faces these challenges. More than 100,000 farmers are 
involved in rice farming. In an effort to increase paddy production, the government has 
provided a great degree of support to paddy producers, most of whom live in poverty. These 
incentives aim to enhance rice production levels, secure self-sufficiency by 2020 and maintain 
food security. Utilizing a PAM model, this study investigated whether the government’s 
interventions make economic sense to be fully self-efficient. In order to arrive at this 
conclusion, the competitiveness of Malaysia’s rice production, particularly in the KADA, 
MADA, KETARA and BLS granary areas, was analyzed. 
The results indicate that three out of four granary areas have comparative advantages in rice 
production with Domestic Resource Cost values, or DRCs, of less than one. Conversely, the 
results indicated no comparative advantage for rice production in the KETARA area, as the 
DRC is greater than one. Similarly, Social Cost Benefit or SCB values in these areas are less 
than one indicating that the comparative advantages in rice production are noteworthy. 
Therefore, social profitability appears in three of the four areas, although there are farms that 
generate a net surplus for the country. To fully understand the impact of these farms, they 
must be identified and studied by further research using disaggregated data. These farms may 
generate social profits, but they might depend on financial government support to provide for 
their families. In this case, policies should focus on encouraging structural changes, which 
enable these farms to grow enough to generate a sufficient income from social profits alone, 
i.e. without (or with much less) subsidy. This way the government could encourage self-
sufficiency and spend less money. In the other region, the average farm does not yield a social 




profit. However, it is likely that this area also has farms that are socially profitable.  In all four 
regions (and especially in the KETARA region there must be many farms that are not 
producing a social profit. Thus, further research with disaggregated data is required to 
determine why this is the case, and how the situation can be improved.  
 
Additional Notes: 
The empirical analysis presented in Appendix 2.2 and 2.3 is based on secondary data provided 
by R.Terano et al (2013), Rabu and Mohd Shah (2013) and KADA (2014). The data were 
then crosschecked with a local expert from BERNAS to ensure reliability and validity. Each 
calculation was conducted on a hectare basis and in Malaysia currency, the Malaysian Ringgit 
(RM). As means of determining the PAM, the authors of this text classified input items into 
tradable and non-tradable inputs categories. In the context of rice farms, tradable inputs 
include fertilizers, chemicals, seeds and fuel, while the other inputs, such as labor, capital and 
land rent were categorized as non-tradable inputs. The social price (shadow price) of all the 
inputs and the output (rice) was subsequently estimated, and finally, the commodity and 
system budget tables were configured to the PAM table and relevant policy parameters were 
derived. 
The conversion of private to social prices is based on several data and assumptions: 
i. Rice is an imported good; therefore, the social price for rice is the import parity price 
of rice equivalents at the farm gate. 
ii. As for the tradable inputs, the social prices of fertilizers, pesticides, seeds, fuel and 
lime are the respective import parity prices at the farm gate. 
iii. Social costs of transplanting packages are also assumed to equal the private costs 
considering that the owners determine the value of these packages and services. 
iv. Domestic inputs, such as land, for which no international prices exist is valued at local 
opportunity costs. Hence, the rental values of land per hectare for different granary 
areas were obtained from an agricultural officer and a land value officer in Selangor. 
Based on the information provided, it is clear that all approaches used to determine the 
value of agricultural land are subject to criticism. In this regard, one can argue that this 
is due to the extreme difficulty of assigning a price to land. 




v. Social costs are assumed to equal private costs for labor. 
vi. The need to determine the shadow exchange rate is important when conducting an 
economic analysis, especially because it affects all the social values of tradable 
components and output. Thus, the shadow exchange rate is used instead of the official 
exchange rate to convert the international prices in US dollars to Malaysia’s currency. 
In 2011, the official exchange rate was $1/3.05 Malaysia Ringgit, but the shadow 
exchange rate was estimated at $1/3.061 Malaysia Ringgit. In 2012, the shadow 
exchange rate was estimated at $1/3.076 (as the official exchange rate was $1/3.06). 
Malaysia is an open economy where the disparity between the official and shadow 
exchange is minimal. 
 
Appendix 2.1: Rice Production in Major Granary Areas, Malaysia (2008- 2010) 
Granary Area Area (Ha) % Area 
Contribution to National Production (Metric ton and %) 
2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 
MADA 96,558 23.22 887,992 37.74 976,192 38.33 912,321 37.01 
KADA 32,167 7.74 179,048 7.61 209.950 8.36 201,135 8.16 
IADA K.S MANIK 27,829 6.69 169,753 7.21 187,117 7.45 184,563 7.08 
IADA BLS  18,814 4.52 174,247 7.41 202,633 8.07 210 8.53 
IADA P. PINANG 10,305 2.46 98,436 4.16 107,285 4.27 115,189 4.67 
IADA S.PERAK 8,529 2.05 62,076 2.64 70,294 2.8 70,814 2.87 
IADA KETARA 5,156 1.24 46,097 1.96 49,082 1.95 52,711 2.14 
IADA 
K.SEMERAK 5,220 1.26 14,757 0.63 16,853 0.67 20,550 0.83 
         TOTAL 
GRANARY 
204,578 49.20 1,632,406 69.38 1,609,666 72.46 1,557,493 71.31 
TOTAL NON 
GRANARY 211,213 50.82 720,626 30.63 691,637 27.54 707,256 28.71 
MALAYSIA 415,791 100 2,353,032 100 2,301,303 100 2,264,749 100 














Appendix 2.2: Private and social costs calculations for the rice farms in KADA, MADA, KETARA and BLS granary areas in Malaysia 








ratio Seed NPK Urea Compound Organic Pesticides Lime Transplanting Fuel Labor Land 
KADA Private 200 378 138 325 132 230 248 0 76 1120 900 6589 1.76 
  Social 213 340 142 373 138 244 322 0 96 1120 1150 5336 1.07 
MADA Private 136 336 104 312 110 184 240 0 42 760 1000 6603 2.05 
  Social 145 302 106 358 115 195 312 0 53 760 2600 5607 1.13 
KETARA Private 140 315 92 312 110 138 0 450 29 580 900 5166 1.69 
  Social 149 284 94 358 115 146 0 450 36 580 2100 4005 0.93 
BLS Private 160 420 115 325 121 184 0 530 53 980 900 8027 2.12 
  Social 168 394 122 390 134 187 0 530 67 980 2100 5963 1.18 
 
Appendix 2.3: Private and social costs calculations for the rice farms in KADA, MADA, KETARA and BLS granary areas in Malaysia 








ratio Seed NPK Urea Compound Organic Pesticides Lime Transplanting Fuel Labor Land 
KADA Private 200 378 138 325 132 230 248 0 76 1120 900 6589 1.76 
  Social 213 340 142 373 138 244 322 0 96 1120 1150 5336 1.07 
MADA Private 136 336 104 312 110 184 240 0 42 760 1000 6603 2.05 
  Social 145 302 106 358 115 195 312 0 53 760 2600 5607 1.13 
KETARA Private 140 315 92 312 110 138 0 450 29 580 900 5166 1.69 
  Social 149 284 94 358 115 146 0 450 36 580 2100 4005 0.93 
BLS Private 160 420 115 325 121 184 0 530 53 980 900 8027 2.12 
  Social 168 394 122 390 134 187 0 530 67 980 2100 5963 1.18 
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Chapter 3  
Determinants of Rice Farming Competitiveness in Malaysia 
: An Extension of the Policy Analysis Matrix 
 
 
The advent of free trade agreements, including the Asean Free Trade agreement (AFTA) and 
WTO accession, hampers the Malaysian rice sector as the sector must compete with low-cost 
exporting countries. This implies that structural changes in trade and adjustments at the farm 
level are needed to improve competitiveness. In this paper we aim to understand the driving 
forces behind competitive rice production in Malaysia; to do so, an extension of the Policy 
Analysis Matrix proposed by Monke and Pearson (1989) is applied. This extension allows us 
to take farm-level heterogeneity into account and derive competitiveness score distributions 
for each rice farm. In a second step of analysis, we use dynamic panel regression methods to 
examine factors influencing rice competitiveness. Our results demonstrate that considering 
the aggregate data or average Social Cost Benefit alone may conceal important variations 
across the farms. Many farmers are shown to be competitive; however these competitive 
farms account for a disproportionately large share of rice production when using disaggregate 
data. We concluded participation in the farmers’ organization, gender and farm size are the 
major determinants of rice competitiveness, while the increasing distance to rice mills, off-
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Agriculture is an important sector of Malaysia’s economy as it provides employment and is 
the main source of income for the population, as well as it alleviates poverty in rural areas. 
Rice is a major staple food in Malaysia and the industry provides employment for 11.6 
million Malaysian rice farmers (12% of the national workforce), and contributes about 7.7% 
to the national GDP (Chan and Cho, 2012). 
 
Since rice is a strategically important staple commodity, the government intervenes more in 
this sector than in others. Rice is highly protected due to food security concerns and the 
critical role it plays in supporting farmers’ incomes. However, the liberalization of rice trade 
fostered by the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture, and regional trade agreements such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), has 
bound Malaysia to commitments in the areas of domestic support, export subsidies and 
market access to agriculture. The key factors that affect the global rice trade are import tariffs, 
tariff rate quotas in major importing countries and price supports in major exporting countries 
(Wailes, 2005).  
 
The recent dramatic changes on the international rice scenario precipitated by the price 
increase in petroleum, high prices of agricultural inputs and the spike in world food prices, 
have had considerable effects on rice farmers and rice production (Timmer and Dawe, 2007; 
Jamora and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2012). The world food price crisis of 2008 placed a 
particularly heavy burden on the balance of trade in many developing countries, especially 
Malaysia, which has been a large net importer of rice for centuries. Rice imports account for a 
larger share of GDP in Malaysia than in other countries. Malaysia’s high dependency on rice 
imports makes the country vulnerable to international market shocks and disruptions in major 
rice exporting countries.  
 
For these reasons rice production will continue to receive significant attention from 
policymakers. The Malaysian government has provided considerable support to rice 
producers, and some economic analysts argue that without this support rice production could 
not compete internationally (Arshad et al. 2011; Umar et al. 2014; Tengku Mohd Ariff and 
Ariffin 1999). Some of these analysts find that the price support scheme has increased rice 
outputs and the income generated from them by more than 50%, and that repealing this policy 
would render the rice sector uncompetitive. However, other analyses indicate that rice 




production in Malaysia is competitive. The study conducted by  Busayo Rashidat et al. (2013) 
determined the relevant costs and benefits of various incentive schemes before and after the 
food crisis for rice production in selected  regions of Malaysia (so-called granary areas). The 
authors assert that there is no significant difference in Domestic Resource Costs (DRC) 
between 2007 and 2008, which leads them to conclude that rice cultivation is socially 
profitable for all paddy farmers. Correspondingly, a recent study conducted by Abdul Fatah 
and von Cramon Taubadel (2015) demonstrates that on average three out four granary areas in 
Malaysia have comparative advantages in rice production between 2011 and 2012. However, 
regional averages can hide considerable variation among farms, which has not been 
considered in the literature to date. 
 
Is rice production in Malaysia competitive? We generate new evidence using an extension of 
the Policy Analysis Matrix approach proposed by Monke and Pearson (1989). This extension 
allows us to take farm-level heterogeneity into account and study the distribution of 
competitiveness scores for each rice farm. In a second step of our analysis, we use panel 
regression methods to study the factors that influence competitiveness at the individual farm 
level. 
 
3.2 Rice production and policies in Malaysia 
Rice production represents 13% of the total area harvested in the country and 30% of the area 
devoted to seasonal crops. Furthermore, rice production represents 6% of the value of 
agricultural production and 11% of Malaysia’s agricultural activity (Chan and Cho, 2012). 
The majority of rice is produced by small predominantly subsistence farmers with an average 
farm size of 2.5 hectares (Mohd Rashid and Mohd Dainuri, 2013). On average, rice 
production in Malaysia yielded 3.7 t/ha during the years 2010-2013, which lies between 
yields in Thailand (3.0 t/ha) and in Vietnam (5.6 t/ha). 
 





Figure 3.1: Average rice yields, ASEAN countries for 2010-2013. (Source: FAOSTAT, 
2016). 
 
Rice is a staple food, and Malaysians consume nearly 2.2 million tons of rice annually, 70% 
of which is produced domestically and the rest of which is imported from major rice 
exporting countries such as Vietnam and Thailand. During the period 2000-2005, the country 
imported 515 thousand metric tons of rice, making Malaysia the third largest Asian rice 
importer after the Philippines and Indonesia (FAOSTAT, 2016). During this time, the 
government argued that it was cheaper to import rice from other countries so as to release 
arable lands for other cash crops that have the potential to produce higher earnings and yield 
more profits. However, the world food crisis in 2008 led to an increased emphasis on self-
sufficiency, and in 2012 the Malaysian government increased price support measures in the 
form of a guaranteed minimum price (GMP), and paddy bonus payments to stimulate supply. 
This output support was supplemented by input subsidies, particularly through the provision 
of fertilizer, low cost credit and irrigation facilities. In addition, to stabilize consumer prices, 
the government allowed the national rice company Padiberas Nasional Berhad (BERNAS) to 
import rice at low or zero tariffs. 
 
These types of programs are common in most developing countries. In Asia, countries such as 
India, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Pakistan implement food price stabilization programs and 
input subsidies (Dorosh, 2009; Timmer and Dawe, 2007; Warr and Yusuf, 2014). However, 
simultaneously protecting both producers and consumers is very costly (Warr and Yusuf, 


























According to Malaysia’s WTO trade report review (2014), the total support given to 
agriculture consisted of reduction commitments amounting to 1 billion RM. Of this, 
approximately 74% was related to Green Box assistance, mainly in the form of income 
support for farmers while others involved the fertilizer subsidy scheme. In 2013, price support 
(incentives or bonus payments for paddy rice production) remained the largest part of 
expenditures (480 million RM) followed by the fertilizer subsidy (465 million RM).  
 
In addition, the Malaysian government has announced the goal of becoming 100% self-
sufficient in rice by the year 2020. Since preliminary evidence (Abdul Fatah and von Cramon, 
2015) indicates that much of Malaysia’s rice production is competitive at both private and 
social prices, producer support measures might be unnecessary. The goal of this paper is to 
generate more detailed evidence on the competitiveness of rice production in Malaysia. 
 
3.3 Measuring the competitiveness of rice production 
The Social Cost Benefit (SCB) ratio is one of the indicators that can be calculated to measure 
competitiveness using the Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) framework developed by Monke 
and Pearson (1989). The PAM is described in Appendix 3.2. 
 
It is defined as: 
SCB = [ ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑃𝑗
𝑆𝑘
𝑗=1  + ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑊𝑗
𝑆𝑛
𝑗=𝑘+1  ] / 𝑃𝑖
𝑆                             (1) 
where Pi is the price of the output i, the Pj are the prices of the k tradeable inputs, the Wj are 
the prices of the n-k non-tradeable inputs, and the ij are technical coefficients which measure 
the amount of input j that is required to produce one unit of output i. Throughout, the 
superscript S indicates that social rather than private prices are employed. Hence, the SCB is 
simply the ratio of the social cost of producing one unit of an output, such as rice, to the social 
value of that unit of output. An SCB value between zero and one indicates that the activity in 
question is competitive, while a value greater than one indicates that social cost exceeds 
social value and the activity is not competitive.
3
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 Another PAM-based indicator that is commonly used is the Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) ratio. 
However, as Frohberg and Hartmann (1997), Masters and Winter-Nelson (1995) and von Cramon-
Taubadel and Nivyevskyi (2008) discuss, the DRC suffers from several weaknesses. In particular, it is 
sensitive to the classification of inputs into tradable and non-tradable, which can be difficult in applied 
work (Monke and Pearson, 1989), and it has a discontinuity at zero, which makes the interpretation of 
DRC distributions difficult. We therefore consider only the SCB ratio.  




The PAM approach and associated indicators, such as the SCB, have been used by analysts 
working in many developing countries where price distortions are often substantial (Yao 
1997; Reig-Martínez et al. 2008; Erenstein 2010; Zheng et al. 2015). However, one major 
drawback of almost all applied PAM analysis to date is that it is carried out with aggregate 
data, for example for average or representative farms. This will provide an incomplete picture 
of sectoral competitiveness since results based on average data may conceal important 
variations in competitiveness among heterogeneous producers (Nivievskyi et al 2010; von 
Cramon-Taubadel and Nivyevskyi 2008). To improve the usefulness of indicators based on 
the PAM, Morrison and Balcombe (2002) suggest resampling data using the bootstrapping 
method. This method can generate distributional properties of the indicators and thus allow 
the calculation of standard deviations and confidence intervals for PAM indicators. von 
Cramon Taubadel and Nivyevskyi (2009) propose the calculation of the distributions of PAM 
indicators using farm-level survey data. Using kernel methods, they estimate SCB 
distributions for different agricultural products (e.g. wheat) over a large sample of farms in 
Ukraine. Using these distributions they estimate the proportion of farms that produces 
competitively for each product and the proportion of the total production of that product that 
is produced competitively. 
 
We adapt the methods proposed by von Cramon-Taubadel and Nivyevskyi (2008, 2009) to 
calculate SCB distributions for rice production in Malaysia using panel data during 2010- 
2014 period. The calculation of SCB distributions is purely a descriptive technique; however 
its use here is motivated by the hypothesis that Malaysia has the potential to grow more rice if 
analysis can identify those farms that are currently competitive and the reasons for their 
superior performance, thus providing benchmarks for other, currently less competitive farms.  
 
3.4 Data and assumptions 
In Malaysia, the rice-cropping season is categorized into main and off-seasons. The main 
season usually begins in September and runs through December, while the off-season runs 
from February to May. During the off-season the amount and frequency of precipitation is 
lower than it is during the main season. Therefore, the off-season crop relies heavily on the 
irrigation system.  
 




In the Third National Agriculture Policy (1998-2010), eight granary areas
4
 were designated as 
permanent rice granary areas responsible for scaling up and increasing productivity in the rice 
farming industry. The eight granaries contribute about 75% of the national rice production. 
The data used in this analysis are from the Muda Agricultural Development Authority 
(MADA), which is the largest granary area and contributed 51% of total granary production 
in 2013 and consistently generates 37% of Malaysia’s total annual rice production on 33% of 
the country’s rice area (Appendix 3.1). The farm level data is collected twice a year and each 
survey period includes a balanced sample of 675 farming households. The panel is composed 
of ten cross-sections, covering main and off- seasons over the five-year period from 2010 to 
2014. This data set provides comprehensive information, including input use, output and 
corresponding prices.  
 
The farm-level panel data described above allows us to estimate the financial costs (profits) 
and social costs (profits) of rice production for each farm in each of the ten seasons. The 
result is a panel of 6750 PAMs one for each farm and season. To complete these PAMs 
(Appendix table 3.2), we first need to classify and decompose input items into tradable and 
non-tradable input categories. In Malaysian rice farming, the tradable inputs are fertilizers, 
seeds and agro-chemicals including pesticides, herbicides, rat and golden snail control, while 
other inputs such as labor, capital and land rent are categorized as non-tradable. Using the 
available data we complete the row of each PAM that describes costs and revenues at private 
prices. Second, we estimate the social prices (shadow price) of all the inputs and of the output 
(rice) and complete the row of the PAM that describes costs and revenues at social prices. 
Finally, we calculate the SCB ratio for each farm and season and derive the distribution of the 
SCB across farms for each season. 
 
Social prices of output and tradable inputs are based on import or export parity prices, 
depending on the trade status of the commodity in question. Since Malaysia is a net importer 
of rice, an import parity is used to measure the social price of rice.  The major rice imports are 
25 percent broken rice mainly from Vietnam, followed by milled rice and glutinous rice 
(Department of Agriculture, 2014). We use the CIF price of 25% broken rice as the reference 
price (social price), obtained from the International Rice Reserch Institute (IRRI). To 
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 Granary Areas refer to major irrigation schemes (areas greater than 4,000 hectares) and recognized 
by the Government in the National Agricultural Policy as the main paddy producing areas. There are 
eight granary areas in Malaysia, namely MADA, KADA, IADA KERIAN, IADA BLS, IADA P. 
Pinang, IADA Seberang Perak, IADA KETARA and IADA Kemasin Semerak (Appendix 2). 




calculate the farm gate equivalent of this CIF price
5
, we use information regarding costs of 
handling, transportation, freight and insurance based on an interview with an officer from 
BERNAS. For the tradable inputs, the social prices are also import parity prices converted to 
the farm gate price. CIF prices for fertilizers, including urea (Europe), TSP (US Gulf ports), 
organic and NPK are provided by the World Bank, IRRI, and various issues of the FAO food 
outlook. The costs of moving these inputs from the port of entrance to the farm gate are based 
on information provided by traders.  
 
For the non-tradeable input of land we assume a social price of zero. This is because of the 
impossibility of growing alternative crops on the land presently devoted to harvesting rice, 
both for legal reasons derived from land regulations and for physical reasons connected to the 
condition of the soil and the risk of seasonal flooding of the cultivation plots. 
 
In some countries where the labor market is imperfect or there are macroeconomic 
imbalances, current wages may be a distorted indicator of the social cost of labor. In such 
cases, the current wages are corrected by using conversion factors to compute social wages  
(European Commission, 2014). However, in the case of a small country, such as Malaysia, 
where the unemployment rate is low, the social wage for labor can be assumed to be equal to 
the market wage. Therefore, we set conversion factor used to convert private into social 
wages equal to one.  
 
The costs of machinery services hired for harvesting, transplanting and threshing were 
included in the capital account. However, payment for these services includes tradable 
components such as machine depreciation, fuel and oil, and non-tradable components such as 
labor for maintenance and the administration of rental operations. Therefore, we decompose 
machinery services into tradable and non-tradable components.  
 
3.5 Results and discussion 
3.5.1 The profile of rice farming  
Rice farming in the MADA region is dominated by a small landholding size ranging between 
1.70 to 2.17 hectares (Table 3.1). Investments in tertiary irrigation development have 
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 The conversion factors of paddy to rice are based on percentages of paddy recovery rates at 0.65. 




considerably increased the production in the MADA area. Average gross paddy yields over 10 
seasons are roughly 6 tons per hectare. 
 
Table 3.1 summarizes household incomes generated in the main and off-seasons from 2010 to 
2014. For the average MADA farm, the monthly gross margin for both seasons constantly 
increased during this period. The average full-time paddy farmer has reached the minimum 
income objective of 960 RM per month, the equivalent of about 8.50 USD per day, which 
meets the government’s aims of raising rice farmers’ income above the poverty line. The 
survey data also shows that non-agricultural income contributes only a small percentage to 
total household income. The use of double cropping has reduced the availability of family 
labor for other income activities and thus increased the number of full-time farmers who 
participate exclusively in rice farming. A summary of calculations for each cost element 
based on private and social valuations for the main season and the off-season, calculated in 
Ringgit Malaysia (RM) currency is presented in Appendix 3.4 
 
Table 3.1: Comparison of household income between main season and off-season, 2010-
2014 
 
Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. *Exchange rate: US$1= RM3.08 and EUR€1=RM4.32 (Oct 31, 
2010); US$1=RM3.07 and EUR€1=4.30 (Oct 31, 2011); US$1=RM3.06 and EUR€1=RM3.96 (Oct 31, 2012); 
US$1=RM3.16 EUR€1=RM4.33 (Oct 31, 2013) and US$1= RM3.29 and EUR€1=RM4.14 (Oct 31, 2014). 
Main  Off Main  Off Main  Off Main  Off Main  Off
Agricultural Income (RM)*:
Gross income from paddy 3907 4035 4200 3205 3971 3613 5136 4267 6770 4901
(2,385) (2,803)   (2,893) (2,077) (2,578) (2,393) (16,021) (2,705)   (4,259)  (2,928)  
Total subsidy 1293 1335 1399 1060 1314 1184 1499 1412 1400 1013
(789)    (927)      (959)    (687)    (853)    (757)    (960)      (895)      (880)     (605)     
Price support or bonus 1723 1738 1813 1415 1780 1586 1991 1876 0 0
(1,043) (1,171)   (1,258) (944)    (1,292) (1,023) (1,270)   (1,197)   -           -           
Income from other agriculture 2062 2181 2171 1839 2294 1729 2006 2033 2227 1460
(1,555) (2,148)   (2,064) (1,798) (2,925) (1,242) (1,601)   (1,617)   (1,708)  (1,076)  
Cost of production 1708 2213 1886 1924 1971 1999 2028 2230 2402 2571
(305)    (673)      (366)    (440)    (393)    (439)    (406)      (465)      (408)     (475)     
Net income from agriculture 7276 7156 7697 5545 7388 6091 8603 7435 7995 4803
(5,032) (6,156)   (6,167) (4,476) (6,130) (4,756) (16,837) (5,610)   (6,051)  (4,098)  
Non-agricultural income 165 195 201 180 159 151 123 102 145 119
(434)    (516)      (540)    (460)    (438)    (428)    (415)      (408)      (713)     (364)     
Total household income 7441 7351 7898 5725 7547 6242 8726 7537 8141 4922
(5,024) (6,131)   (6,163) (4,429) (6,095) (4,747) (16,836) (5,580)   (6,019)  (4,068)  
Nonagricultural income as % 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
 of total household income 
Farm size (ha) 1.94 2.17 2.08 2.02 1.96 1.79 1.75 1.72 1.77 1.70
(1.56) (2.01)     (1.91) (2.00) (1.93) (1.29) (1.25) 1.22 (1.26) (1.39)
Gross yield (kg) 6,338 6,536 6,817 5,175 6,402 5,783 7,303 6,876 7,039 5,134
(3,865) (4,530)   (4,678) (3,360) (4,140) (3,687) (4,624)   (4,355)   (4,426)  (3,059)  
Sample size (n) 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675
2014
Variable
2010 2011 2012 2013




3.5.2 The competitiveness of rice production  
Results from the SCB analysis of rice production between 2010 and 2014 are presented in 
Figure 2 and summarized in Table 3.2. The results reveal that more than 50% of the farms 
produced rice competitively in each year with the exception of the 2014, when only 48% of 
the farms were competitive. Overall, a high share of individual farms and a high share of total 
production are competitive in all years. The competitive farms produce a disproportionate 
share of the total rice in MADA. For example, in 2011 approximately two-thirds of the 
individual farms (73%) were competitive and altogether, they produced a disproportionately 
large amount of the total rice production (90%). This suggests that a large number of 
individual farms in the major granary area are competitive in producing rice.  
 
Table 3.2: Summary of SCB results by share of individual farms and total rice 
production, 2010- 2014 





  Weighted average SCB 0.65 2.33 
2010 Share of the individual farms in the sample (%) 69.19 30.81 
  
Share of the total production volume in the 
sample (%) 
86.14 13.86 
  Weighted average SCB 0.61 2.30 
2011 Share of the individual farms in the sample (%) 73.04 26.96 
  
Share of the total production volume in the 
sample (%) 
89.89 10.11 
  Weighted average SCB 0.66 2.66 
2012 Share of the individual farms in the sample (%) 60.74 39.26 
  
Share of the total production volume in the 
sample (%) 
81.83 18.17 
  Weighted average SCB 0.67 2.28 
2013 Share of the individual farms in the sample (%) 62.37 37.63 
  
Share of the total production volume in the 
sample (%) 
83.49 16.51 
  Weighted average SCB 0.67 2.28 
2014 Share of the individual farms in the sample (%) 47.70 52.30 
  
Share of the total production volume in the 
sample (%) 
71.13 28.87 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Overall, the results confirm that many Malaysian rice farmers are able to produce rice 
competitively. Note that consideration of average SCBs alone would conceal important 
variations among the farms. For example, in 2013, the average ton of paddy was produced at 




a SCB of 1.02, i.e. not competitive (Figure 3.2). This result obscures the fact that more than 
half of the farms (62%) in this region were competitive, and that these competitive farms 
together accounted for 83% of the total rice production. Therefore, the analysis presented here 
demonstrates there is substantial variation in competitiveness between farms that produce rice 
in the MADA granary. 
 
In the following section we attempt to identify factors that explain this variation and that 
could be used to improve the competitiveness of individual farms; thus shifting SCB 
distributions to the left and increasing the overall competitiveness of Malaysian rice 
production.   
 
 
Figure 3.2: Distribution of competitiveness scores (SCB) for the rice farms, 2010-2014 




-Outliers: those SCB values 
greater than 5 were eliminated 
-Avg is the average SCB 
values 
-Numbers in the figures 
indicate the percentages of the 
competitive/ uncompetitive 
farms. 
-For the details on SCB 
calculations, see Table 3.2 




3.5.3 The determinants of rice competitiveness  
To explain differences in competitiveness among farms we use the following dynamic panel 
data model: 
Yit = β1Yit-1 + β2Xit-1 + αi + εit                                                 (2) 
where Yit is farm i’s SCB score in period t, Xit-1 is a vector of exogenous explanatory variables 
(farm size, distance to milling factories, access to credit, off-farm income, landownership, 
hired cost labor, farmers’ organization, land ownership and a time trend), and αi and εit are 
error terms (αi captures unobserved and time constant farm specific effects and εit is an 
idiosyncratic error term). 
 
Since the lagged dependent variable in equation (2) can be correlated with the error term (), 
it violates the assumption of exogeneity. Furthermore, the unobserved farm specific effects 
() can be correlated with explanatory variables in X. To account for these problems, 
Anderson & Hsiao (1981) propose a difference generalized method of moments (DGMM) 
estimator to obtain unbiased estimates. The model is specified using a system of equations, 
one per period, and uses all available lags of the dependent variable as instruments for each 
first-difference equation (Bond et al, 2001). However, if the parameter β1 is close to a random 
walk, then the lagged levels are weak instruments for differences, because, in this case, past 
levels of SCB scores do not convey much information about present changes. A more suitable 
alternative is to use the system generalized method of moments (SGMM) proposed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) that estimates the model in levels, 
as well as in differences, by using the lagged instruments for the level equations.  
 
We employ the SGMM and perform several tests to determine the most appropriate model 
specification. The Arellano-Bond test is executed to determine serial correlation on the 
residuals, under the hypothesis of no first (AR1) or second (AR2) order serial correlation of 
the residuals (Roodman, 2009a). In order to check for endogeneity bias and potential 
problems of specification in the model estimation we use the Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions (Bond, Hoeffler, and Temple 2001). In addition, we use the difference-in-Hansen 
test statistic to test the validity of specific subsets of instruments.  
 
Where valid instruments are usually scant, the Arellano Bond estimation procedure is useful 
since any lagged level is a valid instrument. To avoid the proliferation of instruments, 




Roodman (2009b) suggests that the instrument matrix be collapsed by only constructing 
instruments for each additional lag, rather than constructing an instrument for each lag in each 
period. He further suggests excluding longer lags as instruments so that the number of lags 
used as instruments in any period is capped. There are no clear guidelines on how to select the 
optimal instruments, but in any case they should not exceed the number of observations 
(Roodman, 2009b). 
  
We choose the explanatory variables in the vector X based on theoretical considerations and 
data availability. These variables include characteristics of the farm (e.g. size, distance from 
the rice mill) and the farmer (whether he/she is a member of the farmers’ organization, 
whether he/she owns or rents the farm, gender, off-farm income, access to credit), and the 
amounts of government support received by the farm. Descriptive statistics are presented in 
Table 3.3. Estimation is carried out with the full balanced panel of 6750 SCB ratios presented 
in the previous section; one ratio for each of i=675 farms in each of t=10 seasons (two seasons 
in each of five years).   
 
Table 3.3: Definitions of variables and summary statistics during the period 2010-2014 
Variable Unit Definition Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent variable 






Gross salary paid based on each 
























































Dummy =1 if the farmer is a member 









Gender 0/1 Dummy= 1 if the farmer is a male 0.90 0.29 0.00 1.00 





















Bonus payment or output subsidies 
received by the farmers  who sells the 













Years Years Vector of years dummies         
Season 0/1 Dummy =1 if main season         
Source: Own calculations 




3.6 Results and Discussion 
Table 3.4 presents the results of the econometric model using the SGMM approach. The 
difference-in-Hansen test statistics indicate that the null hypothesis of no serial correlation 
between instruments and error terms cannot be rejected, indicating that the over-identifying 
restrictions are valid. The Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) provides strong evidence that the 
residuals are negatively correlated which corresponds to the first-differencing process 
inherent in the SGMM method. In addition, the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation in the 
first differenced at order 2 (AR2) is not rejected, which is a required assumption for consistent 
results.  
 
Table 3.4: SGMM estimates for rice competitiveness  
Dependent variable: SCB score 
Explanatory variables Coefficient Standard errors 
 
SCBit-1 -0.294 0.400 
Hired cost labor 4.e-04*** 6.e-05 
Distance to the rice mill 0.077** 0.025 
Access to credit 2.e-05 1.e-05 
Landowner  0.038 0.035 
PPK member -0.354** 0.159 
Male -0.077* 0.046 
Off income 5.e-05* 3.e-05 
Farm size  -0.081*** 0.011 
Input subsidiesit-1 -2.e-04 0.001 
Bonus paymentit-1 -4.e-04 0.001 
Main season -0.268*** 0.055 
   
Observations 5400  
Number instruments 29  
Year and system control Yes  
Arellano-Bond test AR(1) -1.84 [0.065] 
Arellano-Bond test AR(2) -0.74 [0.459] 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity 
of instrument subsets 
2.61 [0.855] 
Note: ***Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level.  
P-values in square brackets. Results were generated using xtabond2 from Roodman (2003). 
 
Since the greater values of the SCB score (SCB > 1) indicate less competitiveness, a positive 
estimated coefficient indicates that the explanatory variable in question increases the SCB and 
therefore has a negative influence on competitiveness. The result demonstrates that the 
estimated coefficient of hired labor cost variable is significant at the 1% level. Each additional 
RM/ha spent on hired labor reduces competitiveness. Rice production is generally labor 




intensive. Much of the labor requirements for the nursery, land preparation, fertilizer 
application, pest control, as well as postharvest activities are mainly completed by farmers 
with the help of hired labors, for whom wages are high, particularly during weeding and 
harvesting periods. For example, for 2013, the average daily wage rate is 38 RM (equivalent 
to 8.5 EUR) (Department of Agriculture, 2014). If a 3 ha farm hires a half-time labor, then the 
SCB scores will fall by 0.04. 
 
The variable “distance to milling” has a statistically strong effect on competitiveness at the 
5% level. The farther a farm is located from the closest milling factory, the lower its 
competitiveness. The delayed drying of a paddy can cause severe losses of moisture due to 
high transpiration rates and microorganisms, especially during the dry season (off-season). To 
avoid high post-harvest losses, farmers have to sell paddy immediately after harvest. To 
proceed with this, farmers have the option of selling a paddy directly to a local miller or 
allowing the paddy to be collected by local traders. Most farmers prefer to wait for collection 
because they do not own trucks to load their harvest. Thus, farmers must bear the transaction 
costs, which increase as the distance to the rice mills increases.  
 
It appears that growers who engage collectively in a farmer’s organization (PPK) are 
accessing social and economic benefits greater than non-collective action participants. The 
results are consistent with the predicted function of agricultural cooperatives in improving the 
performance of their members in the market by providing easy access to productive inputs 
and technical and management services, such as training, information and extension on input 
application (Addai et al, 2014). Many governments establish farmer-based cooperation groups 
to improve rural service delivery and access to the market, as well as reduce transaction costs 
and achieve competitiveness. 
 
Male farmers are observed to be operating at a higher level of profitability than their female 
counterparts. It implies that male farmers earned more social profits from rice production and 
are more competitive than the female farmers. This could be due to the limited access the 
female farmers usually have to resources of production in comparison with the male farmers. 
This corroborates the results of many previous studies on the role of gender in agricultural 
production. The study by Siriwardana and Jayawardena (2014) in Sri Lanka found male 
household heads to be more productive than female household heads in mechanized farms. 
Koirala et al. (2015) found female heads of households to be less productive than men in rice 




production in a study in the Philippines, a fact that the authors attributed to culture, access to 
land and economic factors. 
 
Another important finding is that involvement in off-farm activities appears to reduce 
competitiveness. The increasing importance of off-farm work implies less labor effort and 
time spent on the farm.  The coefficient suggests that off-farm income tends to increase the 
SCB ratio by 5x10
-4
. Such an effect, though small, is statistically significant at the 10% level.  
Our result confirms the finding made by Goodwin and Ashok (2004) who noted that increased 
reliance on off-farm work may have implied less attention paid to the on-farm productivity 
issues such as adoption of best management practices and technologies, and in turn decreases 
competitiveness.  
 
We used the farm size variable to test whether competitiveness increases with the scale of 
operation. Our result indicates that increasing the farm size per hectare reduces the SCB of 
rice production by 0.081. This finding suggests that the consolidation of small farms in the 
MADA granary area will lead to the realization of economies of scale in rice production. 
Other variables such as access to credit and landownership have no significant effect on 
competitiveness. 
 
We turned our attention to the rice policies and different mechanisms affecting 
competitiveness. To avoid the effects of heterogeneity on total subsidies, we disaggregated 
subsidies into input subsidies and bonus payments. The whole idea of the SCB is that we 
calculated the social profits without government intervention or subsidies. To determine 
whether these subsidies would improve SCBs, we tested the hypothesis in a dynamic setting; 
do past subsidies affect current competitiveness or are the farms that previously received 
more subsidies more competitive today? We hypothesize that input subsidies, by encouraging 
input use, might lead farms to produce in more efficient, more beneficial ways when 
evaluated at social prices. Additionally, if the bonus payments are more coupled from 
intensity and production decisions, they might not have a negative effect on competitiveness. 
In fact, they may lead to a wealth effect which can reduce farmers’ aversion to risks and 
facilitate investment and thus increase outputs. The various mechanism through which 
decoupled payment and inputs subsidies may affect production are well discussed in the 
literature (see Goodwin and Ashok 2005; Femenia et al. 2010; Sunding and Zilberman 2000). 
 




Our SGMM results, however, indicate no significant difference between these types of 
policies and competitiveness scores. The general evidence seems to be that input subsidies 
and bonuses are, if anything, increasing competitiveness. Subsidies, by encouraging input use, 
may indeed be increasing production and making it more competitive. Since the evidence 
shows no strong effects of subsidies and bonus payments, then the policy implications are that 
the policies are not having a strong effect on competitiveness, and the money in question 
could perhaps be better spent in other ways. At best, the subsidies are a form of social policy 
that simply increases farm incomes, but then the question arises as to why larger farms, that 
are presumably not poor, should also receive these payments. So current spending is poorly 
targeted as social policy, and ineffective as an economic policy to boost competitiveness. 
 
3.7 Conclusion and recommendations 
The Malaysian rice market has been characterized in the past decade by pervasive government 
interventions for various purposes, such as to alleviate poverty and increase self-sufficiency 
levels. Since rice is a staple food, the government intervenes more in the rice market than in 
most others. These interventions include support for producers through subsidies on 
fertilizers, lime and pesticides on the input side and a subsidized guaranteed minimum price 
coupled with price bonuses on the output side. However, the successful completion of WTO 
negotiations together with Asean Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) negotiations would imply 
that significant structural changes must be made not only to the trade regime, but also to the 
rice sector and adjustments at the farm level are needed in order for greater efficiency and 
competitiveness to be achieved.  
 
Previous literature had discussed the impact of policies on agricultural competitiveness using 
the Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) in many developing countries. However, one major 
drawback of almost all applied PAM analysis to date is that it is carried out with aggregate 
data, for example for average or representative farms. This will provide an incomplete picture 
of sectoral competitiveness since results based on average data may conceal important 
variations in competitiveness among heterogeneous producers. We have addressed this 
shortcoming, using a unique, farm level survey data from rice farmers in the major granary 
area in Malaysia over the period 2010 to 2014. Our contribution to the existing literature is 
twofold. First, we provide new evidence on rice competitveness using an extension to the 
Policy Analysis Matrix approach proposed by (Monke and Pearson (1989). This extension 
allows us to take farm-level heterogeneity into account and derive competitiveness score 




distributions for each rice farm. To improve the usefulness of SCB indicator, we use a kernel-
based estimate to demonstrate the distribution of competitiveness scores and determine the 
proportion of farms that are producing competitively and the proportion of total 
production/output value of the product that is produced competitively. Second, we develop a 
panel regression model to examine the factors that influence rice competitiveness at the 
individual farm level. This approach may also be useful for other evaluation in other contexts, 
thus contributing to the broader research direction on agricultural competitiveness. 
 
The empirical results reveal that more than 50% of farmers produce rice competitively from 
2010 until 2013 and altogether, they produce a disproportionately large number of the total 
rice production (80%). This suggests that a large number of individual farms in the granary 
area are competitive in producing rice. Additionally, we briefly note the contrast between the 
distributions of using disaggregate SCB and average SCB that would result from the use of 
aggregated data. 
 
Our dynamic SGMM estimates revealed that participation in a farmer’s organization, gender 
and total farm size are the major determinants of rice competitiveness, while the distance to 
the rice mills, off-farm income and the use of hired labor are the main constraints that reduce 
competitiveness. Additionally, there are no signicant differences between the types of policies 
employed (input subsidies and bonuses) and competitiveness. The estimates produced for this 
paper have the potential to influence on-going debates on federal budget reduction, as well as 
add to the discussion on the agricultural subsidy reform policy.  
 
Policies for rice farmers need to vary depending on the context. This statement is bolstered by 
our empirical analysis, which reveals that the types of supports do not have significant effects 
on competitiveness and the money in question could be spent in other ways. Bonus payments 
and input subsidies in their current form are not as efficient as they seem to be considering 
that essentially only large farms and high-income groups benefit from them. The existing set 
of programs was designed to address situations that are now out-of-date and, as a 
consequence, may no longer be relevant.  
 
If the government decides to preserve small and marginal farms, assistance measures should 
be directed towards these specific groups to prevent such problematic outcomes. For instance, 
improving infrastructure that links farmers to millers would help improve competitiveness. In 




addition, offering support in the form of providing technical assistance through farmers’ 
organization so that farmers can receive a better share of market prices could improve 
competitiveness. If this were the case for the policy agenda, such support could become a 
social safety net for the poor and could facilitate a comfortable exit from farming for small 
farmers through job provision or income support programs. The replacement of the fertilizer 
subsidy by direct income support programs would be tantamount to income support without 
any waste and lack of efficient distribution associated with the fertilizer and input subsidy 
scheme.  
 
In other cases, policy-makers must consider whether there are social reasons to support large 
farms. The empirical evidence reveals that farmers are fully aware of the utility of subsidies; 
considering the fact that the previous provision of input subsidies does not improve current 
competitiveness. If profits generated by farming activities were to be ensured by the 
government, the incentive to adopt innovate practices and technology would diminish.  
 
Similarly, the incorporation of the paddy bonus into the guaranteed minimum price is justified 
on the grounds of increasing rice prices and cost control. Efforts to direct paddy bonus 
payments to poor and small farms by incorporating the access to farm size and production 
deliveries seem achievable. However, regardless of whether the farms are small or large, 
paddy bonuses are given to all farmers. It is important to note that not all paddy growers are 
poor; some support goes to larger farms where profits are already substantial. The drawback 
implies that the support may be biased towards larger farms and is not well-targeted. 
Therefore, a combination of both subsidy schemes is not completely necessary and 
improvement would result in a more efficient use of public money. 
 
Given the fact that the sample in this study constitutes only a dataset of individual rice farms 
selected from one granary area of the country, our findings and policy recommendations 
cannot be generalized to the national level. These results are situation specific and thus cannot 
be extrapolated to other granary areas with different conditions. The SGMM provides an 
appropriate framework to analyse the determinants of rice competitiveness, however data 
limitation prevents the consideration of all aspects in the analysis. We suggest for future 
research to determine the characteristics of farms (bio-physical conditions such as soil types 
and climate variability) and different agro-ecological regions, as well as other farmer’s 
characteristics such as age, education and human capital. Extending this research topic would 




not only supplement the contribution of this study but also can shed light on the variations and 
differences in competitiveness level among rice farms and region specific priorities. 
Additionally, further research will lead to the policies that would enhance farmers income,  
shifting from less efficient to more efficient farms and allowing them to better contribute to 




































Appendix 3.1: Contribution of MADA to the total granary areas and National 
Production, 2010- 2013 
 
Source: Paddy Production Survey Report 2014, Department of Agriculture, Malaysia , Putrajaya. 
* Total parcel excluding Sabah and Sarawak. Land and rice fields in Sabah and Sarawak have not been gazetted 




























Appendix 3.2: Policy Analysis Matrix 
 Items Revenues Costs Profits 
  
 
Tradable Inputs Domestic Factors 
 
Private prices 𝑨 = 𝑃𝑖











D = A-B-C 
Social prices 𝑬 =  𝑃𝑖
















I = A - E J= B - F K = C - G 
L = D – H = 
I – J - K 
Source: Monke and Pearson (1989) 
Note: 
The subscript i refers to outputs and the subscript j refers to inputs, 
aij for (j= 1 to k) are technical coefficients for traded inputs in the production of i; 
aij for(j=k+1 to n) are technical coefficients for domestic inputs in the production of i; 
Pi* is the price of output i, evaluated privately (*=D) or socially (*=S); 
Pj* is the price of traded input j, evaluated privately (*=D) or socially (*=S); 
Wj* is the price of domestic input j, evaluated privately (*=D) or socially (*=S); 
D (= A-B-C) measures Private profit; 
H (=E-F-G) measures Social profits; 
I (= A-E) measures Output transfers; 
J (=B-F) measures Input transfers; 
 K (=C-G) measures Factor transfers; 
 L (= D-H; or I-J-K) measures Net transfers. 
 
Conversion from private to social prices is based on several data and assumptions; 
i. Since rice is an imported good, the social price for rice is the import parity price of 
rice (25% broken) equivalent at the farm gate. Appendix 3.3 displays the calculations 
for the import parity of rice based on the world market price (25% broken Vietnam 
rice) (source from an interview with BERNAS officer). 
ii. As for the tradable inputs, the social prices for fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, and 
seeds are the respective import parity prices at the farm gate. 
 
 




Appendix 3.3: Scheme of Import Parity Price Calculations for Rice, Malaysia  
 
A) PURCHASE PRICE
Purchase Price (FOB)  USD/t
Exchange Rate RM/t
 Less 10% quality discount RM/t
Marine Cargo Insurance BKK/LCH/LKR (THA) Rate (PP*120%x.1%)/t
Land Transportation Rate/Port
Port Handling
Carpenter/EMC/Custom Exam Selected Port (Container Only)
Government Inspection Selected Port (Container Only)
Forwarding/Coordination Service Agrmt.
Terminal Handling Charges (THC) Rate/Port (Container Only)
Documentation Fee Conv. Only
EDI Selected Port
Port Charges/Surcharge Selected Port
Port Weighbridge Selected Port
Storage (Penalties/Delay/EMC/Detention)
Surveyor Fees Contract Rate
Others Rate/Port
SGN (HCM) Rate/Port
Warehouse Handling In + Out + Stck Mgt
Ocean Freight BKK/LCH (THA) Rate/Port
C) WAREHOUSE COST (BASED ON SALES VOLUME)












Total Warehouse Cost  RM/t
Import Parity Price of Rice per MT (A+B+C)  RM/t
 - Processing costs  RM/t
Border Price of Rice  RM/t
Border Price of Paddy
 x Conversion factor and milling rate 0.65
 = Price of paddy  RM/t
 + Transportation farm -> District area  RM/t/km
Import Parity Price at farm gate  RM/t
Total Import Cost per MT
B) IMPORT COST




iii. The need to determine the shadow exchange rate is important for an economic 
analysis. The shadow exchange rate affects all the social values of tradable inputs and 
output. This is the point when various opportunities for alternative investment present 
themselves to a nation and they must be properly evaluated and then the same foreign 
exchange premium must be used in the economic analysis for each alternative. Thus, 
instead of the official exchange rate, the shadow exchange rate is used to convert 
international prices from US dollars to Malaysia’s currency. Malaysia is a small open 
trading nation where such discrepancy between official exchange rate and shadow 
exchange rate is quite small.  
iv. Domestic inputs such as land for which no international prices exist is valued at local 
opportunity costs. However, in this view the rental values of land per hectare for 
granary area at social prices are assumed to be zero since the conversion of paddy 
fields to other crops is unfeasible due to its soil condition and flooding area suitable 
for only rice cropping. In addition Malaysian government has already officially 
recognized the field as the permanent rice growing areas responsible for achieving the 
minimum level of self-sufficiency under the National Agriculture Policy (1984). 
v. Social costs are assumed to equal private costs for labor. Distortions in the labor 
market are minimal since minimum wage is not enforced in agriculture and has 
limited impact on the Malaysian economy. Therefore, the private wage rate for rural 
labor is a good approximation of the social wage and thus, the conversion factor for 
the labor is assumed to be equal to 1. 
vi. Some of the taxes, including land tax and water tax, are viewed as pure transfers from 
one agent to another within the society, which does not create economic value or 
induce an economic impact (European Commission, 2008). In this case, all prices of 
input and output should be a net of VAT or other indirect taxes and should be omitted 
from revenues under economic analysis. Therefore, the conversion factor for the taxes 
is assumed to be 0. 
vii. The following table provides a summary of calculations for each cost element based 
on private and social valuations for the main season and the off-season, calculated in 









Appendix 3.4: Private and social valuations of inputs in rice production, 2010- 2014 
Variable 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Main Season 
private inputs 471 411 406 486 648 
social inputs 426 410 493 440 645 
            
private labor 292 348 341 433 505 
social labor 292 348 341 433 505 
            
private capital 990 1129 1137 1155 1251 
social capital 1248 1422 1433 1456 1577 
            
private land 306 300 315 318 325 
social land 0 0 0 0 0 
            
private others 19 20 21 21 21 
social others 0 0 0 0 0 
Off Season 
private inputs 454 381 459 624 790 
social inputs 395 452 503 568 723 
            
private labor 640 369 408 374 528 
social labor 640 369 408 374 528 
            
private capital 1098 1153 1111 1211 1230 
social capital 1384 1452 1400 1525 1550 
            
private land 305 322 326 340 288 
social land 0 0 0 0 0 
            
private others 20 20 21 21 23 
social others 0 0 0 0 0 
 
           Source: Own calculations 
Note: Exchange rate: US$1= RM3.08 and EUR€1=RM4.32 (Oct 31, 2010); US$1= RM3.07 and EUR€1=4.30 (Oct 
31, 2011); US$1= RM3.06 and EUR€1=RM3.96 (Oct 31, 2012); US$1= RM3.16 EUR€1=RM4.33 (Oct 31, 2013) 











Appendix 3.5: Distribution of competitiveness scores (SCB) for the rice farms, 2010-
2014 
 
                Source: Own calculations 
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Chapter 4  
Estimating Technical Efficiency and Unobserved Heterogeneity  
On Rice Farms in Malaysia 
 
 
Changes and trends in farm efficiency have been of considerable interest to many Asian 
governments due to a strong link between food security and rice production. We use farm 
level data to gain insights on the technical efficiency of the Malaysia’s rice farming. Although 
panel data are available, some important descriptive attributes are scarce. As a result, we take 
unobserved heterogeneity into account and use the recent fixed effect model implemented by 
Chen et al (2014). During the period of 2010-2014, technical efficiency was found to be 
fluctuating, with an average mean value of 60 percent. The low mean values of technical 
efficiency change further revealing that the frontier is shifting inward and some farms are 
essentially moving farther from the frontier. In a second stage of analysis, we examine the 
factors that account for the variations in inefficiencies across the farms as well as their 
potential to improve efficiency and resource use using a fixed effect model regression.  Our 
empirical results indicate that access to credit, non-farm income, distance to the rice mill, 
farm size and hired labor are the major determinants of technical efficiency. Additionally, 
government input subsidies are found to have a positive impact on farm technical efficiency 
and thus support the argument that agricultural subsidies may create incentives for farmers to 
improve their efficiency. Overall, the results indicate that rice production can be improved by 
continuously increasing a farm’s resources and technical efficiency. This suggests that a 
serious policy recommendation that facilitates farmers’ accessibility to credit, capital, land 
and other inputs, especially for small farms, must be carefully designed and well-targeted. 




Keywords: rice, technical efficiency, fixed effect, panel data, unobserved heterogeneity 






The efficiency of the rice production sector has been the subject of considerable interest and 
policy focus for many Asian governments due to the strong relationship between food 
security and rice production (Timmer and Dawe 2007). The global rice market crisis of 2007-
2008 led to sudden spikes in rice prices, which further marginalized poor populations in many 
developing countries and hindered their access to sufficient basic food supplies (Dawe, 2010). 
Rice is a primary food staple for a large part of the world’s human population and has a large 
influence on the livelihood of farmers. For this reason, policymakers have become 
particularly concerned with the efficiency of rice production. Reliable research results on the 
efficiency of rice production can contribute to policies that increase agricultural production, 
promote adequate food supplies, and boost incomes and food security for low income 
farmers.   
 
Research on production efficiency can also contribute to the debate on whether it is necessary 
to support rice production, for example with price support or input subsidies. Many countries 
in Southeast Asia, including Malaysia, protect and support domestic rice producers. Since the 
inception of the ASEAN free trade agreement (AFTA), rice tariffs have been reduced to 0-5% 
for all trading partners in the region. However, in the major rice importing countries, such as 
Malaysia, rice is considered a key to food security and, therefore, is subject to tariffs up to 
20%. Both the volumes of the input subsidies and price support have increased remarkably 
over the years. This support, however, has been the subject of a long-standing debate (Hoang 
and Meyers, 2015).  Some argue that deviations from production and international trade based 
on comparative advantage will result in allocative inefficiencies and rent-seeking behavior. 
Policy makers counter that support is required to boost domestic self-sufficiency and to 
protect farmers from the effects of what is perceived to be unfair competition. Research can 
inform this debate by providing facts on whether and which rice producers are efficient, and 
the factors that contribute to differences in productivity and efficiency among producers.  
 
Malaysia has the potential to grow more rice if analysis can identify efficient farms and the 
causes of their superior performance, thus, providing benchmarks for less efficient farms. The 
study of the rice markets in Malaysia is somehow unique in the region as it exhibits some 
exceptional features and is worth investigating for several reasons. First, Malaysia lies 
entirely in the equatorial zone with uniform temperature, high humidity and rainfall that are 




favorable for the development and growth of the tropical rice crop. The copious rainfall 
provides important water sources for successful cultivation of rice. However, despite of its 
natural endowments, the country’s topography leaves limited arable land to expand rice 
production (Arshad et al. 2011). Second, the average yield in Malaysia from 2010- 2013 was 
4.60 tons paddy per hectare, compared to just 3.44 tons paddy per hectare in the major rice 
exporters in Southeast Asia (Mutert and Fairhurst, 2002). Yet, the evidence indicates that the 
average potential rice yield in the country is 10 tons per hectare (Siwar et al. 2014). The yield 
gap between potential and actual yield levels in Malaysia is nearly twice that of the current 
yield which requires further improvement in efficiency in order to close the gap. Third, the 
2% national population growth rate is resulting in a demand that outpaces the production 
growth. At the same time, there is little scope to extend the crop land frontier: rice land 
availability in Malaysia has declined by 10,600 ha (0.30%) from 1990-1995 (Daño and 
Samonte, n.d.). Consequently, Malaysia needs to produce more rice, while at the same time 
increase the efficiency of the scarce resource, which is largely possible by increasing the 
adoption rate of high-yielding rice varieties in all seasons to up to 90 per cent of total rice area 
(Abiola et al. 2016). This implies that Malaysian farmers need to increase their efficiency by 
utilising the scarce resources efficiently. Therefore, studying the potential of inefficiencies in 
farm performance is important not only from the policy standpoint but also from a global 
context. 
 
However, literature on the efficiency of Malaysian rice production has typically used cross-
sectional data (Thiam et al. 2001). To the best of our knowledge, the technical efficiency of 
Malaysian rice farms, and its evolution over time, have not been studied using representative 
farm panel data. This study is an attempt to narrow this gap. For this purpose, we conduct an 
empirical technical efficiency analysis with unobserved heterogeneity and employ an 
implementation by Chen et al (2014)  of a fixed effect model. We study data from a panel of 
6,570 rice farms covering the years 2010-2014. These data provide a unique opportunity to 
analyze the changes in farm level efficiency over time for rice farms in Malaysia and to gain 
insights into the factors that determine differences in efficiency between farms. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In section 4.2 we present the panel data model 
of technical efficiency that we employ. Section 4.3 describes the data that we use. In section 
4.4 we present and discuss results, and Section 4.5 concludes. 
 




4.2 Methods to measure efficiency using panel data 
Since the seminal work conducted by Aigner et al. (1977), the Stochastic Frontier (SF) model  
has been widely use to estimate the technical efficiency in applied economic research. 
Extensive research in this field has resulted in a growing arsenal of methods and econometrics 
techniques pertaining to specifications, estimation and testing issue. Despite that, when 
productivity or efficiency is analyzed at the farm level, the problem arises that not all relevant 
factor can be observed or measured adequately. Therefore, some environmental, such as soil 
condition, weather, rainfall or droughts, and managerial characteristics are often omitted from 
the model specifications because of unavailable or missing information. This information is 
referred to as unobserved heterogeneity (Álvarez et al, 2009). As a result, inference based on 
the output comparison could be biased and is often criticized because farms are heterogeneous 
and operate under different production and environmental conditions (Abdulai and Tietje, 
2007).  
To overcome the challenge of unobserved heterogeneity, the standard stochastic frontier 
models, such as the fixed-effects or random-effects model, can be employed (Pitt and Lee 
1981; Schmidt and Sickles 1984). A frequent case in most classical stochastic frontier occurs 
when the information that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity not included in the model is 
considered time-invariant and these specifications interpret time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity as inefficiency, thus do not provide any mechanism to disentangle the former 
from the latter. The consideration on how heterogeneity is treated has induced several 
extensions of the standard stochastic frontier model (see Greene (2008) for a recent survey). 
These extensions distinguish between the aforementioned latent components by separating the 
inefficiency from the time invariant unobserved heterogeneity that are unrelated with the 
production process but affect the output (Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson, 1995; Greene, 
2005a,b; Wang and Ho, 2010; Chen et al. 2014). 
 
In the dataset that we employ, managerial characteristics and environmental conditions are not 
directly observed and can be interpreted as unobserved farm heterogeneity. Consider the 




𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽′𝑥𝑖𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡 −  𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                     (1) 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 =  𝑣𝑖𝑡 −  𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                (2) 
                                                 
6
 In the following method, i draw heavily on the following sources;  Belotti and Giuseppe (2012) and 
Holtkamp (2015). 





where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the vector of the output of firm i (i=1,...,N) in period t (t=1,...,T);  xit is a set of 
inputs that produce output 𝑦𝑖𝑡; 𝛼𝑖 is the unit fixed-effect;   β is the associated vector that 
describes technology parameters to be estimated. The composite error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the 
difference between the idiosyncratic error that captures noise 𝑣𝑖𝑡, and the one-sided 
disturbance 𝑢𝑖𝑡 which represents inefficiency. Under the frequently used normal-half normal 
model, the distributional assumptions are 𝑣𝑖𝑡 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ~ 𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝑢
2). However, as 
mentioned previously whether or not to separate 𝛼𝑖  from 𝑢𝑖𝑡  has been the subject of much 
debate in the stochastic frontier literature. A major limitation of the model in equation (1) is 
related to an identification problem which arises when the inefficiency term is time-variant. It 
is not likely that a constant level of inefficiency would extend over long periods of time; i.e. 
process of learning or managerial ability. In this case, it is difficult to disentangle the 
unobserved farm-specific heterogeneity from inefficiency (Greene, 2005).  
 
Greene (2005) proposed a “true fixed effects” or TFE model that includes a maximum 
likelihood dummy variables estimator (MLDVE), in which the unit-specific intercepts are 
estimated with structural parameters. The TFE model places unobserved heterogeneity as 
fixed effects in the stochastic frontier model (equation 1) and generates a neutral shift of the 
function specific to each farm (Porcelli, 2009) while allowing for time-varying inefficiency 
(Belotti and Giuseppe, 2012). This approach is frequently applied, however it leads to 
inconsistent variance parameter estimates due to the incidental parameters problem especially 
in the short panel because the number of parameters depends on the sample size (there are 
firm effects 𝛼𝑖; and the number of parameters, N which increases with the sample size). 
Hence, the estimated error variance, and the parameter 𝜎𝑢
2 is inconsistent. 
 
 
To account for this limitation, Chen et al. (2014) propose a consistent estimator for the TFE 
normal-half normal model based on the within transformed model where the fixed effects 
have been removed. This procedure is commonly used in the panel data:  
𝑧?̅?𝑡 =  𝑧𝑖𝑡 −  𝑧?̅?                                                            (3) 
 
For any corresponding variable (𝑧) in each panel i, the individual mean (𝑧?̅?) is subtracted from 
the observed value in period t (𝑧𝑖𝑡). Correspondingly, the model can be represented by using 




the deviations from means (𝑧?̅?) so that the transformed model is free from incidental 
parameters problem (αi): 
 
?̅?𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽′?̅?𝑖𝑡 +  ?̅?𝑖𝑡 −  ?̅?𝑖𝑡                                                    (4) 
 
As outlined by (Holtkamp, 2015) the model in equation (4) has the following features: first, 
the incidental parameters problem is removed by a within-transformation; second, it produces 
a consistent estimator of the error variance since the relevant likelihood function is derived 
from T-1 deviations; and third, this approach, which is based on a more general distributional 
theory, allows for the maintenance of the firm-specific and time varying inefficiency 𝑢𝑖𝑡. 
 
The distribution of the composed error, 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is defined by the Closed Skew Normal (CSN) 
distribution in the stochastic frontier context (Chen et al. 2014). The CSN is a generalization 
of the skew normal distribution (González-Farías et al. 2004), which is itself a generalization 
of the normal distribution. Therefore, the CSN family preserves some properties of the normal 
distribution (Chen et al. 2014). With panel data, the distribution of the composed error can be 
written as:  




, 0, 𝐼)                                                 (5) 
 
where the density of a CSN distribution includes a p-dimensional pdf and a q-dimensional cdf 




), as well as the mean vector (0) and covariance matrix in the cdf (𝐼) . In the panel data, the 
vector (𝜀𝑖 =  𝜀𝑖1, 𝜀𝑖2 … … 𝜖𝑖𝑇)′ is distributed as: 
                                               𝜖𝑖𝑡 ~ 𝐶𝑆𝑁𝑇,𝑇(0𝑇 , 𝜎
2𝐼𝑇 , − 
𝜆
𝜎
𝐼𝑇 , 0𝑇 , 𝐼𝑇)                                       (6) 
 
where I is the identity matrix and the vector is divided into a linear combination; its mean is 
represented by 𝜀?̅? and its first T-1 deviations as 𝜀̅
∗
𝑖
= (𝜀?̅?1, 𝜀?̅?2 … . . , 𝜀?̅?,𝑇−1)′; and within MLE, 
which is defined by the maximization of the within likelihood with respect to β, λ and 𝜎2, 
which is not subject to the incidental parameters problem, (where β = within estimator, 
𝜆 =  
𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣
   and 𝜎2 = 𝜎𝑢
2  + 𝜎𝑣
2). 
 




The point estimator of Battese and Coelli (1988) can be used to assess technical effciency. 
Therefore, the composed error has to be recovered: 
 
 𝜀𝑖𝑡 =  𝑦𝑖𝑡 −  ?̂?𝑖𝑡 =  𝑦𝑖𝑡 −  𝛽′𝑥𝑖𝑡 −  ?̂?𝑖                                       (7) 
 
The estimate ?̂?𝑖, can be obtained by mean-adjusting the usual estimator for the fixed effects 
linear model. In this model if ?̂? is the within estimator, then the fixed effects estimates of 
individual effects are;  ?̂?𝑖 =  ?̅?𝑖 −  ?̅?𝐼?̂?. However, in the stochastic frontier  model, since the 𝜀?̅? 
is not zero because −𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡) =  √
2
𝜋
𝜎𝑢, the estimator needs to be modified and  ?̂?𝑖 can be 
calculated as the mean-adjusted estimate by (Chen et al. 2014): 
 
?̂?𝐼
𝑀 =  ?̅?𝑖 − ?̂?
′?̅?𝑖 +  √
2
𝜋
?̂?𝑢                                                (8) 
 
where ?̂? and ?̂?𝑢  are the within MLE estimates. 
 
 
4.3 Data and empirical definitions of the variables 
 
We estimate the stochastic frontier model outlined above using farm-level survey data over 
the period 2010-2014. These farms are located in Muda Agricultural Kemubu Authority 
(MADA), Kedah, which is the largest granary area in Malaysia and located in north Malaysia. 
Granary Areas
7
 are acknowledged by the Government in the National Agricultural Policy as 
the main paddy producing areas. These eight areas are irrigated  according to large irrigation 
schemes (areas greater than 4,000 hectares) (Department of Agriculture, 2014).  
 
The output variable is defined as the total output of rice production in kilograms (kg). The 
consideration of the gross output of rice in kg has the advantage of taking quality differences 
into account. The actual purchasing price that farmers normally receive from the processors or 
the rice millers depends on the grain’s purity, quality and moisture content. Corresponding to 
the standards enforced by the local and government millers, the acceptable moisture content 
of paddies in Malaysia is 14%. If the moisture in a sample of paddy surpasses this limit, the 
per kg price of this rice is adjusted accordingly. The vector X includes five inputs: land (in 
                                                 
7
 There are eight granary areas in Malaysia, namely MADA, KADA, IADA KERIAN, IADA BLS, 
IADA P. Pinang, IADA Seberang Perak, IADA KETARA and IADA Kemasin Semerak. 




ha), labor, is approximated by the wage expenditure per day in Ringgit Malaysia (RM), 
capital costs, also in RM (which include the costs of machinery services hired for harvesting, 
transplanting, seedling and threshing), quantity of seeds used (in kg), and the value of 
agricultural chemicals in RM.  
 
These variables are transformed and scaled to their respective means before taking logarithms. 
With this transformation, the elasticities of the output regarding the inputs are the first-order 
coefficients of the inputs in a translog function (evaluated at the means of the variables).  
 
Prior to further analysis, we remove outliers from the balanced panel data of 6,750 rice farms 
for the period 2010-2014. Here, all observations were detected as outliers if 99% of the 
variable of interest (output, capital, labor and seed) lied outside ± 3 standard deviations from 
the mean. To account for zero usage of agricultural chemicals, the values of this variable are 
added to the amount of pesticides subsidies of 200 RM per hectare. Additionally, many data 
sets are incomplete or indicate obvious errors. As a consequence, the remaining panel is 
unbalanced with 6,570 and we continued working with the unbalanced panel data for the rice 
farms in Malaysia. 
 
We use a translog functional form which includes a time trend, 𝑡 as an additional input in 
order to allow for non-neutral technical change. The model specification is therefore:  
 

















2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑡𝑗
5
𝑗=1 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                     (9) 
 
 
In this equation, αi is the unobserved heterogeneity which is treated as fixed; xit is a set of 
inputs that produce output 𝑦𝑖𝑡;  𝑣𝑖𝑡 is the statistical error; and the non-negative random 
variable 𝑢𝑖𝑡  is the technical inefficiency.  
 
Both output and input exhibit substantial variation over time. For example, the average output 
increased from 5,359 kg in 2010 to 6,316 kg in 2013, but then decreased strongly to 4947 kg 
in 2014. Individual inputs such as seed, agricultural chemicals and capital costs also vary 
considerably over time. The standard deviations indicate a higher degree of heterogeneity 
among the rice producers in the dataset, even though they are all located in the same granary 




area. This heterogeneity is presumably due to farm-level variation in factors which are not 
captured in the dataset, including biophysical conditions (e.g. climate, irrigation, soil 
condition), farmer characteristics (e.g. age, education, experience, household size), and 
managerial skills. The CFE model described above allows us to account for this farm-level 
heterogeneity when estimating efficiency. 
 
In a second step, we use a fixed effect panel regression to analyze the determinants of 
technical efficiency. Exogenous variables that we hypothesize will affect technical efficiency 
include farm characteristics (e.g. size, distance from the rice mill), farmer characteristics 
(whether he/she is a member of the farmers’ organization, whether he/she owns or rents the 
farm, gender, off-farm income, access to credit), and the amount of government support 
received by the farm. This support includes subsidies on input use such as fertlizer, lime and 
chemical inputs. Since 1974, farmers who owned less than 10 hectares of lands received free 
fertilizers of 240 kg per hectare of mixed fertilizer, 80 kg per hectare of organic fertilizer and 
150 kg (3 bags) of NPK (nitrogen, phosphate and potassium). In addition, all farmers receive 
a coupon of agricultural chemical inputs for purchasing weeds and pest controls worth of 200 
RM/ha.  Another form of support is the price subsidy. This scheme was introduced in 1980 at 
the rate of 165 RM per ton and was then revised and increased to 248.10 RM per ton in 
1990.A list of these variables and descriptive statistics are provided in Table 4.1.  
 
The relationship between off-farm income and technical efficiency is complex and 
ambiguous. Kumbhakar and Lien, (2010) and Abdulai and Eberlin (2001) postulated higher 
production inefficiency is associated with the involvement of households in off-farm 
activities. Farmers who have various sources of income may devote more time to off-farm 
activities and, hence, pay less attention and effort to farm activities, such as agronomical 
practices. However, off-farm income might also have a beneficial effect on technical 
efficiency. Fernandez-Cornejo et al. (2007) argue that off farm income increases the adoption 
of agricultural innovations through managerial time. Additionally, an increase in nonfarm 
employment reduces financial constraints, especially for resource constrained farmers who 
may require the additional income to purchase productivity enhancing inputs (Huffman, 
1980). 
 
Access to formal credit may relieve financial constraints otherwise hindering farmers from 
investing in efficiency enhancing inputs (Abdulai and Eberlin, 2001; Brummer and Loy, 




2000; von Cramon-Taubadel and Saldias, 2014). In this case, credit could therefore increase 
the net revenue obtained from fixed inputs, market conditions and individual characteristics. 
On the other hand, a credit constrained farmer will be less efficient if credit shortage 
adversely affects access to input and limits the  adoption  of  high  yielding  varieties and  the 
acquisition  of  information  relevant  for  increasing  productivity  (Wozniak,  1993). Credit 
can also be worrisome if default costs are seen to be minor and a credit is therefore used as a 
welfare support measure by the household (Binswanger and Deininger, 1997).   
 
Other variables representing characteristics of the farmers include gender, participation in a 
farmer’s organization and land ownership.  The household head, whether male or female, is 
assumed to be the primary decision maker for that household and therefore contributes to 
efficiency. Farmers who participate in a farmers’ organization might be more efficient due to 
easier access to productive inputs and technical and management services, such as training, 
information and extension on input application (Addai et al, 2014). Economic theory suggests 
that lack land ownership negatively affects a farmer’s access to credit designated to improve 
land-based practices. Therefore, land ownership reduces uncertainty which helps farmers to 
make investment decisions on land, adopt the best cropping system, use the land as collateral 
for credit and thus improves efficiency (Koirala et al, 2016). 
 
Two variables that represent farm characteristics employed in the analysis of the determinants 
of technical inefficiency include land and distance to the rice mill. The relationship between 
farm size and efficiency has gain much attention in the literature. In most developed 
countries, farm size is found to increase consistently in the last decades. Some authors 
hypothesize that larger farms benefited from higher efficiency than smaller farms (Olson and 
Vu 2009; Masterson, 2007). However, other authors, particularly in the developing countries 
studies argue that smaller farms are more productive because they make use of the land more 
intensively (Johnson and Ruttan,1994; Binswanger and Elgin, 1998; Bhatt and Bhat, 2014). 
We hypothesize that smaller farms are more technically efficient than the larger farm, 
considering a relatively small farm with limited access to resources may use the combined 
resources (use labor more intensively, use more of available land for land improvement) in a 
diligent manner in order to survive. Additionally, our hypothesis is that distance to the rice 
mills reduces technical inefficiency. With greater access to the market and better roads and 
transport infrastructure, farmers are able to reduce the risk and uncertainty of postharvest 
losses as well as achieve greater information on market prices. 




The effect of subsidies is ambiguous and remains a controversial issue. The arguments for a 
negative impact of subsidies on technical efficiency point to the weakening of the managerial 
efforts and unfairly undermining poor farmers, reducing incentives for producers to boost 
efficiency and shifting their focus from crops to farming subsidies (Martin and Page 1983; 
Serra et al, 2008). On the other hand, explanations for a positive relationship between 
subsidies and efficiency include the incentives to adopt technologies or practices that are not 
common for the farmers and subsidization may help them to overcome financial constraints 
(Kumbhakar and Lien 2010; Zhu and Lansink 2010). 




Table 4.1:  Summary of rice production data and descriptive statistics, MADA granary area, 2010-2014. 
 
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Rice output kg 5359 3480 4983 3431 5039 3242 6316 15436 4947 3139 5331 7567
Land hectare 2.1 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.7 1.2 1.8 1.3 1.9 1.6
Labor RM 78 80 69 65 80 69 88 76 114 91 86 78
Cost of capital RM 818 167 881 198 875 191 926 169 947 187 889 188
Seed kg 330 265 318 278 298 239 296 245 272 211 303 249
Cost of agriculture chemicals RM 360 66 305 93 344 192 470 243 571 208 589 368
Exogeneous variable
Input subsidy RM 1330 863 1241 853 1249 805 1465 929 1227 779 1303 852
Price support (bonus payment) RM 1753 1112 1631 1134 1685 1167 1947 1235 0 0 1403 1259
Off income (income from non- RM 174 474 189 504 157 437 105 388 128 559 150 476
farm activities)
PPK (=1 if farmer is a member of a Dummy 1.0 0.2 1.0 0.1 1.0 0.1 1.0 0.1 1.0 0.1 1.0 0.1
farmers' organization)
Distance to the rice mills km 3.1 2.2 2.9 2.4 3.1 2.3 2.9 2.5 3.1 2.3 3.0 2.4
Gender (=1 if farmer is a male) Dummy 0.9 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.9 0.2 0.9 0.3 0.9 0.3
Owner (=1 if farmer owns the land) Dummy 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.4
Credit (=1 If farmer get access to credit) Dummy 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.3
Time trend (Year 1= 2010, 5 =2014) 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 3 1
No. of observations
2014 All
1298 1307 1321 1329 1315 6570
Variable Unit
2010 2011 2012 2013




   
 
4.4 Results and discussions 
In this analysis, the use of the farm effects framework to deal with unobserved heterogeneity 
necessitates a check for a random or fixed effects approach. A Hausman test of null 
hypothesis was conducted in the translog production function in the corresponding FGLS and 
LSDV specifications. The test revealed that individual or unobserved effects have no 
correlation with explanatory variables
8
. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis that suggests 
specifications that do not account for these correlations (firm-specific effects and explanatory 
variables) may produce inconsistent and biased results. Therefore, the random effects are 
rejected in favor of the fixed effects model.  
 
Table 4.2 presents the results of CFE model. At first, we compare CFE model with LSDV 
model (see Appendix 4.1). CFE has a considerably smaller AIC than the LSDV model, which 
suggests that it provides a better trade-off between goodness of fit and complexity. 
Furthermore, the fact that 𝜎𝑢
2 in the CFE specification is significant confirms that firm-
specific variation in output is also attributable to inefficiency, which makes our study of 
inefficiency highly relevant. In the following we therefore focus on the CFE results. Note that 
a Likelihood Ratio test indicates that the simplification of the Cobb-Douglas to a translog 
form is rejected.
9
 In general, the model features the desired assumptions and restrictions to 
ensure the accuracy of the estimation. We find only modest violations of the monotonicity in 
inputs at the individual point estimate; 27% of the observations violate monotonicity for land 
while violations of monotonicity for the other factors are; labour (35%), capital (0.05%), seed 
(16%) and agricultural chemical (50%).  
 
The estimated coefficients can be interpreted as the output elasticities since the variables are 
normalized at their respective mean. The estimation results indicate that increases in land, 
labor, capital, seed and agrichemical inputs increase rice output. The high productivity, as 
indicated by the land elasticity, reflects the condition of the land’s structure in the granary 
area. The results also demonstrate that capital and seed have higher elasticities than other 
inputs. The capital allocated to production, which is measured in machinery services such as 
                                                 
8
 The result yielded a value of 𝜒26
2  = [99.11], (p = 0.000).  
9
 The null hypothesis  of simplication of the Cobb- Douglas model is rejected H0: βij = 0, 𝜒
2= [350.5] 
> 𝜒(21,0.01)
2 = [38.9].  
 




   
 
trucks and tractors, is particularly important during harvesting and post-harvest period.The 
availability of such capital can improve output by reducing the risks of postharvest losses and 
diseases that would result from the prolonged delivery of the outputs to the rice mills. The 
significant positive coefficient of seed implies that the use of higher-quality seeds can boost 
output by increasing crop emergence, reducing replanting, and encouraging more vigorous 
early crop growth or crop intensity due to a shorter growth duration. The majority of labor 
requirements, especially during postharvest, manuring, nursery, land preparation, pest control 
and harvesting activities, require more time and labor in rice production. Additional hours in 
this system may increase harvesting activity and reduce post-harvest losses leading to higher 
overall output. Additionally, the use of agricultural chemicals in the rice farming is essential 
in reducing weed problems, pests and diseases. However, this variable is not significant. 
Surprisingly, the coefficient of the time trend variable is -0.02 and is statistically significant at 
the 1% level, indicating a slightly negative technological change over the study period. This 
observation might possibly be due to the low adoption rate of improved seed technologies to 
the farmers in the granary area especially the new improvement in the hybrid rice which is 
expected to increase yield by 20-30% (Jamal et al. 2013). Direct seeding is the primary 
production practice in Malaysia, covering over 80 percent of the rice area planted (Kuyek, 
2000). Direct seeding requires large amounts of seed. However, hybrid seed is very expensive 
which makes it impractical to commercialize.  
 
At the sample mean, we reject the hypothesis of constant return to scale.
10
 The summing up of 
all plausible point elasticities of the estimation, land, labor, capital, seed and agri-chemical 
provided us with a measure of scale elasticities of 1.49. The scale elasticity indicates 
increasing returns to the scale of the rice production, which reacts to proportional increases in 







                                                 
10
 The hypothesis of constant return to scale is rejected, (𝜒5
2 = [138.8], p= (0.000).  




   
 
Table 4.2: Estimation results of the CFE Model 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error p-value 
logland 0.1490 0.0477 0.0020 
loglabor 0.0567 0.0157 0.0000 
logcapital 0.8741 0.0484 0.0000 
logseed 0.4168 0.0339 0.0000 
logagrichemical 0.0023 0.0316 0.9410 
time trend -0.0228 0.0066 0.0010 
0.5* (logland)
2
 -0.1137 0.1342 0.3970 
0.5* (labor)
2
 0.0462 0.0123 0.0000 
0.5* (logcapital)
2
 0.3979 0.0604 0.0000 
0.5* (logseed)
2
 0.8060 0.0803 0.0000 
0.5* (logagrichemical)
2
 0.4252 0.1017 0.0000 
0.5* (time trend)
2
 0.0057 0.0079 0.4680 
logland*labor 0.0518 0.0338 0.1250 
logland*logcapital 0.1601 0.1025 0.1180 
logland*logseed -0.3361 0.0795 0.0000 
logland*logagrichemical -0.1840 0.0924 0.0470 
logland*time trend 0.0071 0.0250 0.7770 
loglabor*logcapital 0.0790 0.0263 0.0030 
loglabor*logseed 0.0315 0.0259 0.2250 
loglabor*logagrichemical -0.0077 0.0205 0.7070 
loglabor*time trend -0.0012 0.0060 0.8430 
logcapital*logseed 0.0076 0.0809 0.9250 
logcapital*logagrichemical 0.0103 0.0717 0.8860 
logcapital*time trend 0.0098 0.0232 0.6730 
logseed*logagrichemical -0.0799 0.0598 0.1820 
logseed*time trend 0.0216 0.0190 0.2550 
logagrichemical*time trend -0.0270 0.0172 0.1170 
ln{\sigma_v^2} -2.9389 0.1753 0.0000 
ln{\sigma_u^2} -0.5721 0.0602 0.0000 
    σv 0.0529 
  σu 0.5644 
  Log likelihood -2667 
  AIC 5393 




The technical efficiency, calculated as a static score for each individual farm for each year 
from 2010 to 2014 is depicted in Figure 4.1, while Table 4.3 provides the descriptive statistics 
of the mean efficiency level. The technical efficiency distribution generated by the CFE 




   
 
model shows the observations of technical efficiency vary over time in many rice farms in the 
MADA granary area. In the period from 2010 to 2014, roughly 60% of the rice farms 
experienced improvements in technical efficiency with more efficient farms produce 
disproportionately more outputs. However, the efficiency fluctuated over this period, as 
illustrated by the TE scores for the upper quartiles that become systematically smaller/ larger 
or improvement/depletion in average TE scores. Results indicate that the mean efficiency was 
61% in 2010, decreased in 2011, and increased steadily for the next two years before it 
declined again in 2014. A high standard deviation throughout the years is indicative of the 
large degree of heterogeneity within the rice production system, which means that some farms 
improved, while some farms did not. The overall estimate of technical efficiency is lower and 
quite dispersed, in particular for farms operating in 2011. In contrast, many farms were rated 
substantially better than the average in 2013.  
 
Figure 4.1: Distribution of the TE of rice farms, 2010-2014 
 
 




   
 
Table 4.3: Technical efficiency (TE) and technical efficiency change (TEC) of rice farms 
 
Source: Own estimation 
 
Our result reinforces several observations made based on the technical efficiency distribution 
provided in Table 3. Specifically, the mean values are around 50-60% which indicates many 
farms are far from the frontier. Increasing overall efficiency is a question of either getting the 
less efficient ones to become more efficient, or getting them to exit so that their resources can 
be used by other, more efficient, producers. This trend is reflected by technical efficiency 
change or TEC that varies over the period. The low mean values of TEC further revealing that 
the frontier was shifting inward and some farms were essentially moving farther from the 
frontier. This finding therefore necessitates a more detailed analysis to determine which 
factors influence a farm’s efficiency. 
 
In the second stage of the analysis, we examine the factors that account for the variations in 
inefficiencies across the farms as well as their potential to improve efficiency and resources 
using fixed effect model. In Table 4.4 the determinants of technical inefficiency are shown. 
The estimated parameters shows the influence of the variables have on technical inefficiency 
level; a positive parameter indicates that a variable has increased technical inefficiency level, 

















2010 0.61 0.19 0.14 0.94 0.47 0.76 -
2011 0.56 0.18 0.12 0.93 0.42 0.71 -0.0697
2012 0.59 0.18 0.10 0.94 0.45 0.74 0.0431
2013 0.64 0.17 0.06 0.96 0.52 0.77 0.0828
2014 0.58 0.17 0.10 0.95 0.47 0.71 -0.0818
Overall 0.60 0.18 0.10 0.95 0.46 0.739 -0.0064
Year
TE




   
 
Table 4.4: Determinants of technical inefficiency 
Dependent variable: Inefficiency 
Variable 
Estimated  Standard 
t-value 
coefficient error 
Input subsidy -0.0003 8.E-06 -41.230 
Price support -4.E-06 6.E-06 -0.760 
Off-income -4.E-05 9.E-06 -4.920 
PPK [dummy, farmer’s organization] 0.0484 0.0333 1.450 
Distance to rice mill 0.0087 0.0019 4.650 
Male 0.0062 0.0139 0.450 
Ownership [dummy, landowner] -0.0092 0.0102 -0.900 
Access to credit -0.0735 0.0150 -4.910 
Land 0.0724 0.0027 26.620 
Cost of labor 0.0001 1.E-05 3.820 
Time trend -0.0052 0.0031 -1.670 
Constant 0.8257 0.0382 21.600 
        
No. of observation 6570     
R-squared 0.4996     
 
The results show that off-farm income, land ownership, access to credit and government 
supports reduce technical inefficiency while participation in farmer’s organization, gender, 
distance to the rice mill, farm size and cost of hired labor increase inefficiency. Ceteris 
paribus, landowners are found to be 0.9% more efficient than tenant operators while 
participation in a farmer’s organization increases inefficiency by 4.8%. However, male are 
found to be 0.6% less efficient than their female counterparts. The farther a farm is located 
from the closest milling factory, the higher its inefficiency. A farm that is 5 km away from the 
nearest rice mill is 0.9% less efficient.  
 
Examining the contribution of the subsidy-related variables to a farm’s technical inefficiency 
provides an overview of the influence government support had on the farmers’ performances 
between 2010 and 2014. The estimated model suggested that all support received had a 
significant and positive effect on technical efficiency. All other things being equal, a farm that 
receives more subsidies is closer to the frontier. For additional 250 RM of input subsidies 
received will make the farm 10% more efficient. Correspondingly, our results demonstrate 
that input use is an important factor in improving agricultural production in Malaysia in such 




   
 
a way that an increase in input subsidy reduces technical inefficiency. Our results corroborate 
the findings made by Tian (2000) on Chinese rice farms and Zhu et al, (2012). 
 
The coefficient of the price support indicates that the provision of price support would have a 
negative impact on technical inefficiency. The result indicates that 1000 RM of subsidies will 
make farm 10% more efficient. A possible explanation could be that when these supports are 
available, they help less efficient farms make investments required to make them more 
competitive.  
 
Farmers who were engaged in off-farm activities, depicted by a negative and significant 
coefficient for off-farm income, tend to exhibit lower inefficiency. Ceteris paribus, a farm 
with 4,000 RM more off-farm income will be 10% more efficient. This positive relationship is 
expected because as the households move towards spending more time off of the farm, they 
will require time and management saving technologies (like herbicide-tolerant crops) to 
maintain production. In addition, they are less likely to adopt management-intensive 
technologies, such as integrated pest manage and agricultural machinery, which corroborates 
the finding made by Ji et al. (2012). Additionally, Takahashi and Otsuka (2009) propose that 
increased nonfarm income may assist in accessing credit; therefore adding to the long-term 
financial investment among rice farmers in the Central Luzon, Philippines. 
 
Similarly, our results show that access to credit has a negative and statistically significant 
relationship with technical inefficiency. All other things being equal, a farm with 200 RM 
more credit volume is 10% more efficient. These results confirm the previously stated 
assumption that by overcoming financial constraint, credit availability helps farmers attain 
higher levels of efficiency through the purchase of higher quality farm inputs, such as 
fertilizers, new technologies and high-yielding varieties of rice seeds. 
 
As expected, technical efficiency decreases with the increasing use of land and it is significant 
at the 1% level. Results imply that large farms are 7.2% more technically inefficient, which 
confirms our expectations. It is often recognized that in the land market especially in 
Malaysia where labor use intensities on small farms are high, smaller farms face higher 
effective purchase prices for land. More land alone does not make a farm more efficient, but 
more land coupled with equivalent increases in other inputs will lead to increased productivity 




   
 
(higher frontier). Therefore, small farms engage in more intensive use of resources; they use 
labor more intensively and use more of available land for land improvement in a diligent 
manner and thereby are more technically efficient.  
 
Additionally, we find that the use of hired labor has a positive effect on technical inefficiency, 
implying family labor is more crucial than hired labor for higher efficiency. Small farmers, 
predominantly are taking advantage of the fact that household labor has very low opportunity 




The rice sector is one of the major sectors of Malaysian agriculture. However, there are few 
studies of the efficiency of rice production in Malaysia. We used farm level data to gain 
insights on the technical efficiency of the country’s rice farming. Although panel data were 
available, some important descriptive attributes were scarce. As a result we took unobserved 
heterogeneity into account. In this framework, we applied the recent fixed effect Stochastic 
Frontier model of Chen et al. (2014), which allows for unmeasured characteristics while 
simultaneously the model estimation is free of incidental parameters.   
 
In the observation period from 2010 to 2014, technical efficiency appeared to be fluctuate in 
rice production. Our results indicate that the mean efficiency was 61% in 2010; it decreased in 
2011 and increased steadily for the next two years, before it declined again in 2014. However, 
technical efficiency change has been quite low during the period.  
 
The potential for increasing individual farm output varies considerably since many farms 
became much better while others became much worse. Government support such as input 
subsidies, credit facilities and off-farm activities are identified as important factors 
contributing to the improvement in the level of technical efficiency among rice farmers. Our 
empirical result points to a significant relationship between efficiency and access to credit. 
Overcoming financial constraints with better credit availability helps farmers attain higher 
levels of efficiency through the purchase of higher quality farm inputs such as fertilizers, new 
technologies and high-yielding varieties of rice seeds. The positive impact of nonfarm income 
on technical efficiency is another reason for the continued and sizeable contribution of 




   
 
nonfarm sources of farm household income. Subsidies seem to be an important component of 
increasing rice production. Our main result indicates that input subsidies have a positive, 
significant influence on the technical efficiency of the Malaysian rice farms. Subsidies can 
improve the technical efficiency if they encourage them to be innovative, to improve the 
implementation of the existing technologies, to increase ability of the farms to adjust their 
behavior and thereby operate more efficiently. Therefore, the direction of subsidies and 
supports affecting farm performance is crucial and the results of this study will help 
policymakers to identify the positive and negative effects and better target public intervention 
to improve farm efficiency. 
 
However, public support provided to the small farmers mainly for political reasons will most 
likely not be enough for these farmers to become efficient. This effort must come to be 
realized through a combination of access to land and capital since poor farmers with small 
landholdings usually need capital in almost all economies (Abdulai and Eberlin 2001). Our 
result supports this notion since the technical efficiency increases with the decreasing use of 
land. A redistribution of land to small farmers with an adequate provision of finance could 
increase technical efficiency.  
 
Overall, the results indicate that rice production can be improved by continuously increasing a 
farm’s resources and technical efficiency. This can only be achieved if agricultural 
development and the policies facilitating farmers’ accessibility to credit, capital, land and off-
farm activities, especially for small farms, are carefully designed and well-targeted. Improved 














   
 
Appendix 4.1: Estimation results of CFE Model and LSDV Model 
 
 
Coefficient Std.Error p-value Coefficient Std.Error p-value
logland 0.1490 0.0477 0.0020 -0.0245 0.0471 0.6030
loglabor 0.0567 0.0157 0.0000 0.0652 0.0168 0.0000
logcapital 0.8741 0.0484 0.0000 1.0603 0.0464 0.0000
logseed 0.4168 0.0339 0.0000 0.5200 0.0334 0.0000
logagrichemical 0.0023 0.0316 0.9410 -0.0131 0.0340 0.7000
time trend -0.0228 0.0066 0.0010 -0.0178 0.0071 0.0120
0.5* (logland)
2
-0.1137 0.1342 0.3970 -0.1382 0.1428 0.3330
0.5* (labor)
2
0.0462 0.0123 0.0000 0.0551 0.0129 0.0000
0.5* (logcapital)
2
0.3979 0.0604 0.0000 0.4392 0.0730 0.0000
0.5* (logseed)
2
0.8060 0.0803 0.0000 0.7595 0.0798 0.0000
0.5* (logagrichemical)
2
0.4252 0.1017 0.0000 0.3835 0.1087 0.0000
0.5* (time trend)
2
0.0057 0.0079 0.4680 0.0101 0.0084 0.2300
logland*labor 0.0518 0.0338 0.1250 0.0499 0.0369 0.1770
logland*logcapital 0.1601 0.1025 0.1180 0.0231 0.1110 0.8350
logland*logseed -0.3361 0.0795 0.0000 -0.2982 0.0806 0.0000
logland*logagrichemical -0.1840 0.0924 0.0470 -0.1754 0.0993 0.0770
logland*time trend 0.0071 0.0250 0.7770 0.0046 0.0266 0.8610
loglabor*logcapital 0.0790 0.0263 0.0030 0.0839 0.0282 0.0030
loglabor*logseed 0.0315 0.0259 0.2250 0.0314 0.0285 0.2710
loglabor*logagrichemical -0.0077 0.0205 0.7070 0.0000 0.0221 1.0000
loglabor*time trend -0.0012 0.0060 0.8430 0.0047 0.0065 0.4640
logcapital*logseed 0.0076 0.0809 0.9250 0.1672 0.0904 0.0650
logcapital*logagrichemical 0.0103 0.0717 0.8860 -0.0718 0.0747 0.3360
logcapital*time trend 0.0098 0.0232 0.6730 0.0129 0.0238 0.5880
logseed*logagrichemical -0.0799 0.0598 0.1820 -0.0465 0.0632 0.4620
logseed*time trend 0.0216 0.0190 0.2550 0.0207 0.0205 0.3130
logagrichemical*time trend -0.0270 0.0172 0.1170 -0.0117 0.0178 0.5110
ln{\sigma_v^2} -2.9389 0.1753 0.0000
ln{\sigma_u^2} -0.5721 0.0602 0.0000
σ v 0.0529
σ u 0.5644













The data employed in this study are based on the panel of 6750 rice farms in MADA granary 
area. The farm level data is collected twice a year and each survey period includes a balanced 
sample of 675 farming households. The panel is composed of ten cross-sections, covering 
main and off- seasons over the five-year period from 2010 to 2014. This data set provides 
comprehensive information, including input use, output and corresponding prices. 
 
However, despite of the rich dataset provided, the data suffers from ambiguous values and 
substantial zero users of variable inputs, particularly agricultural chemicals. For example, the 
standard deviation for the output is 7486, while for the input variables such as agricultural 
chemical and seed, the standard deviations are approximately 217 and 241 respectively, which 
indicate large variations in output and inputs.  Additionally, many data sets are not complete 
or show noticeable errors. We found 1,208  zero values in agrichemicals, 45 in seed, 21 in 
cost capital, 113 in labor and 1 in output. To account for these extreme values, we use a rule 
of thumb of 3 standard deviations from the mean to detect outliers or if 99% of the variable of 
interest lied outside ± 3 standard deviations from the mean. Since all farmers received 
pesticides subsidies in a form of coupon worth 200 RM, we therefore use this value to 
account for zero usage of agricultural chemicals, by adding this amount to the agricultural 
chemical values. Other implausible values were also detected in capital, seed as well as 
agricultural chemicals. These values were then properly adjusted according to the normal 
standard rate proposed by MADA. As a consequence, the remaining panel is unbalanced with 
6,570 out of 6,750 observations were used for the estimation. All the monetary values have 
been deflated by the 2010 consumer price index. Finally, to avoid data inaccuracy or bias, the 
dataset were then crosschecked by MADA officers.  
 










   
 
Appendix 4.2: Data treatment for outliers, missing values and errors 
Variable  Original 
data 
Change data 
due to outliers  
Standard 
deviation 
Change data due to 









457 observations are 
adjusted according to 
the standard 
application rate of the 
seed use  
248.98 
 












585 observations are 
adjusted according to 






6750 - 217.00 
 
1208 missing values 
are replaced with the 
values of pesticides 
subsidies of 200 RM 
367.76 
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Chapter 5  
 
A Note on Farm Competitiveness and Efficiency 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The concept of competitiveness permeates the economic literature in several areas, including: 
the microeconomic level, where competitiveness is measured at a single firm/farm level; the 
meso-economic level, where it is measured at commodity or sector level; and finally at the 
macroeconomic level, where competitiveness is measured at an aggregate or country level 
(Latruffe, 2010). ‘Competitiveness’ has a broad meaning, which has yet to gain universal 
definition acceptance in economics (Ahearn et al 1990; Sharples 1990). The ambiguity 
associated with the term allows researchers to apply their own definition based on different 
ways and perspectives they put forward in the literature. The Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) succinctly describes competitiveness as “the ability of 
companies, industries, regions, nations and supranational regions to generate, while being 
and remaining exposed to international competition, a relatively high factor of income and 
factor employment levels on a sustainable basis” (Hatzichronologou, 1996). The European 
Commission (2001) defines competitiveness as: "the ability of an economy to provide its 
population with high and rising standards of living and high rates of employment on a 
sustainable basis”. However, given the evolution of the concept over time, this term was 
redefined by the Aiginger et al, (2013) as "the ability of a country (region, location) to deliver 
the beyond-GDP goals for its citizens". Others relate this meaning with profitability. 
Agriculture Canada (1991) defines “competitiveness as the ability to gain profits and 
maintain market share”. Latruffe (2010) clarifies competitiveness as “the ability to 
successfully face and engage with the competition, either domestically or internationally”. 
Subsequently, competitiveness equates to the ability to sell the products that satisfy the 
demand while simultaneously securing profits over time. 
Despite the vast research efforts dedicated to this subject during the last two decades, 
considerable misunderstandings exist and interminable debates over the precise meaning of 
‘competitiveness’ and its scope have occurred (Sarker and Ratnasena, 2014). Thus, depending 




   
 
on the purpose of the study, the level of analysis, and the commodity in question, a large 
number of measures of competitiveness have been developed. Latruffe (2010) classifies 
measurement into two disciplines; 1) the neoclassical economies which places emphasis on 
trade and measure competitiveness with comparative advantages, exchange rate and export or 
import indices and; 2) the strategic management which focuses on the firm’s structure and 
strategy, as well as measures the firm’s competitiveness based on various cost indicators, 
including productivity and efficiency. 
 
The first strand of literature suggests that a nation’s competitiveness is based on comparative 
advantage. Comparative advantage, as conceptualised by the Ricardian and Hecksher-Ohlin 
models for two inputs in a two country case11, postulates that differences in production costs 
among countries have resulted in trade flows and that the country with a cost advantage will 
specialize in the production of that good. Such a concept is widely used when comparing the 
international competitiveness between countries. However, a large number of measures for 
determining comparative advantage have been developed due to uncertainty on the precise 
meaning of the comparative/competitive advantage. Singgel (2006) and Latruffe (2010) 
provide a comprehensive survey and discussion on these measures and concepts. Among the 
measures surveyed, the Domestic Resource Cost or DRC is regarded as the true measure of 
comparative advantage (Singgel, 2006). The DRC compares the domestic resources cost at 
social prices to the value added measured at social prices12. The use of the social price ensures 
that the DRC measures the true comparative advantage that can be derived from the Ricardian 
framework. The DRC is a widely applied concept used in economic literature that is also an 
indicator of comparative advantage which can be calculated from the Policy Analysis Matrix 
(PAM) framework (Monke and Pearson, 1989). 
 
Despite the wide use and acceptance of the DRC as an indicator of comparative advantage in 
PAM, it is criticized for yielding potential inaccuracies in the ranking of activities. Masters 
and Winter-Nelson (1995) and Singgel (2006) have demonstrated that the DRC understates 
the competitiveness of activities relying on a high level of non-tradable inputs. The bias is 
                                                 
11
  Findlay and Grubert (1959) who were among the first to use a two country, two good, two factor model to 
consider the effects of Ricardian productivity and factor abundance in jointly determining factor prices and 
production patterns. 
12
 The development of the DRC ratio draws back to Bruno (1965)  as a project appraisal indicator to evaluate the 
benefits of new activities. 
 




   
 
more pronounced if the activities include very divergent combinations of traded and non-
traded inputs. Consequently, Masters and Winter-Nelson (1995) proposed the Social Cost 
Benefit (SCB), which is analogous to the unit cost ratio (UCs) proposed by Singgel (2006). 
SCB compares total domestic costs at social prices to the total outputs measured at social 
prices. Since SCB does not include the calculation of the value added in the critical 
dimension, it is not affected by the classifications of tradable or non-tradable costs.   
 
The second strand of literature focuses on the efficiency and productivity analysis as the 
measurement of competitiveness where technical efficiency and Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) have been the main long-term interest. Productivity analysis has been heavily applied 
on the micro level. Furthermore, a profusion of studies have been conducted to investigate 
technical efficiency and to a lesser extent, the allocative efficiency of farms in various 
countries (Bhatt and Bhat 2014; Brummer and Loy 2000; Kumbhakar 1987; Masterson 2007; 
Yao and Gerald 2007; Abdulai and Huffman 1998). The theoretical elements of these 
concepts are empirically constructed and the practical applications of modeling these 
functions, as well as the measurements using parametric and non-parametric methods, are 
extensive. The competitiveness or the comparative advantage is determined by the Decision 
Making Unit (DMU) and its distance to the best-practice frontier, which is based on relative 
rates of TFP change (Nishimizu and Page, 1986).  
 
Although authors have been prolific in exploring the connection between 
competitiveness/comparative advantage and efficiency, the theoretical treatment does not 
offer any ready conclusions. The SCB approach works with social prices in measuring 
international competitiveness. Efficiency measurement simply compares DMUs with one 
another – the frontier is defined by the best. But whether the best are good enough (whether 
they are actually competitive) is never answered directly by efficiency analysis. It could be 
that even the best are not competitive, but they are surviving due to subsidies or protection. 
There should nevertheless be a relationship – the DMUs that are closest to the frontier should 
have better SCBs, but they might still have ‘bad’ SCBs overall: in other words they might be 
relatively efficient but nonetheless not competitive. Recently, researchers have started to 
produce PAM results with disaggregated data and others use the same types to efficiency 
analysis, this leads to the natural question, how are these two types of analysis related? 




   
 
Establishing the linkage will help policy makers and others make better use of one or the 
other measure if they knew how it relates to the other. 
To motivate our empirical analysis, we develop a simple model that relates competitiveness 
and technical efficiency, and propose a PCB criterion decomposition that formally relates 
improvements in efficiency to improvements in PCB ratio. To date, no empirical work on this 
link has been published, therefore we aim to fill that gap. Our paper makes several 
contributions to the literature. Firstly, our research offers a novel approach for determining 
the relationship between competitiveness and efficiency. Secondly, in addition to introducing 
a theoretical link between the two strands, our analysis  provides a foundation for 
understanding the information, the measurements, and the characteristics associated with each 
method and how these links may contribute to explaining competitiveness. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 5.2 provides an overview of the strengths 
and weakness of each approach to measuring competitiveness. Section 5.3 outlines the SCB 
and PCB calculations using the Policy Analysis Matrix framework; Section 5.4 provides the 
model estimations using both CFE and primal system of profit maximization; Section 5.5 
provides  a decomposition of static competitiveness, distinguished into technical efficiency 
and allocative efficiency; Section 6 describes the empirical illustration we used to test the 
relationship; and the final section concludes the paper. 
 
5.2 Strength and weaknesses of the PAM and SFA approaches  
In this paper, we showed two alternative tools or methods that can be used to explain 
competitiveness and efficiency. In doing so, we proposed a simple decomposition of 
competitiveness into technical efficiency. The proposed technique provides a clear analytical 
link between two largely separate methodologies for assessing economic performance, cost-
benefit indicators based on the international price rule and efficiency analysis, and thus, 
facilitates a more detailed understanding of the definition of competitiveness.  
Despite the acknowledged methodological reservations, SCB or Private Cost Benefit (PCB)  
measurements as described by the PAM framework have proved to be highly useful policy 
tools when market and shadow prices diverge. Activities with the lowest SCB ratios are 
normally assumed to exhibit the greatest potential for expansion as exports or efficient 
substitutes for imports and, defined in this way, the greatest comparative advantage. 




   
 
Additionally, PAM is a straightforward policy analysis that provides a quantitative estimate of 
the impact of policies and market structure of the commodity by comparing the private and 
social structure of incentives on the microeconomic level (i.e. incentives to producers, 
processors, and marketing agents). Moreover, it potentially serves as an information baseline 
used for evaluating agricultural and trade policy analysis, as well as to support policy 
planning or project appraisal needs. PAM is a purely descriptive analysis and its results are 
relatively easy to estimate, however, the advantages of PAM go beyond its pure analytic 
nature in terms of policy analysis. Due to its intuitively comprehensive concept, PAM results 
can serve as an appropriate tool for delivering the information needs of politicians and 
officials interested in evaluating the impact of policies. PAM’s ability to inform provides 
critical information to the best-positioned individuals who are then able to effectively allocate 
funds or budgets for investment and research pathways. It can also inform policy makers 
about the weaknesses and strengths of environments specific to the country. Furthermore, 
PAM’s analysis and results are more relaxed and easy to present; the main users of 
competitiveness indicators are the ministry or government departments designing policies, 
consulting and negotiating trade agreements or writing development plans, as well as private 
sector agents, like banks and industrial corporations. 
A major drawback of PAM, however, is that it does not provide an understanding of the 
historical forces of the current pattern of measured comparative advantage, nor does it expand 
much on the notion of dynamic. Since PAM’s assessment of differences between private and 
social incentives is carried out based on a static approach, or in other words, it is based on 
Leontief fixed-input-output coefficients. This is important, because when we use the observed 
coefficients, that are observed under conditions of private prices, and then assume that these 
coefficients would be the same under social prices, we could be making a mistake. If social 
input price ratios differ from private input price ratios, for example, then farmers would use a 
different input mix under social prices than they do under private prices – they would 
reallocate (also on the output side). Therefore in the longer run, and if there are large gaps 
between private and social prices, SCB measures are likely to be inaccurate. Efficiency 
analysis that is based on flexible functional forms does not suffer from this limitation. It does 
not take the reactions of the producers’ change in domestic prices into account. Additionally, 
PAM’s assessment of differences delivers less insight into the direction of future changes to 




   
 
SCB. Therefore, its applicability to long-term projections is limited and inferences of SCB 
must be interpreted as short-term or as a current incentive structure. 
Historical analyses of economic performance have also tended to focus on the measurement 
of efficiency. Efficiency improvement has been regarded as one of the most important goals 
or analyses for many social and economic policies and reforms. Efficiency measurement 
compares the actual performance with the optimal performance located on the relevant 
frontier. However, an empirical approximation is needed since the true frontier is unobserved. 
This approximation is frequently referred as a “best-practice frontier”. The economic theory 
of production is based on the production (cost or profit) frontiers and efficiency relative to 
those frontiers; where emphasis is often placed on optimizing behavior subject to constraint. 
However, estimation of efficiency relative to the constructed frontiers using econometric 
approach or mathematical programming are both analytically rigorous benchmarking 
assessment to measure efficiency (profit) relative to a frontier. A competent empirical 
application of parametric approach (i.e Stochastic Frontier Analysis) requires a clear 
understanding of both the production economics and the econometric theory behind the 
specified model along with adequate programming skills. Where econometric approach is 
parametric and efficiency analysis is to be taken seriously, producer performance evaluation 
must be robust to both statistical noise and specification error. Obtaining efficient and 
unbiased estimates of production structures can often prove to be a difficult task and 
challenging. 
Despite of its prominence measurement of competitiveness, efficiency studies or analyses are 
costly, due to their complexity. The literature relevant to this wider purpose is not surveyed 
here, but Latruffe (2010) provide such a survey, as far as trade policy analysis is concerned. 
Efficiency models are sufficiently detailed, given their comprehensive nature, and they are 
fully reliable, due to the simplifying assumptions on which they rely. Additionally, efficiency 
studies, whether of using parametric or non-parametric methods, are normally based on the 
domestic prices. Inferences drawn on the comparative advantage are normally grounded in 
terms of technical efficiency change between countries or competing industries or sectors. In 
highly distorted economies, efficiency studies however do not provide information regarding 
the domestic costs relative to international competitors. On the other hand, competitive and 
comparative advantage indicators as described by PAM framework are more manageable and 




   
 
less costly, while permitting the analyst to monitor the impact of policy changes on the 
competitive environment, the cost structure of industries and the resulting market structure. 
5.3 Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) 
The policy analysis matrix (PAM), as developed by Monke & Pearson, (1989) is a double 
entry bookkeeping analytical framework that helps policymakers to address central issues 
regarding agricultural policy developments. PAM is widely used for measuring the impact of 
policies on farm competitiveness and farm level profits. The framework additionally measures 
the influence public investments have on the agricultural system’s efficiency, and the effect 
agricultural research and development have on economic efficiency and comparative 
advantages (Masters and Winter-Nelson 1995; Siggel 2006). 
PAM is composed of two cost columns (shown in Table 5.1); one representing tradable inputs 
and the other domestic factors. Intermediate inputs, which consist of fertilizers, pesticides, 
compound feed, transportation, electricity, fuel and purchased seeds, are divided into tradable 
inputs and domestic factor components. This disaggregation process allows for intermediate 
goods to be separated into four categories: tradable inputs, domestic factors, transfers (taxes 
or subsidies that are disregarded in the social evaluations), and non-tradable inputs (which 
must be further disaggregated so that all costs will be classified as tradable inputs, domestic 
factors and transfers). 
The first row of the matrix provides a measure of private profitability (D), defined as revenue 
(A) minus total costs (B+C), which assesses the values of all outputs and inputs at private 
prices, reflecting the actual market or financial prices received by the farmers, processors, or 
merchants involved in the agricultural system. This private or financial price includes the 
underlying economic costs and valuation combined with the effects of all policies and market 
failures. Thus, the private profitability calculations reveal the competitiveness of the 
agricultural system assuming the use of modern technology, input costs, output values and 
policy transfers.  
The second row of PAM table measures the social profits (H), which reflect the agricultural 
system’s efficient use of resources and overall comparative advantage. Efficient outcomes are 
attainable when economy´s resources are used to create the highest income and output levels. 




   
 
To determine social profits, social prices are used for the valuation of inputs and outputs. 
Social values, or prices, demonstrate a policy benchmark for comparisons because they are 
considered the prevailing prices in a free market in the absence of policy interventions, 
distortions or market failures (Kanaka and Chinnadurai, 2013; Monke and Pearson, 1989). 
The second identity located in the third row of the accounting matrix measures divergences, 
which are defined as the differences between private and social valuations of revenues, costs 
and profits. Any divergence between private and social prices, which is measured vertically, 
must be explained by the effects of the policies which are disaggregated into three categories: 
distorting policies, market failure and efficient policies. When government enforced market 
failure correction policies are not in place, distorting policies are the cause of divergences 
between the private and social prices of tradable outputs and inputs. However, if efficient 
policies enacted by the government are able to correct or offset market failures and create a 
greater income, the differences between private and social valuations will be reduced, since 
















   
 
Table 5.1: Policy Analysis Matrix 
     Items Revenues Costs Profits 
    
Tradable Inputs Domestic Factors   
Private prices 𝑨 = 𝑃𝑖
𝐷 









D = A-B-C 
Social prices 𝑬 =  𝑃𝑖
𝑆 









H = E-F-G 
Effects of divergences 
and efficient policy I = A - E J= B - F K = C - G 
L = D – H 
= 
I – J - K 
Source: Monke and Pearson (1989) 
Note: 
The subscript i refers to outputs and the subscript j refers to inputs, 
aij for (j= 1 to k) are technical coefficients for traded inputs in the production of i; 
aij for(j=k+1 to n) are technical coefficients for domestic inputs in the production of i; 
Pi* is the price of output i, evaluated privately (*=D) or socially (*=S); 
Pj* is the price of traded input j, evaluated privately (*=D) or socially (*=S); 
Wj* is the price of domestic input j, evaluated privately (*=D) or socially (*=S); 
D (= A-B-C) measures Private profit; 
H (=E-F-G) measures Social profits; 
I (= A-E) measures Output transfers; 
J (=B-F) measures Input transfers; 
 K (=C-G) measures Factor transfers; 
 L (= D-H; or I-J-K) measures Net transfers. 
 
The Social Cost Benefit (SCB) ratio is one of the indicators that can be calculated to measure 
competitiveness using the PAM framework. It is defined as: 
 








𝑆                                                  (1) 
where Pi is the price of the output i, the Pj are the prices of the k tradable inputs, the Wj are the 
prices of the n-k non-tradable inputs, and the ij are technical coefficients which measure the 
amount of input j that is required to produce one unit of output i. Throughout, the superscript 
S indicates that social rather than private prices are employed. Hence, the SCB is simply the 
ratio of the social cost of producing one unit of an output, to the social value of that unit of 
output. An SCB value between zero and one indicates that the activity in question is 
competitive, while a value greater than one indicates that social cost exceeds social value and 
the activity is not competitive. 




   
 
Another indicator which is closely related to SCB is the private cost benefit (PCB). It is 










                                                      (2) 
 
where Pi is the price of the output i, the Pj are the prices of the k tradable inputs, the Wj are the 
prices of the n-k non-tradable inputs, and the ij are technical coefficients which measure the 
amount of input j that is required to produce one unit of output i. Here, the superscript D 
indicates private prices are employed throughout the system, reflecting the actual market or 
financial prices. Hence, PCB is the ratio of private costs of domestic factor use to the private 
value added. Similar to SCB, PCB is an indicator of comparative competitiveness. It shows 
how much the production system affords to pay for the domestic factors and still remain 
competitive (break even after earning normal profits which is defined as (A-B-C) = D = 0.  In 
this case, excess profits are attainable if the private costs are less than their value added in 
private prices. This can be achieved by holding down factor and tradable inputs costs so that it 
can minimize the private cost and hence maximize excess profit.  Therefore, a PCB value 
between zero and one indicates that the commodity is competitive while a value greater than 
one indicates that the commodity in question is uncompetitive. 
 
5.4 Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) approach 
 5.4.1 Fixed effect panel model using CFE estimation 
Since the seminal work conducted by Aigner et al. (1977), the Stochastic Frontier (SF) model 
has been widely use to estimate the technical efficiency in applied economic research. 
Extensive research in this field has resulted in a growing arsenal of methods and econometrics 
techniques pertaining to specifications, estimation and testing issue. Despite that, when 
productivity and efficiency are analyzed at the farm level, the problem arises that not all 
relevant factor can be observed or measured adequately. Heterogeneous environmental and 
biophysical characteristics, such as soil condition, rainfall or droughts, as well as managerial 
characteristics, are often omitted from the model specifications due to a lack of information 
available for many of these variables. This information is referred to as unobserved 
heterogeneity (Álvarez et al, 2009). As a result, inference based on the output comparison 
could be biased and is often criticized because farms are heterogeneous and operate under 
different production and environmental conditions (Abdulai and Tietje, 2007). To overcome 




   
 
the challenge of unobserved heterogeneity, we apply the recent fixed effect model 
implemented by Chen et al. (2014). Consider the following specification of the stochastic 
production frontier model for panel data: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽′𝑥𝑖𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡 −  𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                     (3) 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 =  𝑣𝑖𝑡 −  𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                (4) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the vector of the output of firm i (i=1,...,N) in period t (t=1,...,T);  xit is a set of 
inputs that produce output 𝑦𝑖𝑡;  β is the associated vector that describes technology parameters 
to be estimated. The composite error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the difference between the idiosyncratic error 
that captures noise 𝑣𝑖𝑡, and the one-sided disturbance 𝑢𝑖𝑡 which represents inefficiency. Under 
the frequently used normal-half normal model, the distributional assumptions are 
𝑣𝑖𝑡  ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ~ 𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝑢
2). Time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity is captured by 
the vector of incidental parameter, 𝛼𝑖 which is the number of individual intercepts that equal 
to the number of farms. However, whether or not to separate 𝛼𝑖  from 𝑢𝑖𝑡  has been the subject 
of much debate in the stochastic frontier literature. A major limitation of the model in 
equation (4) is related to an identification problem which arises when the inefficiency term is 
time-variant. In many situations, a constant level of inefficiency does not likely to prevail 
over longer period due to several reasons (i.e. process of learning). In this case, it is difficult 
to disentangle the unobserved farm-specific heterogeneity from inefficiency (Greene 2005).  
 
Greene (2005) proposed a “true fixed effects” or TFE model that includes a maximum 
likelihood dummy variables estimator (MLDVE), in which the unit-specific intercepts are 
estimated with structural parameters. The TFE model places unobserved heterogeneity as 
fixed effects in the stochastic frontier model (equation 3) and generates a neutral shift of the 
function specific to each farm (Porcelli 2009) while allowing for time-varying inefficiency 
(Belotti and Giuseppe 2012). This approach is frequently applied, however it leads to 
inconsistent variance parameter estimates due to the incidental parameters problem especially 
in the short panel because the number of parameters depends on the sample size (there are 
firm effects 𝛼𝑖; and the number of parameters, N which increases with the sample size). 
Hence, the estimated error variance, and the parameter 𝜎𝑢
2 is inconsistent. 
 
 




   
 
To account for this limitation, Chen et al. (2014) propose a consistent estimator for the TFE 
normal-half normal model based on the within transformed model where the fixed effects 
have been removed. This procedure is commonly used in the panel data:  
𝑧?̅?𝑡 =  𝑧𝑖𝑡 −  𝑧?̅?                                                              (5) 
 
For any corresponding variable (𝑧) in each panel i, the individual mean (𝑧?̅?) is subtracted from 
the observed value in period t (𝑧𝑖𝑡). Correspondingly, the model can be represented by using 
the deviations from means (𝑧?̅?) so that the transformed model is free from incidental 
parameters problem (αi): 
 
?̅?𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽′?̅?𝑖𝑡 +  ?̅?𝑖𝑡 −  ?̅?𝑖𝑡                                                    (6) 
 
As outlined by (Holtkamp, 2015) the model in equation (6) has the following features: first, 
the incidental parameters problem is removed by a within-transformation; second, it produces 
a consistent estimator of the error variance since the relevant likelihood function is derived 
from T-1 deviations; and third, this approach, which is based on a more general distributional 
theory, allows for the maintenance of the firm-specific and time varying inefficiency 𝑢𝑖𝑡. 
 
 5.4.2 A primal system of Profit Maximization 
The standard microeconomic theory of producer behavior is almost entirely based on the 
neoclassical approach which assumes that firms are efficient both technically and allocatively. 
There is, however, an extensive literature on the measurement of productive efficiency  which 
extended the basic neoclassical approach by allowing firms to make mistakes in the 
production of outputs and use of inputs (Kumbhakar, 1987). 
  
Allocative inefficiency as defined by Schmidt and Lovell (1979) is a failure to allocate right 
proportions of inputs given the input prices. Under the production process that has allocative 
inefficiency, the marginal revenue product is not equal to the marginal resource cost. 
Technical inefficiency occurs when producers fail to maximize the output for a given set of 
inputs. Under the behavioral assumption of profit maximization, we assume that farms 
maximize their profits in making their decision on inputs use and production of outputs. That 




   
 
is, we can consider non-optimal allocation of inputs and output where farms can be both 
allocatively inefficient and technically inefficient. 
 
However, estimation that accounts both technical and allocative inefficiency with the profit 
function approach is not straightforward and complex. In most of the cases, the estimation 
requires large variations in the price variables in order to get precise parameter estimates, 
which may not usually occur in practice especially when we work with a cross-section in 
which most farms have probably faced quite similar prices. Details on the model and 
estimation issues are discussed comprehensively in Kumbhakar (2001) and Kumbhakar and 
Wang (2006). Alternatively, Kumbhakar et.al, (2015) proposed other modeling strategy which 
is the primal system approach by using transcendental logarithmic functional form of the 
stochastic frontier. The authors argue that if the input endogeneity is considered during the 
implementation of the econometric problem, then the output-oriented or input-oriented 
technical inefficiencies are the same. The primal system technique is algebraically equivalent 
to the profit system for self-dual production function. The advantage of the primal system is 
that it solves the problem of insufficient price variability. Furthermore, the model is based on 
the production function, therefore there is no need to take log of profit, which could be an 
issue when profit is negative for some observations. 
 
The production function (Aigner et.al, 1977) for a typical producer (i) can be written as;   
 
yi = f(xi) exp(v - u),     i= 1,2,....n     (7) 
where f(.) is the production frontier; x is the vector of inputs, v is production uncertainty or 
noise and u is technical inefficiency. The profit maximization problem for a producer 
(omitting the subscript i) can be represented as: 
 
max𝑦,𝑥 𝛱 = py – wx     s.t   y = f(x) exp(v - u), u ≥ 0                       (8) 
⇒ max 
𝑥
𝛱 = 𝑝𝑓(𝑥) exp(𝑣 − 𝑢) − 𝑤𝑥                                          (9) 
 ⇒ max𝑥 𝛱 = 𝑝𝑓 ∗ (𝑥) − 𝑤𝑥                                                   (10) 
 
where p is a vector of output prices; y is the level of production; w is the vector of input 
prices; x is the vector of inputs; v is the random error and u is the output-oriented technical 




   
 
inefficiency. Note that we substitute y.exp(v-u) by f* to follow the standard neoclassical 
maximization problem analytics. 
 





exp (𝜂1),    𝜂𝑗 ⋛ 0 , 𝑗 = 1, … . . 𝐽                                (11)    
 
The first-order condition indicates that the value of the marginal product of input i can be 





∗ =  
𝑤𝑗
𝑤1
exp(𝜉𝑗) ,   𝑗 = 2, 3, … . . 𝐽,                                   (12) 
 
𝑝𝑓𝑗
∗ = 𝑤1 exp(𝜂1),                                                     (13) 
 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒,    𝜉 =  𝜂𝑗 −  𝜂1                                                 (14) 
 
where fj and f1 are the marginal products of input j and input 1, respectively; wj and w1 are 
prices of input j and input 1, respectively; and 𝜉 is allocative inefficiency for the input pair (j, 
1). The use of  allocative inefficiency in equation 12 which is defined by Schmidt and Lovell, 
(1979) is appropriate, because a producer is said to be allocatively inefficient if he fails to 
allocate input in a way that the ratio of input prices equates the marginal rate of substitution 
(MRTS).  
 









), where 𝑠𝑗 are cost shares of the input 𝑥𝑗 given the 












=  𝑤1exp (𝜂1)                                                    (16) 
 
Finally the primal system to be estimated can be obtained by taking logarithms of equations 
(15) and (16): 
𝑙𝑛 𝑠𝑗 − 𝑙𝑛𝑠1 = ln (
𝑤𝑗 
𝑤1
) + ln (
𝑥𝑗
𝑥1
) +  𝜉𝑗,             𝑗 = 2, … … … 𝐽                      (17) 
ln 𝑝 + 𝑙𝑛𝑠1 + ln 𝑦 − 𝑙𝑛𝑥1 − ln 𝑤1 =  𝜂1                                    (18) 




   
 
Econometric estimation of the primal system can be performed by considering a translog 
production function: 
ln 𝑦 =  𝛼0 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑗 ln 𝑥𝑗𝑗 +  
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑘 ln 𝑥𝑗𝑘𝑗 ln 𝑥𝑘 + 𝑣 − 𝑢                     (19) 
ln 𝑠𝑗 = ln 𝑠1 − ln (
𝑤𝑗
𝑤1
) − ln (
𝑥𝑗
𝑥1
) =  𝜉𝑗,           𝑗 =  2,3, … … … . . , 𝐽           (20) 
ln 𝑠1 = ln (
𝑤1
𝑝
) + ln 𝑥1 − ln 𝑦 +  𝜂1                                                         (21) 
Econometric estimation of the primal system described by equation (19) can be performed 
under the assumption that the error components have the following distributions: 
 
𝑣 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑉
2)                                                       (22) 
 
𝑢 ~ 𝑁+(0, 𝜎𝑉
2)                                                      (23) 
 
(𝜉′, 𝜂1)
′~ 𝑀𝑉 𝑁 (0, 𝛴)                                               (24) 
 
𝜂𝑗  𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑣 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑢 
 
where v is a vector of normally distributed random noises that capture specific heterogeneities 
of farmers; u is the vector of technical inefficiencies half-normally distributed; η is the vector 
of allocative inefficiencies; and the final assumption of 𝜂j is assumed to be independent for 
simplicity. We assume normal distributions on allocative errors since ξj can take both positive 
and negative values (meaning that inputs can be over- or underused) as suggested by 
Kumbhakar and Wang (2006). 
The likelihood function for the system is: 
𝐿 = 𝑓(𝑣 − 𝑢). 𝑔(𝜉′, 𝜂1). |𝐽|,                                       (25) 
where |J| is the determinant of the Jacobian matrix:  
|𝐽| = |(
𝜕(𝑣−𝑢,𝜉2,𝜉3,…,𝜉𝐽,𝜂1)
𝜕(ln 𝑦,ln 𝑥1,ln 𝑥2,……,ln 𝑥𝐽)
|                                         (26) 
The production parameters of the above model 𝛼𝑗 can be obtained by maximizing the above 
likelihood function. After estimation, the technical inefficiency, u, can be estimated using the 
Jondrow et al. (1982) formula that is ?̂? = 𝐸(𝑢|𝑣 − 𝑢) while the allocative inefficieny 𝜉𝑗 can 




   
 
be obtained from the residuals of the first-order condition in equation (19). Alternatively, one 
can estimate technical efficiency from 𝑇?̂? = 𝐸(exp(−𝑢|𝑣 − 𝑢).  
 
5.5 Static decomposition of competitiveness 
 5.5.1 Decomposition of PCB 
By linking both PAM and SFA methods, we can therefore derive the static decomposition of 
competitiveness or PCB into technical efficiency (TE). We use PCB as an indicator of 
competitiveness since it is calculated at the private prices which can be possibly comparable 
to efficiency estimates (i.e efficiency ultimately based on farm behavior in the face of private 
prices).   
The measurement of the technical efficiency as introduced by Farrell’s (1957) method 
measures each firm’s technical efficiency relative to the achieved frontier. The frontier 
represents a minimum input quantities per unit of output given the existing technology. 
Assume that we use two inputs to produce a unit of output, Farrell’s efficiency criterion can 
therefore be defined as; 
      
𝑟𝐾 + 𝑤𝐿
𝑄
                                                                       (27) 
where r is the rental cost of capital; w is the wage rate; K is the capital input; L is the labor 
input; and Q is the volume of output. Here, firms may also focus on the maximization of the 
value added at the market prices of a given input of domestic resources allocated to the 
production of traded goods. The unit isoquant according to Farrell (1957) can be constructed 
in the value added at market prices and efficiency criterion expresses as: 
     
𝑟𝐾 + 𝑤𝐿
𝑃𝑑𝑄 − ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑃𝑑𝑖𝑖
                                                            (28) 
where A is quantity of input i in the production of of output Q; 𝑃𝑑𝑖 is the market price of 
intermediate input i; and 𝑃𝑑 is the market price of output. This expression is the familiar of 




   
 
Private Cost Benefit or PCB
13
 that we have described earlier in Section 5.3. By assuming the 
relative market price of labour has declined, then in this case, firm would exhibit the 
minimum Private Resource Cost ratio. Minimizing the PCB in traded goods activities is 
equivalent to maximizing value added at market price per unit of domestic resource 
employed. Firms that have minimum private cost ratios have the highest levels of overall 
efficiency according to the Farrell criterion. The relationship between technical efficiency and 
PCB is thus can be straightforward. We can re-write equation (28) as; 
 𝑃𝐶𝐵 =   
𝑟𝐾 + 𝑤𝐿
𝑃𝑑𝑄 − ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑃𝑑𝑖𝑖
                                                      (29) 
 𝑃𝐶𝐵 =  𝑟𝐶𝐾 + 𝑤𝐶𝐿                                                          (30) 
where         
𝐶𝐾 =  
𝐾
(𝑃𝑑𝑄 − ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑃𝑑𝑖  )   𝑖
                                                (31) 
       
𝐶𝐿 =  
𝐿
(𝑃𝑑𝑄 − ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑃𝑑𝑖  )   𝑖
                                                (32) 
𝐶𝐾 and 𝐶𝐿 indicate the value added at market prices of the two input-output coefficients for 
capital and labor respectively. Taking the total differential of the equations above (29-32), the 







) 𝑑𝑘 + ((
𝜕𝐶𝐾
𝜕𝑚
) 𝑑𝑚] + 𝑤[(
𝜕𝐶𝐿
𝜕𝑘





(𝑃𝑑𝑄 −  ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑃𝑑𝑖  )   𝑖








































) 𝑑𝑚                       (34) 
                                                 
13
. The only different in Farrell (1957) is that under the distortions of output market and intermediate 
inputs, Farrell illustrates the measurement of social efficiency and focus on the maximization of the 
value added at the international prices which is analogously to the Domestic Resource Cost. 




   
 
Hence, equation (34) can be re-written and transformed into: 
𝑃𝐶?̂? =  𝜃𝐾?̂?𝐾 +  𝜃𝐿?̂?𝐿 + 𝜃𝐾?̂?𝐾 +  𝜃𝐿?̂?𝐿                                       (35) 
where 𝑃𝐶?̂? = 𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐵/𝑃𝐶𝐵 is the proportionate change in the private resource cost ratio; 
𝜃𝐾 = 𝑟𝐾/(𝑟𝐾 + 𝑤𝐿) is the share of capital costs in total factor private costs; and 𝜃𝐿 =













)𝑑𝑘  are  the proportionate changes in the coefficients of capital and labor 
arising from a change in capital-labor ratio; while k is the partial derivative notation that 






)𝑑𝑚 are the 
proportional changes in the output- input coefficients arising from technical efficiency (TE) 
improvements, m. 
The proportionate change in PCB is equal to the sum of of the proportionate changes in 
output-input coefficients of capital and labor weighted by their shares in total domestic 
private costs. Equation (35) will then reduce to the weighted sum of the proportionate changes 
in the output-input coefficients arising from technical efficiency improvements if relative 
factor proportions are held constant, i.e 𝑑𝑘 = 0. Therefore, a PCB value between zero and one 
indicates that a firm is efficient since the private opportunity cost of total factor inputs is less 
than contribution to the value added at market prices while a value greater than one indicates 
that a firm is inefficient.  
5.5.2 Decomposition of SCB 
By linking both SCB method which has been described in Section 5.3 and the profit 
maximization in Section 5.4.2, we can therefore derive the static decomposition of 
competitiveness which can be distinguished into technical and allocative efficiencies. Assume 




𝑖 , … . . 𝑥𝐿
𝑖 )′ ∈  𝑅+
𝐿 , to produce J outputs, y
i
 = (𝑦1
𝑖 , … … . . , 𝑦𝐽
𝑖)′ ∈ 𝑅. The SCB is 
simply the ratio of the social cost of producing one unit of an output, such as rice, to the social 
value of that unit of output: 
  𝑆𝐶𝐵 =
𝑤𝑥
𝑝𝑦
                                                               (36) 




   
 
where p is a vector of output prices; y is the level of production; w is the vector of input 
prices; x is the vector of inputs. An SCB value between zero and one indicates that the activity 
in question is competitive, while a value greater than one indicates that social cost exceeds 
social value and the activity is not competitive. 
  
Assume that the production technology is defined by an output set Y(x), representing the 
vector of outputs 𝑅+
𝐽
 that can be produced by an input vector 𝑅+
𝐿  and that all farms n have 
access to the same technology T that is 𝑇 ≡ {(𝑥, 𝑦): 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒 𝑦}. Following Fare and 
Grosskopf (1997) the profit function defined as: 
 
𝜋(𝑝, 𝑤) = sup {𝑝𝑦 − 𝑤𝑥: (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ 𝑇}                                          (37) 
that gives the ‘maximal’ profit given prices (p, w) and technology. With a suitable choice of 
direction for the classical technology distance functions, we can derive both output- and 
input-based Farrell decompositions of profit efficiency, respectively. We begin with the 
Shepard (1970) output distance function which can be defined as: 
𝐷𝑂(𝑥, 𝑦) = inf {𝜃 > 0: (𝑥,
𝑦
𝜃
) 𝜖 𝑇}                                             (38) 
and input distance function: 
𝐷𝑖(𝑥, 𝑦) = sup {⋋> 0: (
𝑥
⋋
, 𝑦) 𝜖 𝑇}                                            (39) 
where the scalars θ and ⋋ are the corresponding level of efficiency. The output distance 
function 𝐷𝑂(𝑥, 𝑦) seeks the largest proportional increase in the observed output vector y 
provided that the expanded vector (y/θ) is still an element of the original output set 
(Grosskopf et al. 1995). Similarly, the input distance function 𝐷𝑖(𝑥, 𝑦)seeks the radial 
contraction of inputs the farm should achieve to put on the frontier or to be considered as 
being input-efficient. If the farm is fully efficient, so that it is on the frontier, then  𝐷𝑂(𝑥, 𝑦) =
1 or 𝐷𝑖(𝑥, 𝑦) = 1 whereas 𝐷𝑂(𝑥, 𝑦) < 1 or 𝐷𝑖(𝑥, 𝑦) > 1 indicates the farm is inefficient. 
 
The reciprocal of the Shepard distance function is equivalent to a Farrell output-based 




                                                           (40) 




   
 




                                                             (41) 
                                                 
Given the profit frontier as expressed in (37) and the Shepard (1970) output and input 
distance function, the profit efficiency inequality as described by Farrell becomes:  
 






                                                                                                                                    (42) 
and  






                                                                (43) 
 
Combining expressions in (37), (40) or (41) and Farrell output-based or input-based revenue 
efficiency decomposition (42 or 43), we obtain:                                                                                                                          
𝜋(𝑝, 𝑤)
𝑝𝑦
+ 𝑆𝐶𝐵 ≥ 𝑇𝐸0 (𝑥, 𝑦)                                                   (44) 






 ≥ 𝑇𝐸𝑖 (𝑥, 𝑦)                                            (45) 
where SCB is a measure of competitiveness as defined in Section 5.3. Following Färe and 
Grosskopf (1997), these two equations gives Farrell output-based revenue efficiency 











= 𝑇𝐸𝑖 (𝑥, 𝑦). 𝐴𝐸𝑖                                           (47) 
Note that 𝐴𝐸0(𝐴𝐸𝐼) should be greater (less) or equal one. Equation 46 represents the profit 
efficiency which is the product of technical and allocative efficiencies in which we have 
presented in Section 5.4.2. Finally, by isolating SCB in (46 and 47) we obtain the following 
decompositions; 




   
 
𝑆𝐶𝐵 = 𝑇𝐸0 (𝑥, 𝑦). 𝐴𝐸0 −
𝜋(𝑝,𝑤)
𝑝𝑦
                                              (48) 
 
and                                                  
1
𝑆𝐶𝐵
= 𝑇𝐸𝑖 (𝑥, 𝑦). 𝐴𝐸𝑖 +
𝜋(𝑝,𝑤)
𝑤𝑥
                                                (49) 
 
5.6 Empirical Illustration 
This section applies our competitive analysis-based methodology and technical efficiency 
with both CFE and primal profit maximization estimates. The data was collected between 
2010 and 2014 from Malaysian rice farms, which consist of a representative farm panel of 




Our decomposition provides some insights into the origins of the Malaysian rice industry’s 
comparative advantage and efficiency. Figure 5.1 shows the average mean values of the PCB 
and SCB distributions that were collected during the given period.  
 
  
Figure 5.1: Distribution of rice farms’ competitiveness scores (PCB and SCB)  
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 Granary areas are the irrigated areas which refer to major irrigation schemes (areas greater than 
4,000 hectares) and recognized by the Government in the National Agricultural Policy as the main 
paddy producing areas (Department of Agriculture, 2014). 




   
 
During the expressed time period, the average PCB value was 0.94, indicating that rice 
production was competitive during the period. This implies that, on average, many more 
competitive farms disproportionately produced more rice outputs at private prices. However, 
at social prices, the average SCB value was 1.05, implying that rice production was slightly 
uncompetitive during the studied period. 
Additionally, the technical efficiency distribution generated by the CFE model shows that 
roughly 53% of the rice farms made improvements to their technical efficiency while more 
efficient farms disproportionately produced more outputs. 
 
Figure 5.2: Distribution rice farms’ technical efficiency, 2010-2014 
By linking the PCB method, as demonstrated in Section 5.3, and technical efficiency using 
the SFA method, shown in Section 5.4, and by interpreting the information derived from this 
decomposition, it is possible to comprehend both relationships to explore the extent to which 
variation in the level of technical efficiency affects the performance of a farm’s 
competitiveness, i.e. PCB. 
We used Spearman’s correlation to assess the relationship between PCB and TE. There is a 
negative correlation between these two variables, which is statistically significant, [rs = -
0.5969], (p = 0.000).  
The decomposition subplot portrayed in Figure 5.3 displays a scatter plot of PCB versus 
technical efficiency (TE). It demonstrates that competitive/comparative advantage (PCB<1) 




   
 
has a positive relationship with the level of technical efficiency. This implies that many farms 
with similar technical efficiency scores display high competitiveness, while very few farms 
nevertheless display a lower degree of competitiveness. In other words, farms that are closest 
to the frontier have better PCBs, but they still might have ‘bad’ PCBs relatively speaking: in 
other words they might be relatively efficient, but nonetheless not competitive. 
 
Figure 5.3: Demonstration of decomposition of competitiveness level (logPCB versus 
TE) 
Additionally, our decomposition provides some insights into the origins of the Malaysian rice 
industry’s comparative advantage and efficiency. The two dominant components of the 
decomposition of SCB are technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. The profit frontier is 
defined by input and output prices and available technology. That is, a farm can increase its 
profit through improvements in technical efficiency and through an optimal mix of inputs. 
However, instead of examining whether profits can be achieved and by how much, the farm 
can consider what drives the loss of profit- is technical inefficiency or is the problem 
primarily allocative inefficiency, as expressed by equation (48) or (49). In this analysis, the 
loss of profit due to technical and allocative inefficiencies experienced by Malaysian rice 
farms is demonstrated in Figure 5.4. The profit loss due to technical inefficiency is about 50% 
while 169% of potential profit loss is due to allocative inefficiency (Table 5.2).  
 




   
 
 
Figure 5.4: Distributions of Technical Inefficiency (TI) and Allocative Inefficiency (AI) 
Source: Own estimation 
 
Table 5.2: Profit loss due to technical inefficiency, allocative inefficiency or both 
  





  Percentiles Smallest   Percentiles Smallest   Percentiles Smallest 
1% 0.19 0.05   0.00 0.00   0.26 0.23 
5% 0.22 0.13   0.01 0.00   0.30 0.23 
10% 0.25 0.13   0.01 0.00   0.33 0.23 
25% 0.33 0.14   0.04 0.00   0.39 0.24 
                  
50% 0.47     0.17     0.57   
    Largest     Largest     Largest 
75% 0.65 0.99   0.72 168.69   0.96 19.05 
90% 0.80 0.99   3.20 171.07   1.77 19.70 
95% 0.86 0.99   6.95 266.94   2.64 22.28 
99% 0.94 0.99   25.48 353.62   5.48 27.26 
  Mean 0.50   Mean 1.69   Mean 0.92 
  Std. Dev. 0.20   Std. Dev. 8.65   Std. Dev. 1.18 
 




   
 
To further illustrate a static relationship, we developed a simple model based on fixed effect 
panel model. For this purpose, we used PCB as the dependent variable since this is the actual 
market price that farmers actually received while participating in the system and the reference 
for the comparison between different farms (their individual PCB and efficiency scores) is the 
current domestic competition within Malaysia. The model can be defined as; 
logYit = αi + βjXjit+ εit                                                   (50) 
Yit is farm i’s PCB in period t; Xit is a vector of exogenous explanatory variables (technical 
efficiency, farm size, hired cost labor, distance to milling factories and a time trend); αi 
captures unobserved and time constant farm specific effects; and εit is an idiosyncratic error 
term. The estimated fixed effect equations yield the following results; 
 
Table 5.3: Results of static decompositions of competitiveness 
Dependent log(PCB) 




















   
(0.0135) 
Cost of labor 
  
0.0004*** 






















Note: Standard errors are in the parentheses. *** p < 0.001. 
 
Since the greater values of the PCB scores (PCB > 1) indicate less competitiveness, a positive 
estimated coefficient indicates that explanatory variables in question increase PCB scores and 
therefore have a negative influence on competitiveness. The results show that the estimated 
coefficients of technical efficiency in both models are negative and strongly significant at the 




   
 
1% level. The TE coefficient indicates that a 1% increase in technical efficiency will lead to a 
38% decrease in the PCB unit, assuming that all other variables remain constant. This 
outcome implies a relationship between high levels of efficiency and lower scores of PCB and 
indicates a higher competitiveness, thus confirming our prior hypothesis on static 
decomposition. We anticipated this relationship and it goes in the predicted direction, 
however, other factors also influence the PCB.  
 
Although, beyond the application of simple regression, if we are interested in identifying 
competitive farms we can do PAM analysis that gives the ranking and by simply performing 
the rank correlation of technical efficiency, we can identify the farms that are in the top 10% 
tier of competitiveness are also generally in the top 10% of technical efficiency. However, 
what other factors beyond a farm’s technical efficiency can explain its competitiveness? 
Technical efficiency should be able to explain this relationship; if farms are not technically 
efficient, then they are not receiving the most possible output for a given number of inputs, 
therefore not receiving the most possible revenue for the given cost, and thus such farms 
cannot be profitable if they are not technically efficient. Nevertheless, if the regression shows 
that profitability is 70% accounted for by technical efficiency, the question is, where is the 
remaining 30%? This could be due to some other variations or factors that influence 
competitiveness. Farms that are technically inefficient could still be profitable by 
compensating and excelling in other areas. This possibility is something that we cannot 
directly measure; it could also be the outcome of unexplained variations or the result of the 
measured factors, such as scale efficiency or allocative efficiency. This can be achieved with 
the use of the Stochastic Frontier Analysis, which allows for the more efficient use of inputs 




In this paper we have demonstrated how one can use two alternative methods or tools to 
explain comeptitiveness, i.e PAM analysis as well as a more sophisticated SFA method. By 
linking both approaches, we have proposed a method for a static decomposition of 
competitiveness measured by the Private Cost Benefit (PCB) into  technical efficiency (TE). 




   
 
Our motivation was a belief that technical efficiency positively contributes to 
competitiveness.  
 
Our empirical application of the technique to the rice sector in Malaysia for the period 2010-
2014 provides an illustration of the utility of the methods. The results broadly indicate that a 
change in the level of technical efficiency is the major source of change in competitiveness 
and account for a relatively lower PCB ratio. Technical efficiency displays a negative and 
significant effect on PCB, which implies higher efficiencies lead to lower PCB values and 
thus increases in overall competitiveness. The results of the preceding analysis suggest that 
the level of comparative/competitive advantage may be an equally important determinant of 
technical efficiency in rice production in Malaysia, which is explained by 65% of the 
technical efficiency. However, the other 35% of profitability or competitiveness might be 
explained by the other factors such as scale or allocative efficiency.  
It is evident that these two methods are not substitutes, but they are complements. Whether or 
not a farm is technically efficient does affect PCB; however that’s not all. There are some 
other variations or factors that could explain the remaining profitability or competitiveness. 
We could use PAM or PCB to explain competitiveness in certain settings; however we would 
have to conduct SFA ahead to get additional information on the other factors that might be 
influencing PCB or competitiveness.  
 
Each of these approaches is characterized by important strengths and weaknesses. The main 
advantage of PAM is that it is simple and intuitively easy to use and to explain to the lay 
people than to technical or scientists which are commonly attached to a more sophisticated 
SFA method. The result of PAM is easily communicable and the intuitiveness of the results 
and its applicability contribute to its consideration in fulfilling the information needs 
especially for consulting and policy makers’ dialogues. In some cases, then it might be almost 
better to use PAM rather than sophisticated SFA modeling. However, instead of its simple 
conception, PAM also suffers from the limitation of the Leontief fixed input-output 
coefficients which do not take into account the changes in domestic prices as well as the 
difficulty in estimating social prices. On the other hand, the more sophisticated analytical 
approach such as profit or distance function approach is hardly being applied and relatively 




   
 
difficult to understand and explain due to its complexity and rigorously mathematical 
programming or calculations.  
Our discussions on these two approaches and how they are linked may help policy makers 
and others make better use of one or the other measure. Although they reveal important 
differences between the two sets of estimates, both approaches point to a fairly similar result 
or conclusion on the competitiveness. Therefore, it is suggested that further efforts should be 
made to combine the advantages of existing methodologies and to improve the collection, 




























   
 
Appendices  
Appendix 5.1: Demonstration of decomposition of PCB, 2010-2014 
 
Appendix 5.2: Demonstration of decomposition of SCB, 2010- 2014 
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Chapter 6  
Concluding Remarks 
 
This dissertation presents four selected studies on the topic of the “competitiveness and 
efficiency of rice production in Malaysia”. Chapter 2 analyses the profitability and 
competitiveness of the rice sector using the Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) developed by 
Monke and Pearson (1989) and aggregated data. Chapter 3 extends the PAM method by 
performing a disaggregated competitiveness analysis and analysing the determinants of 
competitiveness. Chapter 4 examines the performance of a rice farm using an efficiency 
analysis. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation by linking both competitiveness and 
efficiency analyses using a static decomposition of competitiveness. In this section, we 
present a summary of the main results and their implications, discuss the limitations and 
challenges of the estimations, and present recommendations for future work.  
 
6.1 Key contributions and summary  
Rice is the most important source of livelihood and is a major source of employment for more 
than 100,000 farmers and agricultural workers in Malaysia. It accounts for about 9% of the 
country’s gross value added in agriculture and is grown on approximately 1.8 million hectares 
of arable land (FAO, 2001). Rice is also the main source of caloric intake for many 
Malaysians, contributing to nearly half of the average Malaysian’s total caloric intake per day. 
Malaysia’s agro-climatic and geographical location provides the basis for the country’s 
potential in agricultural production. The tropical climate and suitable soil conditions are 
favorable for the development and growth of the tropical rice crop. The country lies entirely 
in the equatorial zone with uniform temperatures, high humidity and a long wet season. The 
copious rainfall is an important water source necessary for the successful cultivation of rice. 
Hence, the rice sector plays a notable role in the society and government’s agricultural 
policies and interventions aim to achieve “several, often conflicting, objectives”, including the 
augmentation of farmers’ incomes, delivering quality products at low prices to consumers, 





   
 
However, despite its high dependency on the importation of rice, the country continues its 
aggresive pursuit of rice self-sufficiency, which involves the commitment to end rice imports 
and become 100% self-sufficient in terms of rice production by the year 2020. The most 
impeding constraint to Malaysia’s competitiveness is that the country’s endowment of natural 
advantage and agro-climatic conditions do not automatically yield sufficient qualities of 
complementary efforts, including a coherent policy framework, facilities and transport 
infrastructures, as well information and marketing systems, all of which are essential to the 
establishment of a competitive rice sector. 
 
The recent free trade agreements, including the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) and 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) accession, offer attractive opportunities, but also pose 
challenges for the Malaysian rice sector as it must compete with other low-cost exporting 
countries. This implies that not only structural changes in trade, but also adjustments at the 
farm-level are needed to improve the sector’s efficiency and competitiveness. Further 
developments in the rice sector will, therefore, depend on the availability of adequate supplies 
of relatively low-cost and high-quality rice, or in other words, on the competitiveness of rice 
production. This dissertation offers an analytical work to provide new insights into this issue 
and the opportunities for improvement as well as the determinants of Malaysia’s rice 
competitiveness.  
 
In the first paper, the Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) indicator using aggregate data is 
employed to shed light on the competitiveness of Malaysia’s rice sector. The main conclusion 
is that rice production demonstrates modest international competitiveness.  The empirical 
results show that three out of four granary areas have comparative advantages in the 
production of rice with Domestic Resource Cost values, or DRCs, of less than one. The farms 
located in these areas produce a net surplus for the entire country. In the remaining region, 
rice farming appears to be marginally competitive and imparts relatively low social profits. 
 
For the second paper, we essentially continued the analysis performed in the first paper and 
focused on a disaggregated competitiveness analysis and the determinants of rice 
competitiveness in Malaysia. The weakness of the DRC method is that it is based on average, 





   
 
be misleading as the variations across heterogeneous producers grow. For this reason, we 
employed the Social Benefit Cost (SCB) indicator using farm-level survey data to generate 
SCB distributions that demonstrate the competitiveness of rice production in Malaysia. The 
results of the SCB analysis reveal that a large proportion of farms are able to produce rice 
competitively; more than 60% of rice farmers produced rice competitively over the period 
from 2010 to 2013 and these competitive farms produced a disproportionately large number 
of the total rice production (80%) each year. The only exception was in 2014, where 48% of 
the farms that were identified as competitive accounted for 71% of the total rice production. 
From 2012 to 2014, the SCB scores based on average revenue and cost data were greater than 
1. This indicates that social revenue was not enough to cover the social value added, 
suggesting these farms are losing their international competitiveness, in other words they are 
uncompetitive. However, the SCB distributions based on disaggregated data revealed that 
many farms were competitive and these competitive farms accounted for a disproportionately 
large share of rice production during that period. Hence, the competitive farms, on average, 
tend to produce more rice than non-competitive farms. This information highlights the 
primary advantage of using disaggregated SCB distributions and avoids the pitfalls working 
with the average data. In the second stage of the analysis, we further analysed the factors that 
might influence a farm’s degree of competitiveness. The available evidence suggests that 
participation in the farmers’ organization, gender and farm size are the major determinants of 
rice competitiveness, while the increasing travel distance to rice mills, off-farm income and 
the use of hired labour may reduce competitiveness. 
 
For the third paper, we performed an efficiency analysis method to measure the technical 
efficiency of the performance of Malaysia’s rice farms. The framework provided in the paper 
took unobserved heterogeneity into account using the recent fixed effect model (Chen et al, 
2014); the cases in which managerial characteristics and environmental conditions are not 
observed are assumed to be constant or different for each rice farm. This is crucial 
considering the panel data collections provided by developing countries are significantly 
costlier and some important attributes may not exist. Therefore, the model allows for 
unobserved heterogeneity and the estimation is free of incidental parameters. In the 
observation period from 2010 to 2014, technical efficiency appearead to be fluctuate in rice 





   
 
2011 and increased steadily for the next two years, before it declined again in 2014. However, 
the low mean values of technical efficiency change (TEC) further revealing that the frontier is 
shifting inward and some farms are essentially moving farther from the frontier.  
 
In the second stage of the analysis, we examine the factors that account for the variations in 
inefficiencies across the farms as well as their potential to improve efficiency and resources 
using an a fixed effect panel regression. Our empirical results indicate that access to credit, 
non-farm income, farm size and hired labor are the major determinants of technical efficiency. 
The potential for increasing individual farm output varies considerably since many farms 
became much better while others became much worse. Government support such as input 
subsidies, credit facilities, distance to the rice mills and off-farm activities are identified as 
important factors causing variations in the level of technical efficiency among rice farmers. 
Furthermore, the scale elasticity of 1.49 indicates a strong economy of scale; in which outputs 
can be increased with more than proportionate increases in inputs. This is imperative 
considering that rice production in Malaysia is small and most of the farmers might depend on 
capital and other inputs which necessitates a serious policy recommendation. It is possible to 
achieve more if the provisions of inputs particularly mechanization and transport facilities as 
well as improvement in high-yielding rice variety are further well distributed and reinforced 
in the future so that it will help to increase the overall efficiency of rice production in 
Malaysia. 
 
Finally, the fourth paper links the two strands of analysis on competitiveness. The first strand 
of the literature focuses on the analysis of comparative advantages/competitiveness, while the 
second strand emphasizes the efficiency analysis where the concept of technical efficiency is 
of prime interest. To demonstrate this relationship, we proposed a static decomposition of the 
PCB into technical efficiency. Our result demonstrates that technical efficiency positively 
contributes to competitiveness, thus confirming the common perception of the static 
decomposition. By comparing PCB and TE, our result reveals a clear relationship between 
competitiveness and efficiency, however higher technical efficiency alone does not translated 
into higher competitiveness. The low R-square indicates that other unexplained variations 
may exist or perhaps other factors may affect this relationship such as scale efficiency, 





   
 
fixed effect panel regression. This leads us to conclude that both approaches (PAM analysis 
and SFA method) are not substituted but they are rather complementing. We use PCB to 
explain competitiveness in certain settings; however we would have to conduct SFA ahead to 
get additional information on the other factors that might be influencing PCB or 
competitiveness.  
 
6.2 Policy implications and options 
Factors like a lack of coherent policy action, poor transportation and infrastructure, low 
availability of credit and marketing, and information asymmetries exacerbate the underlying 
barriers to achieving rice competitiveness that are listed in Section 6.1. These barriers can be 
diminished or even eliminated with better political leadership capable of setting a new frontier 
and priorities with the past misallocation as well as working hand-in-hand with partners (i.e., 
international institutions) and various stakeholders to balance their priorities and provide 
insightful information and funding, while simultaneously minimizing the repercussions of the 
development of agricultural competitiveness in Malaysia. 
 
Since the inception of the AFTA, in compilation with the trade liberalization fostered by the 
WTO, rice tariffs have been reduced to 0-5% for all trading partners in the region. Regardless, 
in the major rice importing countries, such as Malaysia, rice is considered highly vulnerable 
to food security and, therefore, is subject to up to 20% tariffs. Both the WTO accession and 
on-going negotiations on a free trade agreement with ASEAN countries will require further 
improvements in productivity and competitiveness at the farm-level. In particular, the 
conditions of Malaysia’s accession to the WTO include the commitment to reducing trade 
distortions and interventions on agricultural markets, a strategy which policymakers have 
employed in the rice sector in recent years. Consequently, import barriers such as seeds, agri-
chemicals and agricultural machineries which make imports are expensive and lessens 
competitiveness should be reduced.  
 
According to Malaysia’s WTO Trade Report Review (2014), the total support given to 
agriculture consisted of reduction commitments amounting to 1 billion Ringgit Malaysia 
(RM). Of this, approximately 74% was related to Green Box assistance, mainly in the form of 





   
 
support (incentives or bonus payments for paddy rice production) remained the largest part of 
expenditures (480 million RM) followed by the fertilizer subsidy (465 million RM). This 
form of agricultural support has cost Malaysian agriculture billions of RM in revenue. Since 
our preliminary evidence indicates that many rice farmers are socially competitive, the 
subsidization and price support of rice production, which are poorly targeted and distort 
incentives, should be phased out.  This could be replaced with targeted, direct income support 
and income stabilisation measures.  
 
Further efforts are required to reduce marketing margins and farm gate prices that may reduce 
competitiveness; this could be accomplished by upgrading local storage facilities, 
transportation infrastructure and the logistics associated with the rice delivery system and 
marketing chain. Postharvest and value addition are integral components of strategies to 
improve agricultural productivity and linkages between farmers and the markets. The causes 
of storage losses and waste are principally connected to the managerial and technical 
limitations of harvesting techniques, storage and cooling facilities in difficult climatic 
conditions, infrastructure, packaging and marketing systems (Kiaya, 2014). Proper drying and 
transport facilities are therefore important to minimize storage/postharvest losses. In addition, 
a well-developed system of transport and infrastructure, including quality roads, ports, or air 
transport, reduces the distance between regions and integrates national markets as well as 
facilitates the movement of rice outputs to the market in a secure and timely manner. 
 
Financial support and agricultural credit for rice farmers needs to be emphasized further. The 
current policy of subsidization on credit is given at interest rates of 4.5% per season. 
However, for many small farmers who harvest less than 3t/ha per season, a lack of finance 
and collateral has forced them to borrow money from relatives or family members instead of 
from agricultural credit institutions. Therefore, a strategy for coping with this problem would 
be for the government to offer loans with lower or zero interest rates, which should be granted 
regardless of a farmer’s capital (this is especially relevant for small farmers). Similarly, the 
acquisition of flexible agricultural credit schemes will allow farmers to better access and 






   
 
Additionally, more investments in research and development (R&D) are required to enhance 
competitiveness. It is important that public and private sectors play important roles in 
supporting and nurturing an environment that is conducive to innovative activity. This 
progression requires access to complementary inputs and sufficient investments, especially by 
the private sectors. This includes high-quality research institutions and universities to inject 
local communities with knowledge, and an expansion of human capital used to build new 
technologies. Extensive collaborative actions between universities and industries in research 
and technological developments are additionally necessitated. A review of the analysis on the 
disaggregated competitiveness reveals that there is some variability in the average SCB ratios 
from year to year that could be explained by other factors such as weather conditions 
(monsoons during the main season and drought during the off-season) and pest attacks. 
Therefore, further research and experimentation that are applicable to specific local conditions  
are  required to ensure that their durability in a variety of local conditions as well as for the 
adaptation to general agriculture environments such as temperature, soil, water conditions and 
local pests.  
 
Between 2010 and 2014, the mean values of  technical efficiency  in the rice production were 
50 to 60 percent. This average masks important differences among rice farms and points to 
substantial scope for further efficiency improvement. This has certainly implications for the 
efficiency-enhancing policies in the country. Furthermore, the findings on the estimates scale 
elasticities deserve further attention in policy-decision making. Apparently, there is a strong 
trend towards increasing returns to scale. The outputs elasticities of the inputs are higher 
especially for capital and seed. Correspondingly, the positive elasticity of land indicates that 
land is an important input which represents a high cost share (particularly for the rice farming 
with low land endowment) such that it is farmed intensively. This suggests the  role of 
policies in fostering efficiency of the inputs and creating an enabling environments in terms of 
infrastructure and capital as well as access to the input resources  that provide adequate 
incentives for the farmers particularly small farmers to invest in productive inputs. 
Accordingly, this should be a strong signal for the government to change priorities in budget 
allocations by providing more funds in investment that could enhance the technical efficiency 






   
 
6.3 Data limitations and methodological issues 
Due to the fact that the production of rice provides the majority of agricultural and economic 
opportunities in the case study region, this dissertation focuses on the competitiveness and 
efficiency of rice production. Using the extension of the Policy Analysis Matrix approach, 
which is based on the disaggregate competitiveness analysis, we demonstrate a simple and 
effective way to estimate competitiveness. Additionally, our research allowed us to determine 
how to take unobserved heterogeneity in the recent fixed model to analyse technical 
efficiency into account. Although our analysis sheds some insight into the constraints of 
competitiveness and efficiency in the context of the rice sector, and provide policy 
recommendations for future intervention programs, we acknowledge several limitations of 
this study. 
 
First, the study only focuses on one granary area although there are eight granary areas in 
Malaysia that are projected to be completely self-sufficient in rice production by the year 
2020. Therefore, the dataset is not representative of Malaysia as a whole. The results 
presented in this study are situation specific and cannot be extrapolated to other states or 
granaries with different settings and conditions. The results of a similar study conducted in 
other regions of Malaysia might differ to those presented in Chapter 3 depending on the 
context and situation of the study. Of course, different granaries may vary with respect to 
farm structure, management, soil condition, climate or temperature, and on-farm practices. 
The study should be repeated at different ecological zones and areas in order to generate more 
information on overall competitiveness of rice production in Malaysia. 
 
Second, the SGMM estimation provides an appropriate framework to analyse the 
determinants of change in competitiveness, but certainly it does not capture all aspects of this 
process. While this study identifies and analyses the factors that could explain the variation in 
competitiveness among rice farms, it omitted many factors associated with a lack of data 
regarding biophysical conditions such as soil, climate, pests, diseases, and other 
characteristics of the farmers including age, experience and education level. These factors are 






   
 
Additionally, the average mean value of efficiency found in rice farming was much lower 
during 2010 to 2014, while the variations in technical efficiency scores were much higher. 
These divergences are likely to be associated with the effect of unobserved heterogeneity that 
are not accounted in this model i.e, although the analyses account for the individual effect, the 
performance among the farms may differ a lot. For the rice production in Malaysia, natural 
conditions such as weather, pest attacks, the spread of disease and managerial skills are likely 
to account for this inefficiency performance. The full potential of production is not utilized in 
the analysis presumably due to either the omission or the lack of data available on these 
natural conditions and the management that is not completely captured by the noise 
component. This is reflected by the MADA dataset analyzed in Chapter 4. Many data sets are 
incomplete or indicate obvious errors that might also affect our estimation on technical 
efficiency.  
 
Finally, as shown in Chapter 5, we attempted to relate technical efficiency and 
competitiveness in the static case. To do this, we decomposed the PCB measure into technical 
efficiency. In other words, this distinction demonstrates how efficiently farms utilize the 
inputs they possess to produce the maximum of possible outputs. While the results confirm 
the perception of the static competitiveness that exists in the relevant literature, they do not 
demonstrate the dynamic pattern of the competitiveness growth. The theoretical background 
of efficiency and the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is well-established (Fare and Primont, 
1995: Kumbhakar et al, 2007). The extension of the dynamic or productivity decomposition 
can address the mixtures of output and input as well as the potential determinants of 
competitiveness (Nishimizu and Page, 1986: Bruemmer et al, 2002). Nevertheless, the 
ignorance of such effects and concepts is predominantly due to the limitations of the data and 
insufficient technical knowledge on the correct measurement of outputs and inputs as well as 
dynamic decomposition that is ultimately dependent on data sources.  
 
6.4 Directions for future research  
Since we performed a disaggregated competitiveness analysis, the impacts of policies and 
other determinants on farm competitiveness can be monitored by extending the SCB 
distributions introduced in this study as new years of detailed farm-level data become 





   
 
generate long-term panel data and information on year-to-year fluctuations such as the years 
leading up to the 2008 food crisis, during the food crisis, and the period after the food crisis. 
To provide a sounder basis for the interpretation of the data as it pertains to future rice 
developments, a more detailed analysis could further disaggregate SCB distributions by 
region, farm size, and each individual product. An interesting follow-up work could also be 
conducted on overall farm competitiveness. Some of the farms may produce multiple outputs 
and hence, the incentives might vary depending on, for example, the degree of specialization 
and technological requirements. Therefore, one might compare the distributions of 
competitiveness scores for each individual product and for the whole farm. 
 
In this study, we performed an analysis using a large dataset exclusively covering a five-year 
period. The implications of the policy are informative; however, they must be interpreted with 
caution especially if one wants to relate to the determinants of technological improvements. 
The process of technology adoption usually takes longer and requires longer panel data to 
generate more information and implications at the farm-level. Given the availability of 
sufficiently long panels, a potential work could investigate the dynamic decomposition of 
productivity growth and the performance patterns of rice production in Malaysia. This way, 
we could obtain a detailed analysis of the sources of productivity growth, including technical 
change, technical efficiency change and returns to scale, which can shed light on the sources 
of differences in technological gaps or improvements. 
 
Moreover, further research could be done with respect to explaining the potential 
determinants of the rice sector’s competitiveness in Malaysia as a whole. This study can be 
replicated and extended to the different granary areas or different systems of rice production 
(irrigated or rain-fed). Nonetheless, the level of competitiveness might differ across regions, 
and may depend on natural conditions, management practices and postharvest losses that 
occur over time. Improvements to such estimation will provide a more practical interpretation 
and comparison of the competitiveness of rice production, which in turn will confirm the 
results of this study. 
 
The framework that we used in Chapter 4 regarding the recent fixed effect model (Chen et al, 





   
 
in the panel data. Assuming that unobserved heterogeneity is time-invariant is more of a 
philosophical issue (Chen et al, 2014). For the farm-level data, this assumption is acceptable 
since many unobserved characteristics are fixed for either a certain period or only in the short-
run. In the context of the long series of agricultural data, the acceptance of persistent technical 
inefficiency within this problem seems more problematic (Colombi et al, 2014). Farms that 
exhibit a constant level of inefficiency are likely to drop out of the competition and exit the 
markets, which subsequently leads to the farm’s restricted access to technology and market 
failure. Accordingly, future research should address these consequences in productivity 
analysis and the necessity of improving farm or sectoral data quality and comparability should 
also be fortified further. 
 
Finally, we demonstrate the link between competitiveness and technical efficiency and how 
these two approaches (PAM analysis and SFA method) are related. We use PCB and SCB as 
indicators to explain competitiveness while SFA approach to estimate technical efficiency. 
Nevertheless, the decomposition of SCB is quite complex and proved to be challenging. The 
use of primal profit maximization is intuitive since it avoids the problem of large variations in 
prices, which is commonly occurring in practice. However, beyond its implementation, it 
requires rigorous mathematical programming and strong economic foundation. Alternatively, 
one could possibly decompose SCB using the cost function or cost-share equation or 
production frontier which requires less severe exercise when estimating both technical 
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